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Reckoning With Life

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TO
HENRY MATHER WARREN
WHOSE INTEREST IN PHILOSOPHY
HAS BEEN AN INSPIRATION

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PREFACE

IN taking up a book of serious intent such as this, a reader has a right to know at the start what the writer hopes to accomplish.

My purpose in writing is fairly definite. Progress in the sciences has been amazingly rapid; and at every marked advance questions have arisen that affect the conceptions by which we live. The old forms have seemed inadequate to hold the new truths. We are bewildered and not sure of ourselves. Doubt has eaten its way into the very substance of our beliefs; and, as a consequence, hesitancy characterizes our conduct when we are called upon to face great moral issues. Social enterprises that aim at building a better civilization are tragically weak. Justice and friendly coöperation, which would bring an era of peace and prosperity for all, have had scant opportunity to show what they could do.

I believe that one of the main reasons for this moral impotency is the lack of a well-grounded philosophy of life. But a philosophy of life is an intellectual undertaking and must proceed by a critical weighing of all pertinent evidence. As conclusions are expected to hold against every demurrer, criticism should never be evaded, for it serves to expose any flaw in the argument. Such a philosophy of life has been the task of the centuries. Every position has been defended and as-

sailed until the layman knows not what to think.

But underlying the conflict of opinion there are certain established insights. These should be brought together and viewed in their supporting relationships to yield the needed assurance. In the following attempt at such a synthesis I have tried to express myself in language easily understood, in order that thoughtful readers, though not familiar with a philosophical jargon, may follow the argument and test it for themselves. I have been more interested in a constructive presentation than in negative lines of thought. Hence treatment of opposing theories has been confined to crucial differences that need consideration in the building up of the general argument. I have been mindful that the present age calls for brevity and streamlining.

As my interest lies in man and his future, I use the term life to include the entire compass of human activities, intelligent and intelligible. What life is we find out by living. Long-continued search into the nature of the forces that condition us has brought me increasing conviction that life as a whole has a meaning, and that it is possible to get some adumbration of what that meaning is. Moreover, I believe that if we live in the light of that meaning, we may find abiding comfort therein. My purpose is to set forth the empirical support for this belief. Hence I start with a study of our perceptual experience. Here we are all on common ground and can find a firm basis for theory.

In apprehending the outside world, we begin

immediately, even if for the most part subconsciously, to distinguish between this experience and flights of fancy which beguile our idle moments. There is a compulsion about our apprehending the external objects, and an absence of compulsion in the flights of fancy. In the one situation something not ourselves controls us; in the other there is no empirical evidence of such control. This primary distinction enables us to affirm, without fear of effective contradiction, that we are in contact with some power or energy that conditions our every perception. The basic experiences of life result from an interchange of influences between ourselves and this controlling power.

The next consideration is: What are we, who have the experiences? It seems a mistake to adopt any of the extrusive conceptions of the self—equating it with the body or with experience, or making it an entity that somehow exists whether active or not. We experience ourselves as experiencing. Our experiences do not come detached, unowned, as floating islands of activity, proceeding from nothing, expressing nothing. They are permeated with our own creativity and valuation. Assuming, then, that experience implies an experient, I consider the various types of activity that constitute the life of an experient and infer therefrom what sort of nature the self must have.

In Part Three the field is more speculative. Here are presented three great problems that have long perplexed the minds of men and still retain their interest—the significance of evil, the possibility

of a future life, and the nature of the ultimate ground of all that is. In discussing these questions, we cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, get beyond the tentative. But I hope that some light can be thrown on them by the conclusions reached in Parts One and Two.

Most of the insights herein set forth I owe to earlier writers. I have pondered these insights long, until they have combined into a harmonious whole that hardly belongs to any of the traditional schools. A casual reader may put the book aside as one more vain attempt to solve the riddle of the universe. But, as has frequently happened in my university classes, a persistent student who is willing to allow time for gradual transformation of his ways of thinking may get invigorating satisfaction from these views. He is likely to discover that the conclusions afford answers that seem to do justice to both sides in various long-standing debates. I refer to such theoretical questions as these: Is a monistic or dualistic theory of knowledge to be accepted? Is there a psychic element in all forms of nature? Is beauty subjective or does it inhere in the object? Is our knowledge that other minds exist immediate or inferential? The persevering thinker may find also that along this path some ethical and religious matters are seen in clearer light.

To my constant collaborator I am so deeply indebted that only her wish restrains me from adding her name on the title page.

GEORGE ARTHUR WILSON

Cambridge, Massachusetts

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

By quotation from other writers one gets an attenuated form of Platonic dialogue. It is a pleasure to express appreciation and thanks to the following publishers for permission to quote from works issued by them: The Macmillan Company; Henry Holt and Company; Prentice-Hall, Inc.; Charles Scribner's Sons; Abingdon-Cokesbury Press; Columbia University Press; Thomas Y. Crowell Company; Harper & Brothers; Little, Brown & Company; Longmans, Green & Company; W. W. Norton & Company; The Open Court Publishing Company; D. Van Nostrand Company.

PART ONE

NATURE

CHAPTER I

ACCOUNTING FOR SENSE PERCEPTION

I

FROM infancy on we are continuously facing the task of adjusting ourselves to the world about us. If conditions are favorable, as is the case for those who live in a settled and prosperous community, we feel secure and can develop interests in great variety—social, scientific, aesthetic, religious. But if anything happens to disturb this assurance, we become uneasy and are ready to turn from our other pursuits in order to restore that physical security which is the basis of worth-while existence. Hence an effort to set forth a consistent view of life may well begin with a study of nature, that is, the external world as it appears in sense perception and as it is analyzed by the scientist.

To begin by studying our sense world has obvious advantages. First, we deal with elementary experiences, common to all human beings. We do not ask, "What is the nature of being?" and by analysis of the notion try to determine what reality must be. Nor do we at the start raise the issue as to what the knowing entity called the self may be. Nor do we lay down as fundamental the proposition that an ultimate power exists, a most real being, and then proceed to formulate a theory of man and nature. Any one of these starting points

is beset with embarrassing problems that are sufficient to paralyze thought. Second, so much work has been done in the field of sense perception that we may benefit by the critical scrutiny and thorough analyses from a long past.

After a careful survey of the world as revealed in sense perception and after a search there for the meanings that make life what it is, we shall be prepared to take up the complexities of life in the higher forms of its manifestation. Meanings exist for the interpreter. They express cognitive and other values that the thing-world may have. They survive the changes in things, and may have a permanent significance. While attention is focused on external objects, the self as interpreter can safely be ignored, because it functions whenever we think at all, and it functions unobtrusively. To discover it we must reverse the usual direction of our thinking. Then the self appears as the *sine qua non* of experience. Before our task is done, we shall come upon the problem of destiny. As we face the future, we have nothing to guide us except carefully wrought-out conclusions from the past and the present, however confusing the jumble of things and jangle of voices. The soundest convictions emerge from a critical study of life as it is lived.

2

WHAT are the general features that all recognize as constituting the world of sense perception? It lies spread out before us in every direction. It appears as a countless number of things with manifold

characteristics and relations. It endures through time; and it is active throughout, for it is constantly changing.

One is impressed at the start with the immense complexity of this world as it presents itself to an observant person. It includes not only the purely physical but the organic and the human. Since, however, the human rests upon the organic, and the organic upon the physical, we may profitably begin our analysis by a study of the physical features of our sense world and leave the others for consideration later.

This physical world seems to speak to us directly and make itself known as it really is. We do not normally experience any effort in seeing objects that are in full view, nor are we aware of any constructive mental activity in apprehending their various characteristics, their changes, and their relations to one another. They are just there. We perceive them as a matter of course because we are in a position to take note. But this naïve conception of our relation to the physical world cannot hold out long against the shafts of critical thinking.

At the outset, questions multiply in bewildering profusion. What are physical things? How can they remain the same and yet change? What is the relation of their present to their past? How can they exist as past? If their existence is all in the present, what do we mean by calling them substantial things? What is the relation of the individual thing to its attributes or states? How do we know that things are out there in space where we see them?

These questions and many others that arise indicate the difficulty of our problem.

Let us examine briefly some of the representative theories of sense perception.

The popular explanation is that the world of objects in its substantial character lies all about us, and that we come to apprehend these objects by a complex process of mediation. The objects declare themselves to us by reflecting the light that falls upon them, by resisting pressure, by resounding when struck, and so on. Something in the form of waves reaches us, and, using the sensory organs as media, causes us to apprehend the objects. This theory explains the perception of sense objects without assuming anything beyond what might inhere in physical nature. It has, therefore, when worked out with scientific exactness of observation, been useful as a description of the way in which activities are linked.

Yet when we ask, not how the objects of our world are connected and how our psychophysical organism functions, but how we come to know that such objects as constitute our physical world actually exist for us and how we may distinguish them as apparently independent things from illusions or dream objects or creatures of fancy, the foregoing explanation by a naïve realism begins to show its inadequacy. If what we see were the cause of our seeing it, the object would have to be both cause and effect.¹ Or again, if the individual ob-

1. For a specific illustration see William E. Hocking, *Types of Philosophy* (rev. ed.), pp. 275 f.

ject were the cause of its being perceived, how should we account for the relations of one object to another? Our experience world is a world of things interrelated and constantly changing. These things are so intricately connected that science in tracing connection loses sight of their individuality. Things under analytic scrutiny seem to melt into interrelated activities. Moreover, if our perceptions reveal nature directly and as it is, there is no provision for error and illusion. If I see a man at some distance, and then upon closer observation recognize that what I saw is not a man but a post, my first perception was not a true revelation of the external world. Whence, then, did it come? For such reasons as these, naïve realism does not suffice as an explanation of sense perception.

3

BUT realism need not be naïve. The outgrowths of this primitive type have been many. Practically every systematic view of life starts with the assumption that the world as "given" in perception is in some sense real. It is not my intention to attempt here a comprehensive estimate of these various ways of thought.² Some typical examples will serve to present general positions as a basis for comment. Such criticism as I have to offer now, and

2. I have treated the subject more fully in *The Self and Its World*, pp. 131-149, *et passim*.

from time to time in later chapters, will need to be supplemented by constructive suggestions when I set forth the arguments for a view that seems to me more convincing.

The new realism of a generation ago marked an advance beyond previous types, and introduced subtleties of interpretation, utilizing, to advantage, prevalent scientific concepts. But painstaking efforts to explain error and illusion in harmony with the theory failed to satisfy opponents. A further advance was necessary, and critical realism came into being. Under the name critical realism are grouped certain theories that differ widely in some particulars but agree in holding that the physical world, at least in its essential features, exists, independent of percipients, in a space and time of its own.

One extreme in this group is represented by Roy Wood Sellars. He advocates a theory of sense perception that is mainly materialistic, yet gives importance to psychic activity. I am in hearty sympathy with the emphasis that Sellars puts upon the outward direction of the act of perceiving. "The set of the perceptual complex is toward the external world and from this fact the perceptual experience derives its character."³ But he assumes an independent outside world interpreted and revealed in perception; he holds to the theory that the causal stimulus comes from the external thing; and he appeals, though with refinements, to cor-

3. *The Philosophy of Physical Realism* (The Macmillan Company), p. 72.

respondence and correlation. Distinguishing sense data from the immediate object of perception, equated with "the external thing denoted and interpreted,"⁴ he leaves unsolved the duplication that is a fundamental difficulty with such a theory. What William McDougall says of science is applicable also to philosophy: it "cannot long rest content before an utterly mysterious but obtrusive correlation."⁵

The other extreme in critical realism is represented by James Bissett Pratt, in that he freely recognizes—what is central in my own view—a self as doing the thinking in perception.⁶ But he agrees with critical realists generally (or dualistic realists, as he prefers to call them) in holding that our responses to sensory stimulation are not the things of the physical world, but *sensa* and images that somehow stand for them or symbolize them. The term *sensa*, however, varies in meaning with different realists. For some the *sensa* are mental, for others physical, and for still others neither mental nor physical but neutral. Being hypothetical, they can be made to mean whatever best suits the theorizer.

As Pratt by implication acknowledges,⁷ modern science, coming more and more to regard nature as a network of activities rather than a collection of things, leaves realism without the support of a powerful ally. The latest developments in science

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 278.

5. *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution*, p. 84.

6. *Personal Realism* (The Macmillan Company), pp. 265 ff.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

indicate that philosophy will do well to lay more stress on the dynamic.

I have already suggested that dualistic realism, severing mental content from outer object, requires transition from one to the other, and offers no bridge of explanation.⁸ Some ultimates must, of course, be left unexplained. But this transition does not seem to belong to that privileged class, especially if a different theory renders the leap unnecessary.

Another difficulty for me in accepting Pratt's argument for the independent reality of the physical world in its spatio-temporal substantial character I will try to state briefly. There is a confusing interplay between two conceptions: first, that the independent world is made up of physical things, ontological objects which epistemological objects characterize or symbolize;⁹ and second, that the independent world is dynamic, a world of activities, a causal process.¹⁰

The first conception gives us an independent world that resembles in character our naïve world. In presenting the picture Pratt defines the existent as "that which is capable of making a difference to experience."¹¹ Therefore, if I understand him correctly, he would agree that physical things when experienced are, as I shall try to show later, values. But what are they when not experienced? Once,

8. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

9. E. g., *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 70 ff., 151, 162, 191, 205 f.

10. E. g., *op. cit.*, pp. 130 f., 136, 165, 375.

11. *Op. cit.*, pp. 57 f., cf. p. 164.

at least, the guarding phrase "is capable of" drops out: "The existent, as contrasted with the merely subsistent or conceptual, comes into touch, somewhere and somehow directly or indirectly with some actual experience."¹² Possibly it might be said—although Pratt does not say it—that the physical reals are always experienced by a cosmic Mind,¹³ for which they are values. But a cosmic Mind has not our needs, and hence would hardly have occasion to build for itself a world of physical things such as are useful for us. The main question at issue concerns the possibility of physical things that "are not made of experience stuff."¹⁴ If we try to tell what a thing of this kind would be, the difficulties become formidable. Many have been the attempts to take a physical thing, such as a stone or an apple, and strip it of every characteristic that bears the mark of subjective origin. When the analysis has been thorough, nothing has been left; and that which lies beyond experience—the non-mental—has not been reached.

As to the second conception of the independent world, one can hardly doubt the existence of a cosmic network of activities underlying our experience. Here we reach an order that is, in my opinion, truly independent of us and not to be identified with the world of physical things. As the reader who has the courage and patience to continue will

12. *Op. cit.*, p. 164.

13. Cf. Berkeley, *The Second Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous*.

14. Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

find, the distinction between the world of physical things, which are our responses to stimulation, and the causal order, which stimulates us, is basic in my own theory of reality. When science analyzes physical things into activities, it is working its way through appearance toward the real. This view I shall set forth more fully later. Pratt in his final chapter comes close to it but does not distinguish the causal activities from the physical world that we experience. He calls the physical world "the body of God."¹⁵ This idea has a long history, but it is analogical and speculative. If it is taken as anything more than a vague metaphor, it presents difficulties that are daunting. I should not like to go farther myself in the direction of this analogy than to say that the world in a broad sense, including human beings as we know them, is our embodiment of what God means to us.

Arthur O. Lovejoy tries to justify a dualistic epistemology for realism by comparison with remembering. "There is nothing more paradoxical in the conception of a knowledge of physical objects by means of *sensa* not identical with those objects than there is in the conception of a knowledge of past events by means of memory-images not identical with those events."¹⁶ Memory-images, however, are not identified with past events but remain distinct; whereas, according to the dualistic realist,

15. *Op. cit.*, p. 375, *Naturalism*, pp. 165 ff. Cf. D. C. Macintosh, *The Problem of Religious Knowledge*, pp. 377 f. For further consideration of this subject see Chapter XVII, sec. 2.

16. *The Revolt against Dualism* (The Open Court Publishing Company), p. 313.

sensa somehow fuse with physical things before there is perception of objects. The *sensa* are never known or experienced as such; they are hypothetical entities.

4

SUPPOSE we take another approach to the problem of sense perception. William James describes percepts—in contrast with concepts—as a continuous flux, meaning nothing. From the immediate data “attention carves out objects, which conception then names and identifies forever. . . . We say *what* each part of the sensible continuum is, and all these abstracted *whats* are concepts.”¹⁷

This description is highly figurative, and treats as the perceptual flux that which analytical thought is supposed to reach when it has removed from actual experience all that can be construed as the work of a thinker. It is plainly an abstraction and of doubtful validity. It never enters, as a mere continuum, into consciousness. Even if it did, it would be a continuum for consciousness only after the present had been united to the past members of the flow by an act of memory. We cannot know the simplest object without giving it a past, even though the perception may be practically instantaneous. And when we combine a past with a present, we have the budding of a concept as the very condition of an elementary percept. James, in other passages, recognizes the inseparability of the per-

17. *Some Problems of Philosophy* (Longmans, Green & Co.), p. 50.

ceptual from the conceptual.¹⁸ To make this acknowledgment is to grant that in all apprehension, however simple and elementary, there is constructive mental activity.

Clarence I. Lewis, who presents a careful analysis of the primary cognitive experience, says that if an object be noted at all, "some meaning of it also will be contained in the experience," and this meaning is brought by the mind.¹⁹ The "also" is inserted because Lewis is trying to find in experience an element that is given. This "brute-fact element" he seeks to identify with the sensuous; but apparently he is not very well satisfied himself with the result, for he concludes that the definitive criterion of givenness is not the sensuous quality, but rather "that the mode of thought can neither create nor alter it." Such a conclusion, however, is not so much finding a given element in experience as recognizing some initiating of experience and some control over it. I can appreciate the unwillingness of investigators to go outside of experience for an explanation; yet no philosophy can reach an explanation without recourse to what is beyond experience. Even the real thing of the critical realist is transcendental, though he may not acknowledge this. It seems to me that we should get on better if we made a sharp distinction between experience itself and the given as that which sets the possibilities of experience. Then there would be no need of arguing, for instance, to what

18. *Op. cit.*, pp. 47, 74, 107 f.

19. *Mind and the World-Order* (Charles Scribner's Sons), p. 50.

extent the value-quality of experience is not an appraisal by the mind.

Some conditioning of our perceptions of the physical world must be granted. We may say, as a minimum, that something having the nature of stimulation calls out response on our part. This responsive activity of ours is evidently of a constructive sort, resulting in apprehension of the thing-world. Under ordinary conditions this work of the mind in sense perception is subconscious; but some psychological experimentation has come close to bringing it into consciousness.²⁰ Even if subconscious, the activity is nonetheless mental.

Brief as is this description of the process in sense perception, I believe it is adequate as far as it goes. If it were something novel, as it was in Kant's day, much painstaking elaboration would be advisable. But the field has been minutely explored many times and from every conceivable angle. That different investigators should have diverse views as to the conditions and implications of perception is only natural. It is quite impossible to come to the problem with a completely open mind, a *tabula rasa*; for willy-nilly we bring with us a mass of beliefs and attitudes that are sure to influence our judgment. Once we recognize, however, that bias is inevitable, we can do much to counteract it by studied hospitality to alternative theories.

Some mention of two points may help to an understanding.

20. Cf. F. R. Bichowsky, "The Mechanism of Consciousness: Presentation," *The American Journal of Psychology*, XXXVI (1925), 589.

First, the conclusion that the mind, in responding to stimulation, creates its perceived objects without conscious effort is no ground for doubting that it does the work. The rapidity is so great that we are aware of the product only, not the process. There is abundant evidence that it is the nature of the mind to be constructively active. In sense perception, in reverie, in dreams, the mind is ever busy with world-building.

Second, the object cannot be given ready-made. Even the old theories of images thrown off and of ideas imprinted on the mind had to be abandoned. Nor is the modern suggestion of a controlling pattern from the object much better. The object as perceived is effect, not cause. It is the result of the mind's creative response to stimulation.

If there is still protest that the scientific account of sense perception traces movement from the object inward to the brain, let us remind ourselves that the scientist has ruled out from his field the idea of efficient causation and has learned to be content with formulae describing activities as expressions of law. Though he may still use the old terminology and speak of cause and effect, he means only a sequential series, unless the words lead him into inconsistencies of thought. The scientist's interest is in our experience world. When we are not considering productive causation, we may continue to analyze sense perception on the assumption that the stimulations come from the object through various media to the brain. The case is like that of our views concerning the relation of sun and earth.

For practical purposes we proceed on the assumption that the earth is fixed in space, and the sun revolves around it. On that supposition we can without any perplexity live our daily routine and enjoy sunrises and sunsets. But when we want theoretical insight into astronomical matters, we must change our view into what amounts to a reversal of our usual conception.

The question may be asked, Is there any likelihood that the scientific theory of sense perception will ever harmonize with the philosophical view that you are setting forth? In reply it may be said that science is showing a tendency to consider some problems that have heretofore been regarded as characteristically philosophical. This is true even in physics, where one might least expect it. Sir Arthur Eddington, throughout his book, *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, argues that future progress in physics will depend upon epistemology. If this tendency should continue, the scientist from his own point of view may insist upon making further adjustments. When science holds in abeyance the question of efficient cause, and works by means of mathematical equations, it is not concerned with direction in a series of events. "In primary physics, which knows nothing of time's arrow, there is no discrimination of cause and effect; but events are connected by a *symmetrical* causal relation which is the same viewed from either end."²¹ If this is accepted, there would seem to be

21. A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (The Macmillan Company), pp. 295 f.

no scientific barrier to the theory that the physical thing is not the source of the stimulations, but is the effect that they initiate.

F. R. Bichowsky approaches this way of regarding sense perception. After formulating what he calls the first law of psychophysiology, he adds: "This law is of practical scientific interest for it gives a method of deducing physiological facts from introspection."²²

Further inquiry concerning the stimulations will be necessary later. But now let us turn to the mental activity on the part of the percipient.

I have used the verbs construct and create to indicate what the mind does in sense perception. Neither word is wholly satisfactory; for construct might seem to imply some preëxisting material, and create might seem at variance with controlling stimulations. The philosopher's lament over the inadequacy of language is recurrent. I shall have to trust that the exposition as a whole will convey to the reader my meaning.

When the controlling stimulations become effective, the percipient, responding, has his familiar sense world. He apprehends objects as substantial things, enduring through time, occupying space, and having manifold relations with other objects. The stimulations may call out response of various kinds—visual, auditory, tactual, and so on. But until analysis begins, the response is felt as unitary.

22. "Factors Common to the Mind and to the External World," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVII (1940), 483 f.

Immediate responses to stimulation are organized into a whole that we call nature or the physical universe. This organization, of course, is for each individual the work of a lifetime and at first is quite rudimentary. Even after many years of effort the diligent student knows only too well that his work of organization has hardly more than begun. The demands of practical life are not so great but that elementary phases of this organization may suffice as the basis for an active form of existence. But when our civilization becomes complex and exacting, our world organization needs to be thorough and far-reaching. A notable feature of this progressive organization is the vast extension in time and space necessary in our perceptual world to make it cohere as a consistent whole.

Immediate responses and their organization both require a unique activity which we call thinking. But there is a difference. The one process is carried on below consciousness; the other is volitional, consequent upon the desire to understand. Because the thinking done in elementary sense perception is subconscious, many students of the subject hesitate to call it thinking. But it deserves to be considered such by reason of its constructive character. It might be called prejudgmental thinking, in accordance with prevalent definitions of judgment as having to do with conclusions.²³ This prejudg-

23. E. g., John Dewey, *Logic* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 120: "Judgment may be identified as the settled outcome of inquiry."

mental type of thinking found in elementary sense perception becomes evident only in the analysis of the product. It behooves us, therefore, to ascertain by direct analysis of our perceptual world what are the more significant forms of this constructive activity.

CHAPTER II

HOW THE MIND CONSTRUCTS ITS OBJECTS

I SPACE

ONE of the most striking features of our sense world is that it is spread out in space. It is a thing-world, and the things are mutually exclusive. Each has a place which it maintains against intrusion. Every perceptual experience thus has a horizon, encompassing objects. How can this be? The only answer that seems adequate is that we give our objects spatial form. We construct the objects, and the space comes into existence with them.

This conclusion has long been combated, but no better theory has been suggested. Suppose, for instance, we should assume that space is an original datum, an independent existence of some sort, into which we put our objects. On this theory we could have no objects were it not for the infinite eternal space as the container. But this theory helps not at all when we become critical, for a space that antedates the objects we perceive and is independent of them cannot be identified with the actual space of our perceived objects. All the spaces that we know are phenomenal, that is, they exist in the world as we know it. We first have objects that are spatially related, and only by a process of abstraction do we reach the conception of a space that is

empty. Our ordinary perceptual space is just large enough to contain the perceived objects. When we shift our point of view, we have a different space. However, space, considered apart from objects, is much the same everywhere and at all periods of our experience. Hence we pass easily to the conception of a universal space that is homogeneous throughout, a relatively empty continuum.

Our objects move about somewhat and occupy various positions. The position of an object has significance only with reference to the position of other objects. One thing is above or below or to one side of another thing. Because the relations of things may be considered apart from the things, we tend to think of the relations as belonging to space. This gives rise to a conception of space as a nexus of relations. The number of relations is limited only by the ingenuity of the mathematical imagination and runs off in the direction of infinity. We cannot call this space empty. But since the relations may be treated in abstraction from things in space and have the marks of universality, this potentially infinite nexus of space relations has a way of coalescing with empty space. Universal space is generally known as geometrical space. Taken strictly, empty space is a limiting idea, quite unthinkable. But we can approximate it, as in actual experience the physicist can approximate a perfect vacuum. The most abstract space that it is possible for the human mind to conceive contains something, if nothing more than a modicum of space relations vaguely apprehended.

Distance between objects furnishes a means of measuring interaction. When objects are near each other, the reciprocal influences are greater than when they are far apart. The law of gravitation, stating that bodies attract one another inversely as the square of the distance, might seem to suggest that space itself plays a part in the cosmic drama. Yet we think of space as contrasting with things in just this regard. Things are supposed to be centers of activity and to differ from one another in the way in which they act. But empty space has no such characteristic. It is pure absence of change. How can space be a form of energy without becoming a thing, in need of another space to contain it? This question ceases to trouble us when we recognize space as an aspect of thought construction in sense perception. As an aspect it has no separate existence, and to think of it apart from the objects is to make it an abstraction. Of course we do this habitually but we are dealing with an abstraction nevertheless. Our propensity to look upon things as constituted things by the energy they express leads us to ascribe energy to every separable phase of things that we regard as existent. We can even consider colors, sounds, and other qualities of things as forms of energy when we abstract them from the things that manifest color, sound, and the other qualities. Space, considered as an entity, falls within this group. We first abstract it from spatial things, then look upon it as an entity, and then reason that if it is an entity it must be active, a form of energy. A deeper insight into the essential

nature of thinghood as response of the mind to stimulations will enable us to clear up the difficulties in thinking of space as pure emptiness, and as a nexus of relations, and as a form of energy. These various conceptions of space may, in their proper context, have a value in the organization of our experiences, but that should not betray us into conclusions that cannot be critically justified.

If a realistic thinker should still persist in making space the physical antecedent of our having an experience of things in space, it would be pertinent to point out that such a space would either manifest itself to us by its activity¹ and thereby lose its character as space, or fail to declare itself and therefore not enter our experience at all. It could in no way be used in a theory of reality without violating the nature of space.

This conclusion that space is subjective in origin does not contravene the scientific conception of space, for the scientist is not concerned with the reality of space but wholly with its function in experience. As an aspect of our physical world, space is as real as any other aspect and as little subject to our volition.

Space, then, is that form of the percipient's constructive activity whereby he is able to apprehend

1. This alternative is chosen by J. B. Pratt: "Thus space, either as a container or as a unified aggregation of all actual bodies and the distances between them, is related causally and otherwise to all actual centers of experience and thus 'makes a difference' to them, but is not dependent for its existence on being perceived or thought of by them." (*Personal Realism*, p. 162.)

a multiplicity of objects as coexisting, able to keep them apart and keep them together. It is the self's way of setting in order its external world. The apparent independence of space is derived from the apparent independence of the things it contains.

2 TIME

ANOTHER striking characteristic of our sense world is that it endures. It continues to exist, certainly as long as we perceive it. We find difficulty in realizing that to know objects as enduring we must actually reconstruct them as past. The present objects and their past are thus connected by us in an order of succession. Time is the principle of connection according to which the self links together the successive events of its experience. The past comes into being for us as we produce in our own private psychic laboratory an experience that we locate in a present no longer existing. There is no past except for an intelligence, and there is no intelligence apart from memory.

But if the events are successive, are they not already in time? An explanation is not far to seek. The succession, however it may originate, is known to us as a succession only through our linking the events together in a temporal order. But the time in our experience must be distinguished from succession in the control exercised upon us. The time series as we apprehend it is a necessary implication of activity in the source of control, for we cannot conceive of activity without before and after. Time

seems independent of us because it expresses the continuity of the activity by which we are stimulated.

What we have before us, then, as we apprehend the objects about us, is not merely their immediate present but a more or less definite reconstruction of their past. The past and the present are mutually exclusive. Hence we think of the one as preceding the other. The members of the succession are in this way apprehended as if they were spread out in a quasi space extending from the present into the past and presumably into the future. It is this expanse of past, present, and future that we call objective time. It closely resembles the space idea, for coexistent objects are held apart and held together in a common space, and successive objects are held apart and held together in a common time.

The analogy between time and space is closer than may at first appear. It is quite impossible to have any conception of time that does not include somewhat of past and future; and when these are grasped together in thought, the result is psychologically a space image, as Lotze points out.² Every present thus includes a bit of what was and a bit of what will be. This constitutes an unresolvable puzzle so long as we think of time as existing apart from the knowing mind. In fact, this necessity of making the present concrete by borrowing from the past and the future is clear evidence that time

2. *Metaphysics*, trans. ed. B. Bosanquet, I, 315; cf. H. Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, trans. by F. L. Pogson, pp. 98 f.

is a construct by the thinker and has no other existence.

The scientist, in his reconstruction of the past, has been forced by ever-accumulating data to push the beginning back farther and farther into the dim unknown. The time-span is relative to the spread of events contained in it.

The intellectualist is inclined to regard the temporal order as an intellectual grasp of present events and past events and future events as actually coexistent. This view does away with the profound mystery of cosmic change, and thus makes the world intellectually construable. The distinction between past and present appears as one of relative definiteness and clearness. There is a tang and vividness in the present that the past lacks, because we are limited in our power to reproduce the past. But we might picture to ourselves an intelligence infinite in its ability to apprehend details of existence. For such an intelligence the past and the future and the present might seem to be one eternal now. This may be an inspiring picture, but it does not explain the world we know, which is a changing world. The past is that which has ceased to be in our experience. It is the time when we no longer function, and what we did is only a memory. The present is the time in which we are active, doing something. And the future is the ideal extension of the time-form to cover what we expect to do. It is not a matter of limited intellectual grasp that makes the division of time into past,

present, and future significant to us. The time order has to do more with our active volitional life than with intellection. In fact, as soon as we try to comprehend time as an idea, we distort it, for we make the fact of succession illusory.

Yet for certain scientific purposes this distortion is not only permissible but inevitable. When science would deal with some phase of the evolutionary process, it passes back and forth over the temporal succession and studies it as if the whole course were present for inspection. Results are thus obtained which encourage the investigator to look upon the past as somehow existing. How can the past influence the present if it does not exist? Here we have one of those questions which may receive an answer serviceable to experimental science yet not satisfying to critical thought. When we begin to reflect, we recognize that ideational content is static, and that, as changeless, it is not capable of expressing the real world, of which change is a fundamental characteristic. If we start with experience, we must start with change, for we have a world that ceaselessly passes into new forms of existence, to which we must continuously adjust ourselves. The change is no less change that unchanging concepts can express to some extent its nature. Later in this chapter the subject of change will be considered; but here I may point out that the concepts which make up our knowledge of the outside world express not the individual events as the concrete elements in change but generalized notions of events. Thus the scientist by his methods of

analysis and comparison and generalization is able to ignore the novelty in the changing process and extract the time-transcending features of many events that constitute an order of change. He gets the relatively timeless out of the time-flow of events. This extraction of the timeless from the changing world proves to be valid, that is, it helps us in anticipating future events and in contriving to alter the course of nature. So effective is this application of concepts to nature that the temptation is strong to look upon the conceptual content as the reality and the incessant change as appearance.

There is a tendency to view time, as well as space, objectively and to think of it as affecting events. It seems to have a corrosive effect upon objects—the gnawing tooth of time. It comes to have the essential characteristics of an independent existent. It is a form of energy. For this conception of time the same reasons can be given as for the similar conception of space. It is apparently involved in a realistic view of nature. If enduring things have an independent reality, so must the time they occupy. Calculations in which time is a factor proceed as if time were an active energy, making a real difference. This comes about because things in time are continuously changing. We find it convenient to put the cause in time itself. The convenience justifies the shift, so long as our interest does not go beyond scientific use of the time units. Time as energy thus becomes a thing, able to interact with other things. It loses its nature as different from the things contained in it.

But when we view time as the way the mind unites events in an order of succession, we start on a course of thought away from the idea of time as a form of energy. We find that time simply exhibits the successive events as connected in an order; further than that, it in no way affects them. Perceptually we have many temporal successions, and by a process of abstraction we can think of time apart from the successive events. Thus originates the common statement that time is the abstract form of succession—a characterization appropriate enough if the empty form is recognized as an abstraction and not a nonmental entity. Empty time has no characteristics in itself that would distinguish one portion of time from another. Qualitative differences belong to events in time. If time were regarded as independent of the percipient, this contrast of time as an energy and time as empty and passive would amount to a contradiction; but the view that time has its source in the mind enables us to utilize both conceptions, though in different contexts.

Concerned as we are at present with the question as to what the percipient contributes in the way of constructive principles in acquiring his objective world, we may say that time is the percipient's grasp of events in an order of succession.

3 SUBSTANCE

To think of objects as substantial things, the percipient must do a complicated piece of work. Suppose he responded to each stimulation and occu-

pieced himself with each in turn; he would have a succession of detached events. No object would emerge therefrom. But he is selective in his responses. What commands his interest and attention he grips, as it were; and he makes this response representative of the series preceding and following. The object constructed in such response is looked upon as being the same object enduring through the succession. The percipient comes to think of this object as maintaining itself while changing. So far as practicable, he holds to the identity of the object, however much it may change in appearance or in relation to other objects. Because of this ascription of power to maintain its inner integrity as a union of many characteristics, and its outer integrity toward what is beyond, he calls it a substantial thing, or substance. A close look at what is implied in the notion of substance shows that it really is just this causal power of holding parts together and resisting encroachments from other objects. The thing is conceived as a complex of energies.

4 CAUSALITY

WE now face the problem of causal connection in its dual form, exemplified first in the inner structure and cohesion of a thing and secondly in the ways in which things affect one another. In its cosmic aspects it becomes the problem how we may think the universe as an interrelated whole of things that maintain themselves as apparently in-

dependent individuals. Since things are complex enduring entities, it is natural to think of their parts as held together by some energy residing in them. If this uncritical assumption of causal energy in things could be successfully assailed, there would seem to be no way of explanation. The substantial character of things would seem an opaque mystery. The criticisms of Hume, who led the attack upon the unreflective view, are undoubtedly valid if the thing-world is regarded as independent of its being known. In such a world causal connection, and therefore thinghood, could have no place. Things would dissolve into their ultimate simple elements, whatever that may mean; and the result would be—what? The nearest we can come to an answer is to pronounce the word “process”; but we could hardly put any meaning into the term without giving the process the status of a mental construct.

We must look more closely at the persistent theory that internal cohesion in a thing depends upon some force that comes into existence with the thing itself. A great advantage of this notion is that it can be applied equally well to the dynamic relations of things to one another; and hence a single hypothesis covers all cases of causal connection. Force as cohesion and as interaction can be measured and given mathematical expression. Such measurements are the data for the science of physics. But as soon as one asks about the nature of this force, and how, as a concrete actuality, it

differs from the entities that it holds together, doubts begin to arise.

If we attribute to this force all the activity in the thing and in its relations to other things, then we must think of the related parts as passive. But in that case the parts would drop out of the picture altogether and the force alone would remain. This outcome is usually accepted as inevitable by those who retain the theory of force in nature. Generalized it becomes the well-known dynamic theory of the universe. According to this view, strictly interpreted, there are no realities called things in nature, no passive entities of any sort; everywhere we encounter the activities of this universal force. Nature is a vast intricate network of interactive connections. The individual objects built up by us in sense perception are mere aspects, equilibria, or centers of activity. They are simply portions of the world process that we isolate for practical use.

What, then, is this force that accomplishes all the work of nature? It is something assumed in order to explain the activities of observed things. That is its sole *raison d'être*. Now there are many sorts of activities in and among things. Does the same force originate them all? To maintain an affirmative answer, it would be necessary to endow the force with the power to retain its unity and identity while acting in many ways. If this power be denied, as it must be unless we read into it our own nature as thinking beings, the force breaks up into as many forces as there are activities. In other words, the forces (considered as impersonal)

and the activities become indistinguishable; and the activities of things are explained by the activities of things.

When the futility of this way of reasoning was clearly seen by the scientist, he left to the metaphysician the problem of explaining efficient causation, and contented himself with the strictly scientific task of accurate measurement and description of nature's processes with a view to forecasting future events. For the scientist, this was a good riddance. For the philosopher, on the other hand, causality has remained the central problem of a reasoned world view.

Our idea of causation seems to be derived from volition and resistance. We are never wholly satisfied with things as they are and we desire something different. Following upon our act of will, changes take place. Some effect is brought about. We interpret our volition as causal.

Upon willing a change in the objective situation, we meet resistance, the inertia of physical things. We think of them as causal. Resistance may be physical, or it may be ideational and pertain to meaning. Since our thing-world is all interpretation, we may err in hasty conclusions, as when we take a boulder in the distance to be a bear. Further observation will reveal our mistake, as we encounter a resistance of actuality to our erroneous assumption. When we are dealing with practical interests only, we find the naïve view of things as causal to be convenient and adequate.

Have we, then, two types of causal efficiency—the one subjective, originating in the will, and the other objective, the inertia of physical things? The atmosphere grows misty when we try to make out the nature of that objective causation. Is it like the volitional, or is it different? If we would construe it as different and call it mechanical, we meet serious difficulties. The most embarrassing of these is that what we actually apprehend is an orderly sequence, and even its orderliness turns out to be the result of intentional selection on our part. The producing cause eludes us. This line of thought will be carried further when the general argument has been more fully developed.³

Some realists present a conception of the physical world in terms of space, time—or space-time—and quality, without taking account of the causal relation as anything other than orderly sequence. But either they unobservedly bring in cause as actuality—not to speak of psychic conditions—or they fail to reach the world as we experience it and have only a group of abstractions. The concept of quality implies an observer who discriminates, for instance, red from blue, solid from liquid. In short, it transcends the pure description to which the realist sought to confine himself. When we call into the open all that the term quality must include to complete, with the help of space and time, the characterization of nature as commonly experienced, we find thinghood and causality confront-

3. See p. 281.

ing us. To assume that space, time, and quality are the ultimates is to abandon explanation and never to arrive at the real in experience. We must assume causality of some sort, in some sense, located somewhere, if we are to carry out a serious examination of the actual world.

As has been shown, the attribution of force to things to explain their relations, internal and external, leads to insuperable difficulties. Is it possible to locate the causal energy anywhere else? To answer this question we shall need to go back to the analysis of sense perception. We found that, since we have scant range of option about perceiving the physical world as we do, there must be some control exercised upon us. This control, coming presumably in the form of stimulations, calls forth responses on our part; and these responses constitute our world of apprehended objects. Now if physical things, considered as physical, owe their existence to our responsive perceptual activity and are strictly effects, the causal problem is carried from the thing-world back to whatever it is that compels us to experience that world. Some adequate cause must be posited to account for our having experiences of things. Its nature we shall have to examine later. But much is gained in a preliminary way by removing the cause from the things themselves, where we can make nothing of it, to the sphere of effective control, where activity is the one all-sufficient mark of existence. For the present, this cause may be designated by a non-

committal name—the causal or dynamic order.⁴

When we completely sever the world of things as our constructs from the dynamic order that conditions us, we are rid of a veritable incubus of an independent world that is in space and time but is not the world of our experience—an x that can be dragged part way into our world, but ever defies complete inclusion. If we keep the dynamic order distinct from the entire compass of experience, we may still assert concerning its activities whatever is implied in their being the nexus of conditions constituting our objective environment.

We never experience the causal order as something apart from our experience of objects. But it is a necessary assumption to account for the coercion exercised over us in sense perception, for things as apprehended have determinate qualities and positions. They are not subject to our will, except insofar as by exertion we can overcome the resistance that they offer.

It need hardly be said that to locate causal efficiency, not in things, but in the dynamic order that controls the course of our sense perception, does not change their familiar character. Their substantiality remains just what it was before. A thing is no less a thing by being an effect. Analysis

4. Albert C. Knudson comes close to this view when he says of the external world as the source of stimuli: "It is a barren, poverty-stricken world; and this forces on us the conviction that, if it has any extramental existence at all, it is an embryonic or purely instrumental type of existence." (*The Philosophy of Personalism* [Abingdon-Cokesbury Press], p. 139.)

has but given us the philosophical counterpart of what science gave Eddington for his second table.⁵

We have now traced objective causal activities to the control exercised over us in sense perception. The stimulations through which this control affects the percipient define, for the most part, the phenomena of experience; and since the phenomena of experience constitute a world of physical things, the stimulations must have such character and sequence as give ground for interpreting certain ones as belonging together, cohering as a unity. The mind, reacting to successive stimulations and having the power to hold in memory a past for present constructions, gets a world of things that endure. The cohesion of an individual thing depends, therefore, upon the stimulations, on the one hand, and upon the mind's constructive habit, on the other. Similarly, the interconnection of one thing with another may be accounted for by two factors: first, relations among the stimulations; and second, the nature and needs of the responding mind.

We have been considering nature as physical, that is, as it appears to a physicist. But in our experience world much, at least, of nature is alive; and living nature is more than physical. Here, then, a study of causation must recognize a difference in the conditions of the problem. A living organism is able to maintain itself. It is not merely a thing that can be analyzed into vanishing forms of activity. It has a power of self-maintenance and self-

5. *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. ix.

direction, a power to produce effects, and hence it is a real cause. Some theorists in the past and in the present incline to the view that every existing thing is alive. But questions that we are not yet ready to consider suggest difficulties besetting this theory.

5 CHANGE

ONE of the most interesting characteristics of things as substances is their identity in change. How can a thing change? If it is different at any stage of its existence from what it was before, is it not a different thing? A thing is what it is and not something else. This would seem to be unimpeachable good sense. But does it not follow, then, that throughout nature what appears to us as change is really the continuous emergence of new entities, which immediately vanish and are replaced by others? Such a conclusion would, of course, necessitate a reconstruction of our universe. If everything is forever giving way to something else, there can be no enduring entities. Thought is completely baffled in facing such a conception.

At first this reasoning seems to be a mere quibble. But it is more than that, for thought cannot grasp change as such. Whatever it lays hold of is thereby transfixed, because thought content is always static. Our ideas considered as content are changeless in meaning; they remain timelessly what they are, like words in a dictionary. The phases of a change thus become, for thought, separate unalterable entities. Certain thinkers of an

idealistic sort have tried to view reality as a thought system, but have been unable to deal effectively with the problem of change. Some have declared change to be illusory. They have contended that all real being is forever what it is. If the world is intelligible, and if we are to know what it is, must we not reduce it to thought content? We can know only what we can think. But the situation is not improved by saying that change is illusory, for the illusion would itself be a case of change, and hence in need of explanation. The only universe we know is throughout in perpetual change. No experience in life is more familiar and well established.

Our task is to find some way of reconciling identity and difference, for change includes both. Reason has no difficulty in conceiving identity alone. All thought content illustrates that. Nor has reason stumbled over the facts of difference and succession. But how can a thing remain the same through the process of becoming different? In short, how can a thing change?

By way of preface it may be said that change is not exchange of one thing for another. If we see a chair, and then successively a table and a bookcase and a piano, we do not think of these as different manifestations of the chair. Such metamorphosis would belong to fairy tales or sorcery, and even there it would not be change in but change into.

Psychological analysis can help us to an understanding. As we have seen, the mind responds to stimulations constructively. From the immediate

situation, in which distinctions have not yet emerged, objects take form and definiteness through the efforts of the percipient to give significance to the successive stimulations. Every object represents a certain series running through the time-span of the experience. The character of the stimulations makes it possible to think of successive appearances as belonging together. So long as this conviction of belonging together is retained, the appearances may become different without jeopardizing the unity and integrity of the thing. Distinguishable features or qualities are the alterable factors. Thus we say that the clay changes in hardness, or the bar of rusting iron changes in color. The clay remains the same, considered as a particular lump; the iron remains the same in being a certain piece of metal. We distinguish the thing from its states or qualities. Yet the thing cannot be separated from its qualities, nor regarded as a mere sum of them. The unity of the thing is a thought unity, determined by practical considerations, and lasting as long as there is uninterrupted functioning in a definite way. But the various states or qualities are what we sensuously observe. Just as the eye animates a series of Disney cartoons passing rapidly before it, so the mind gives continuity of meaning to its responses to successive stimulations. Without the perception of qualities we should have no basis for thinking thinghood; and without the inferential synthetic act of the mind by which the thing as a unitary complex

whole comes into being, the qualities would be unattached and meaningless. Of course, they might be hypostatized, but then they would have to be treated no longer as qualities of things but as themselves distinct entities. This is what Whitehead seems to do when he calls them "eternal objects."⁶ They have lost connection with reality, and are like the cartoons taken as separate drawings without any illusion of life.

Change, therefore, involves no conflict between identity and difference. The identity of the changing thing is a persistent meaning, from the realm of thought where changelessness belongs. The differences are in the appearances, which do not change individually, but which are more or less unlike and continually succeed one another. Whenever the appearances in the succession are so different that we cannot regard them as inhering in the thing, we have no recourse but to refer them to another thing series. Thus the nature of a thing is expressed by the qualitatively different aspects that we can correlate within the unity of its function. In summary, then, it may be said that change in objects is a complex experience of a percipient, finding the same meaning or function in successive stimulations that differ to some extent.

This analysis of change makes evident the need for sharply distinguishing reality from thought about it. The real in experience is always changing, but thoughts as meanings do not change.

6. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 146; *Process and Reality* (The Macmillan Company), p. 444.

6 QUALITY

I HAVE had occasion to refer to the qualities of objects. A further word about these qualitative differences by which things are distinguished will add to our understanding of the objective world.

That which characterizes an object may be called a quality. These individual characteristics defy enumeration; but they are dealt with more readily by being grouped, usually according to the several senses. Thus important quality classes are color, tone, scent, taste, hardness, weight.

As qualities are specific, and depend, for their existence, upon the stimulation of a particular individual, they are never quite the same for any two persons. The variation may not be great, but it is always present, even though easy-going common sense ignores it. On account of this variation in the experience of different persons, qualities such as color and taste have been pronounced subjective. John Locke made popular the term secondary qualities, to distinguish these from an object's size, shape, texture, and so on—qualities which, as supposedly residing in the thing and hence objective, are primary. But this distinction, though it has been widely accepted, cannot be strictly maintained. If there is reason to say that one group of qualities is subjective, the same reason applies to all the rest.

There is possible ambiguity at this point. To say that a quality is subjective may mean either that it originates in the mind, or that in its par-

ticularity it exists only for the one percipient. Correspondingly, a quality may be considered objective either because it appears to belong intrinsically to the object, or because it is apparently apprehended alike by various observers. But these different meanings need not lead to confusion if the status of qualities is clearly understood.

A thing is what it is because of its qualities. They must therefore come into being with the thing, that is, they are as objective as the thing itself. But the thing with its qualities does not exist for the percipient except as he constructs it and gives it a place among the other things that make up his perceived world.

Writers have sometimes argued that a rose might lose its fragrance without losing its character as a rose, whereas if it lost its shape and its physical structure, it would no longer be a rose; and hence the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is fundamental. But on closer examination the difference on which the argument turns is seen to be a matter of relative importance of fragrance and structure in our estimate of the nature of the thing. Strictly, we must hold that both primary and secondary qualities are inherent in the thing and constitute what it is.

The variety and gradations of quality in nature are inexhaustible. They must have a double origin: first, in the form and character of the dynamic contacts that stimulate the percipient in sense perception; and second, in the percipient's responsive activities by which the thing as perceived comes

into existence. Just to note our part in the transaction gives us a sense of the exceeding complexity of the activity by which we get our world of objects.

Thus far we have been considering mainly those features that can be singled out and intellectually identified as constituting the thing. What is to be said about those qualities that we read into the thing temporarily, as it were, qualities that depend on our affective attitude? Are they constitutive of the thing in any intelligible sense? For instance, we may walk through a garden and have little sense of its beauty if we are full of anxieties or forebodings. Or again, when we are in a responsive mood, a sunset over the ocean is awe-inspiring; but when we are intent upon some enterprise that absorbs our interest, the sublimity of the view is not so impressive. These instances will serve as examples of a numerous class. The qualities are transient, and seem to depend not so much on the thing as on our attitude toward the thing. What is the status of these qualities? Is the garden beautiful? Is the sunset sublime? A ready answer maintains that these qualities, which are usually called tertiary qualities, are essentially subjective. That this does not give them their final status I shall try to show in the following chapter, when value is under consideration.

7 QUANTITY

CONFRONTED as we are by the miscellany of perceived objects differing qualitatively, we are prompted by our practical interests, as well as

curiosity, to a quantitative treatment. Counting ignores qualitative distinctions, and fixes attention on some common characteristic that serves as a basis for grouping objects. The process of counting is far from being so simple as it may seem. Most of the primary resources of the mind, such as memory, discrimination, relation, are employed. Counting is a means of retaining individuals while simplifying by organization into groups. It is an early and fundamental achievement in abstraction.

The other elementary numerical process is measuring. This requires the determination of a standard as nearly constant as possible. Since nature is characterized throughout by change, the finding of satisfactory standards of reference has been a difficult task. In all strictness an absolute standard is never attainable.

Through counting and measuring, the distinctively scientific world is evolved from the world of sense perception.

CHAPTER III

THINGS AS VALUES

1

OUR common-sense unreflective view is that we have a world in which objects are discriminated more or less definitely, and sustain manifold relations to one another. We ourselves are more or less like other objects, but we have all sorts of needs and desires. We reach out, lay hold of things about us, and learn that we can use them to satisfy our wants. It is a great discovery that the world can yield so many good things for our use. But we have to work for them. And unless we know how to escape the dangers that beset us—dangers from falling objects and from poisons and from slippery places—we suffer injury and may be destroyed. Hence life is a struggle to conquer nature sufficiently to wrest from it what we need in order to live. In the course of thousands of years man has learned many of its secrets. Now it is not so terrifying, not so inimical, not so ominous as once it seemed to be.

The transformation of nature is the achievement of science. It represents the success of man in learning to control in his own interest the activities in the midst of which he finds himself. Ultimately the task of science is to discover values and make them available. There are hidden values which science

digs out. There are inaccessible values to which science clears the way. Science is constantly increasing the value-content of nature for us. The work done by science—analyzing, measuring, relating, generalizing, applying—is itself a contribution to our values, for it serves important subjective or cognitive ends. It develops interest in the pursuit of knowledge and exalts devotion to truth.

But in the course of this ever-deepening study the naïve view of the world has been entirely forsaken. "Although we seem to have very definite conceptions of objects in the external world," says Eddington, "those conceptions do not enter into exact science and are not in any way confirmed by it. Before exact science can begin to handle the problem, they must be replaced by quantities representing the results of physical measurement."¹ This transformation of nature for scientific purposes brings up questions, and compels a reconsideration of the way in which the common-sense view of nature comes about.

Let us, then, turn again to sense perception, our acknowledged starting point. What is the essential character of physical things as revealed by their origin in sense perception? Suppose we start with an infant's early response to his contacts with the dynamic order. His reactions are general and diffuse, not specialized. The qualities of his world are but vaguely apprehended. How does the child, as he develops, treat these ill-defined sensory experiences? He learns that a certain portion of the situa-

1. *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 253.

tion has more interest for him than the rest. It begins to take shape as a unitary thing. It may mean to him something to eat. It is a value that satisfies some need. The child, in response to the succession of stimulations, has done something constructive, has reified his interest. His object is in space because he has put it there, spreading it out so that its parts are mutually exclusive. His object is in time because he has united what was, in the succession, with what is, and thereby constituted a thing that has a past. This spatio-temporal object is taken to be substantial because the successive phases appear to belong together, as if something were uniting them and giving them permanence. Thus the child builds his world of things. The spread-outness of the original welter, and its persistence even though changing all the time, result from the elementary activity of continuous projection. As the stimulations continue, the mind keeps active in this manner.

Whatever objects appear within our ken are there either as something we desire or as something we would avoid. They cease to exist for us the moment they cease to command our attention in the one way or the other. It is only in focusing interest that we synthesize our incipient experiences into an object. The term value covers whatever is of interest to a self. In this broad sense it includes both the goods of life and the evils. For the present discussion this inclusive use of the word value is a convenience, inasmuch as there is no occasion for distinction between positive and negative values, and

the same thing may be desirable at one time and undesirable at another. But when, as in the consideration of moral values, the distinction becomes important, the terms good and evil, or right and wrong, are available.

2

IN determining our interests various factors in the depths of our nature unite—inherited tendencies and tastes, the subtle influences of our previous experiences, the rhythms of our emotional life, our ambitions, trifling or great. Differences in persons lead to differences in the meanings that they find in a situation. Here, for example, is a woodland. A lumber dealer sees a stand of timber having a calculable yield and quality. An artist sees form, mass, light and shade, color, saturation. A boy sees his playground, where a tree is a castle and where any rock may cover hidden treasure. Each observer, however many there may be, finds in the scene a somewhat different interest corresponding to his own prepossessions. Practically the same conditions thus furnish an indefinite number of meanings.

What is true of a multitude of observers is true also of the individual in his changing moods. If his interest is slight, the object is vague; details are lost in a blur of psychic filling. But if he is intensely interested, a given stimulation will call forth an elaborate response with relatively full details. The same object will at one moment have a certain complexity corresponding to a certain interest, and at the next moment a different complexity as interest

shifts. You listlessly assume that the stone on the table serves as an effective paperweight, but when you think of its being worn down to its present shape by abrasion against other stones as the tides rolled them up and down the beach for many years, you note with closer attention its beautifully rounded contour and smooth surface. An object that is recognized as a clue in a search by a detective may have attention that even calls to its aid a microscope and a chemical test. Or when curiosity about a thing mounts to a scientific interest, the search for details that are pertinent is as thorough as can be made.

That the character of our objects varies with the fluctuations of our interest may be seen also in our forming of unitary wholes. Suppose I have in my hand a piece of tufa. If I wish to use it in building a rock garden, I treat it as a whole. It is a unitary value. But if I wish to use it to furnish specimens for students of geology, I crack it up into several pieces, and each piece becomes a unit, a value in itself. Or, instead of dividing up our values, we may combine them into larger units, as when we put bricks and mortar and lumber and nails together to make a house. We have an interest in the unity of whatever object holds our attention. However complex it may be, however multitudinous its parts, we treat it as a unitary thing because thus it serves some purpose of ours. Strip from the collection of qualities the integrating value, and they become a mere manifold.

Other determinants of the unity of objects have

been suggested, notably joint prominence, joint change, and joint movement. But these are not always decisive. Such part of a thing as is prominent because it has a strong light on it may seem a whole until a part in shadow is recognized as belonging to the unit. In autumn one side of a leaf may change in color without being considered a separate thing. A rotary eggbeater in operation is regarded as unitary, though not all the parts are moving.

Value as constituting objects explains not only character fluctuations and unity in complexity, but permanence in change. So long as the value remains the same, the thing retains its identity in the midst of changes. It cannot change beyond a certain limit without losing its particular value, and that would be tantamount to losing its identity as a thing. Thus a book is a book whether open or shut, whether standing on the shelf or lying on the table. But destroy its readability, and it is no longer a book; it is so much waste paper. Because many values have a continuous appeal, or have become recurrent in supplying our elementary needs, a majority of the ordinary things with which we come into contact keep their identity. A concrete thing as the embodiment of a value resists analysis; that is, the interest must fade, and with it the unity it conserved, before analysis can take place. But the ease with which we can break up or refashion our units makes the world a strange blend of fixities and fluidities.

Sometimes we hold to the identity of a value without realizing the changes that are going on in

it. Our valuation tends to lag behind the process of nature. We go on blissfully ignoring change, until suddenly we awake to a realization that the house needs repainting, or the coat is worn threadbare.

Every change of interest leads to a new set of articulations in an object. We construct a thing in accordance with the interest of the moment. But from these individual constructions we form a composite idea of the object, as able to satisfy all our interests in it and as relatively permanent. This is what we consider the real object. But in truth it is our ideal. It cannot have other than an ideal existence; for as real it would have to comprise contradictory qualities, in much worse fashion than those figures of primitive art which show a front-view eye in a profile head.

3

THIS view of the identity of thinghood and value is not always readily accepted, owing partly to possible misunderstandings and partly to failure to be thoroughgoing.

Perhaps the main difficulty is the persistent intrusion of the causal into the world of sense perception. As causal, a thing seems to be an active entity, which may have value for us but is itself more than value. This objection should be examined.

If we are to have a substantial world, things must be thought as centers of activity and as affecting one another. These characteristics are essential to our conception of the physical order. It has taken

many generations of thinkers to bring into the open the hidden factors in this conception of nature as a thing-world. When Hume gave a negative answer to the question, Is there any valid reason for believing that one object in nature can act causally on another? he was by implication attacking and, I believe, overthrowing once for all the view that nature, considered as an independent world of objects, is the seat of causal activity. But he stopped short with a negation. The two centuries that have followed have been devoted to getting beyond his skeptical conclusion. The result is the recognition that physical nature as we know it is effect, that is, constructive interpretation, and not in itself causal. I have already in the preceding chapter touched upon the argument leading to this insight, and have noted my intention to take up later the different status of objects classified as having life.

In analyzing experienced nature we are able to separate in thought two aspects—the thing aspect and the dynamic aspect. They contrast in essential respects, but they are never found apart. The one gives us a collocation of related objects; the other gives us a process in which all individual units tend to disappear. We are constantly shifting from the one point of view to the other, and so easily that only critical reflection can make us aware of what we have been doing. Thus we save for ourselves the validity of both views.

This dual character of our environing universe is explained by the double origin already set forth. Physical things originate for us in our contacts with

a dynamic order, and constitute our interpretation of those contacts; they are what the dynamic order means to us. Whatever we apprehend by constructive response bears the stamp of its double origin—construction under control. As construction it is, strictly speaking, devoid of causal efficiency; it is wholly effect. But as interpretation it represents in concrete forms the causal world. Since we do not experience the dynamic order itself, we inevitably look upon physical things as causal. They represent that order in our experience. It is wholly a case of transferring causal efficiency from the dynamic order to our experienced world of things. "The primary experience," as W. R. Sorley says, "is at once perceptive and appreciative; its object is both an existence and a value."² We affirm the existence of an object by attributing to it inertia, but this inertia, as I have just said, is a transfer of power from the causal order that affects us in sense perception. The value is what the object is to us in itself.³

The distinction between these two aspects of nature is essential to an understanding of the view that things are values. It is primarily the thing as our construction that is a value. If we try to penetrate to the inner nature of the other factor, the dynamic order, we get little help from any source except from what we know of our own inner life. This must be considered later.⁴ But just now we note that into the clear have come two distinct but

2. *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 26.

3. Cf. Wilbur M. Urban, *The Intelligible World*, pp. 157 ff.

4. See Chapters V and XVII.

closely related types of reality—the causal, creative type, and the objective world, which is value. So far as we know, or think we know, the causal, creative type of reality, it too becomes to us value, since it thereby takes on human significance.

Another objection to the view that things are values is frequently raised. Someone points out that the stars have moved through the heavens for countless aeons without being valued by us. A discriminative reply is that that which would cause us to apprehend the stars must have been active throughout the ages; but the stars themselves did not exist for us until we saw them—if indeed we do see the stars. As a matter of fact, we see twinkling lights in the heavens, and before we can tell what they are, we must follow the bidding of science and construct vast orbs and scatter them through sidereal space. These have the value for us of telling what the beautiful lights in the night heavens are and satisfying our desire for explanation.

A similar difficulty is often urged. If value is the essence of the thing, what becomes of the thing when we cease to value it? Does the fire in my fireplace become nonexistent when I leave the room? If it does not continue to burn, how is it that I find the wood reduced to ashes when I come back? This is the old issue that divides thinkers into various groups—idealists, realists, pragmatists, and skeptics—according as they emphasize the work of the mind in perception, or the reality of the thing perceived, or the practical nature and limited va-

lidity of the tests used, or our inability to know a world that is regarded as independent of our knowing it.

The answer, I think, might run somewhat as follows. The causal order that conditions us in our every activity and furnishes the stimulations that incite us to have the experience of an outside world of physical things is independent of us in the sense that its being does not depend on its being perceived. Whatever abides through intervals between our apprehensions must be more than phenomenal, that is, more than effects of stimulation. This includes not only the cosmic causal order, but also the centers of life that we find in organisms, for organisms manifest causal energy and a power of self-maintenance. What abides when not perceived or valued is, primarily, the mysterious power that conditions us, and, secondarily, the life of organisms. Things considered as physical entities do not sustain themselves continuously. Their inferred continuity when not perceived is, in fact, the continuity of the patterns of activity in the causal world. While the things last, they make a difference to the percipient; for they are his construction, his interpretation of his contacts with the nexus of causal activities; they are through and through values. Their career when not perceived is strictly an inferred career made possible and plausible by the metonymous transfer to them of energy from the independent causal order. We can in most instances follow the course of changes in the thing when it is not an object of apprehension; but that is because

we have learned through experience the orderly sequences in the causal world. In the case of the wood burning in the fireplace, what we see as we look in that direction is what the perceptual stimulations mean to us. The situation changes as we watch it, and the changes follow a regular course. These sequences are determined by the causal order which they express. If I leave the room, my apprehension of the fire ceases, but the causal forces continue at work in their usual way, which is such that on my return I see ashes.

Pratt's inquiry⁵ as to a letter on its way from America to China would have a like answer. In everyday language we may say that the letter is in the hold of the ship, even though no one on board is aware of it. But speaking critically, we must confine ourselves to inference that the causal activities interpretable as the letter are continuing.

It would apparently be much simpler and superficially more plausible to say that the wood in the fireplace and the letter in the hold, as well as all other objects belonging to the physical order, are independent of our apprehending them; that they have a past that we did not make and a present that we have merely discovered. But the evidence, as I am seeking to show, is against such a view. In the present connection one might emphasize the argument that if things owe their existence to their serving the needs and interests of human individuals, there is no satisfactory way to account for things as independent. Whose things would they be? The

5. *Personal Realism*, pp. 106 f.

only ready answer would follow Berkeley's suggestion, to which reference has already been made. But the interpretation of things as values detracts from such plausibility as the suggestion has in its original form.

Values must exist for a valuer. Physical objects as values constitute what may be called a human world, made up of what is of interest to each percipient. It is true that most of the universe at any one time is completely out of the consciousness of an individual, that is, it is practically nonexistent for him. But very little is needed to make at least a part of the nonexistent become real. While you are writing at your desk, your perceived world is quite small—some desk-surface with books, papers, pens, and the like, then a vaguer border of walls, floor, and furniture. If the loud honking of a motorcar disturbs the quiet, your world has widened to include the street. But your world at any one moment is made up of that which is of value (positive or negative) to you at that moment.

4

THINGS viewed in the ordinary way as external and unattached have a minimum of qualities, assumed to be the same for all percipients, if due allowance is made for differences in position and the like. The secondary qualities are recognized as coconstitutive with the primary. Yet the secondary qualities bring things inevitably within the orbit of the percipient, and make them no longer alien but in a real sense the possession of each individual. Things thus have

something private about them, which, do our best, we are unable to communicate to others. To one person they may be meager in value-content, to another rich. This means that what we perceive is not altogether a direct and foregone response to stimulations. The stimulations initiate and control the perceptive activity; but from the start the self has its entire resources, native and acquired, available for giving character to the product. The self takes liberties with its objects as values, and endows them with qualities dependent on the emotional attitude toward them. Every object constituting our physical world is thus a practically unresolvable mixture of common and private features. What the word common means in this connection will be considered in the following chapter.

When sense perception is thus explained, the much-debated question whether tertiary qualities are subjective or objective falls away. They have the same status as the primary and secondary qualities, that is, they are subjective in origin and objective in reference. Even here there is no "bifurcation of nature." Yet the aesthetic quality is so variable and fluctuating, as compared, for example, with mass or even with color, that it appears adventitious as regards the actuality of the object. It seems a value that the percipient attaches to what is perceived. The same object may be beautiful to one observer and not to another. But to say that beauty is subjective as over against primary, or primary and secondary, qualities implies a dualistic realism, which the previous argument has rejected as un-

tenable. I have been trying to show that thinghood itself is value. All the qualities that constitute the thing are subjective in origin, are a valuing of the whole situation. A change in the primary qualities of the object means a change in the aesthetic quality. Hence the subjective origin of tertiary qualities does not carry with it noninherence in the thing. If we should undertake to divest the thing of what originates in the mind of the observer, there would be nothing left except the energy attributed to it, and this would be borrowed from the dynamic order. The self acting as a unit creates its object with various qualities that reflect the self's complex nature. The creative responses depend not only upon the specific forms and intensities of the stimulations but upon the observer's prepossessions, his past experiences, his present interests and abilities.⁶ The result appears in the overtones of qualitative apprehension. Because the subjective influences differ in different individuals, and more or less in the same individual at different times, aesthetic judgments vary. To some extent things thought of as objectively existent also vary. Tests of validity are important in the one case as in the other, but they are not found with equal ease. Those aspects of our world which are most readily measurable have a maximum of practical value on a hylic level, and are therefore considered real par excellence. On the other hand, there is little of our aesthetic

6. Theodore M. Greene recognizes this connection when he describes how an artist's expression of himself is intermingled with expression of the environmental forces that have formed him (*The Arts and the Art of Criticism*, p. 232).

perceptions that we can directly and accurately express and compare. Hence we are inclined to think of them as vague, evanescent, and nonessential.

What, then, is the real object? In brief, the simple and, as it seems to me, adequate answer is that the real object is to each observer just what he perceives. If he is dull or uninterested, he sees little more than a general outline with patches of color; but if he is alert and inquisitive, he gets sharp definition and many particulars. Scientific curiosity and persistent study bring to light details unnoticed by the casual observer. The scientist usually knows what to look for. What he finds he assumes is common to all; that is, anyone with his facilities could see as he does. Contrasting with the findings of the scientific mind are the features that the imaginative observer supplies. Such an observer may have little ability in accurate discernment, but by his lively imagination he may clothe the object with value-qualities that only a like poetic temperament can appreciate. Between these two extremes there is every variety and gradation of value-content in the objects of nature. But in the range from the precise findings of science to the adornments by poetic fantasy there is no point at which one may say with assurance: "Here is where the description of the real thing ends and the romancing begins." There is romance in every part of the series, and the question is of more or less.

Nature yields many a suggestion that the gifted can weave into a fabric of beauty. From everyday noises and rhythms the musical genius draws in-

spiration for songs and symphonies. From the forms and colors of natural objects the painter turns to spread on canvas what he sees with his mind's eye also. From the round of prosaic events the poet leads us into his world of ideal meanings.

The aesthetic extension of ordinary reality into imaginative spheres is matched by extensions in other directions. Such are the intellectual into the boundless realm of abstract truth, the moral into the intangibles of moral value, the religious into the profoundest emotions of the human spirit.

CHAPTER IV

OUR COMMON WORLD

1

IF THE WORLD that each individual knows is the world that he constructs in response to stimulation and in accordance with his own needs and interests, it must be his own private world, not exactly like that of anyone else. Color-blindness furnishes a stock illustration of this privacy. So long as a color-blind person makes his contacts in ordinary life without reference to certain color distinctions, his world and ours seem to be quite the same. But when some experience reveals that he is deficient in color sense, we realize that we do not know what his world looks like. Long and elaborate experimentation has been necessary to ascertain the hues in which persons more or less lacking in normal color vision see their objects.

The uniqueness of the individual's world may be realized in connection with other qualities than color. The same object may be warm to one and cool to another, or the same sound may be loud to one and faint to another.

At first thought, however, the conclusion that each individual percipient apprehends the world in a way not duplicated by any other person seems practically absurd. For all the objects in our physical world are sharable, if not shared, objects; and

one of the main tests of a physical existence is the social test, that is, what seems to me true concerning the object tallies with what seems to you true. Physical nature is made up of these agreed-upon objects. They are not private possessions.

The issue before us, then, is clear. How can each individual be confined to his own world as perceived by him, and yet be sure that the world known to him is known by others? A satisfactory answer is essential to a critically thought-out world view.

2

INASMUCH as critics are always ready with a charge of solipsism, let us at once consider whether the view of the individual's private world to which the argument thus far has led is indeed solipsistic. Two points must be borne in mind.

In the first place, there is a well-recognized distinction between the objects of my ordinary world, which I must see as I do, and objects of fantasy, with which I may follow my own sweet will. In constructing my world of sense perception I am under some control, some coercion from without. To affirm this control is to transcend solipsism.

In the second place, each individual percipient's world may be private in the sense that it is his unique interpretation, differing from the interpretations of other percipients, yet all may be interpretations of what is common. The sketches made by a group of art students from the same model are all different, but they are not solipsistic. Even

if each student were never to see any other sketch than his own, his drawing would still represent, not some private imagining, but the model common to all in the group.

If we suppose that percipients are responding to the same dynamic order or control, the charge of solipsism is no more pertinent than in the case of what is commonly called the realistic view. For how could an independent thing-world be known except by individual constructive activity, which would result in as many perceptual worlds as there were percipients?

In the light of these considerations, we may dismiss the thought of solipsism, and turn to the question, How do we get our common world?

To begin with, we should take into account the general similarities in our own natures. We all have bodily structure and sensory organs of approximately the same pattern. Our mental processes are subject to the same laws of validity. Our needs and interests are much alike.

Again, if the stimulations that reach us are—with due allowance for differences of position, and so on—of the same character for one person as for another, our responses will have a general resemblance.

Thus a foundation for a common world of experience would be supplied by approximately uniform activity of the dynamic order upon human beings, all having substantially the same methods of constructive interpretation.

Further, we are by nature social beings. We are

given to communicating our experiences—what we have seen and heard, felt, thought, and done. Racial advance has taught us the use of language and has not yet completely proscribed demonstration by gesture. All behavior is more or less expressive. In general, our private worlds are such that you can talk about the physical objects you perceive, and I understand you as if you were referring to the objects I perceive. So far as we can reciprocate in this way, we have a common world.¹ ✓

When your description of an object does not quite harmonize with mine, we seek an explanation in the appertaining conditions. To you the coin looks elliptical, to me it looks round; but you see it at an acute angle, whereas I look down upon it from directly above. We are continually making adjustments for differences in point of view, differences in previous experience, and the like. If we would take such differences into account still more, we might save ourselves many a misunderstanding. Various persons may use the same words but not intend the same meaning. Frequently we assume that more of our private world has been conveyed to the hearer or reader than is actually the case, and

1. Cf. H. Wildon Carr: "If there is an intersubjective intercourse, nothing more is necessary to account for the genesis of the idea of a common world for such an idea must be its immediate consequence. The existence of a common world as the cause of intercourse is unintelligible, just because knowledge of such existence could only arise as an effect of intercourse." (*The Monadology of Leibniz*, p. 201.) J. E. Boodin: "A common perceptual world is the outcome of the social process, not the presupposition of it." (*The Social Mind* [The Macmillan Company], p. 322.) See also C. I. Lewis, *Mind and the World-Order*, chap. iv.

then we may find that we are misunderstood. Ambiguities and misinterpretations are so numerous that a working surmise as to one another's perceptions is the best we can hope for.

Language, though invaluable as a means of intercourse, is far from being adequate to express the details of one's experience. Not only are words lacking, but such as there are have general meanings. They cannot carry an experience across from one person to another exactly as it was had. We freight our words with our own definite experiences; but as they pass to the hearer, they drop the definiteness that we fain would have them carry. Only the conceptual content is left. The hearer forthwith concretizes the generalities in accordance with his own definite experiences. The speaker ordinarily assumes that his words communicate his own unique experiences, whereas the hearer interprets the words in harmony with his experiences, which are equally unique. Yet some common ground is won. Within the range of the metrical sciences a high degree of communicable accuracy is already attained; but in the region of complex actualities which exist by reason of their value-content, we can be only vague and suggestive.

The common world, then, is for each individual so much of his private world as he considers shared or sharable by others. This has a practical basis. It means, not that the apprehensions of two or more individuals are identical, but that, after due allowance is made for known differences of position and disposition, each person assumes that the world he

is apprehending is the world with which other percipients have to do. This assumption is a matter of course with us all. We are not conscious of making it until some misunderstanding reveals a discrepancy between our own and another person's perceptual world. ✓

The conviction of community affects us in contrasting ways. On the one hand, we may discount the inexpressible in our experience, and regarding it as of questionable validity and value, we may tend to conventionalize our outlook upon life and to suppress originality and uniqueness in favor of what others will understand and approve. This conduces to leanness and superficiality; for the unexpressed aspects may come from the deeper currents of our lives. They may include those profound insights that slowly take form and definiteness from our myriad contacts with nature and human society. On the other hand, our ability to test and expand our own perceptual experiences by the findings of others makes possible an indefinite enrichment of our intellectual life. We are able to correct inaccuracies in our thinking and to appropriate what others may give us from their own store of knowledge. The impressive achievements of the natural sciences are built up in this way. They are the systematized results of coöperative effort. A discovery or theory is not looked upon as established until the evidence is reviewed and tested by various persons. Yet the individual's own world of experience, however corrected and enlarged by social contributions, remains his private world. What does

not belong as a construct to that private creation cannot possibly be known by him.

3

THE common world, because common, seems to detach itself from all individual construction, and hence it is often taken to be the real world. It is regarded as external, abiding, and vastly more extensive than the private world of the individual. This is the universe as science has revealed it. Take, for instance, the far geological past. No one has ever experienced it, but we all concede that it had its place in history. The Mesozoic age of reptiles belongs hypothetically to the common world, but not actually to any private individual world. This is evident, because those monsters of the past are scientific constructs out of rather meager data found among the rocks. But when an imaginative genius gives us a conjectural model of a tyrannosaur, we can all have perceptual knowledge and realize what we missed by not living in the age of reptiles.

Largely on the assumption that the thing-world is not the exclusive possession of the individual percipient but is shared by all observers, the realist insists that physical things are independent of being known. A. O. Lovejoy, using a striking illustration, argues in favor of a common or public space and time.² But even in respect to space and time we may appeal to the uniformities already pointed out as making possible a common world. The same independent causal order conditions all percipients;

2. *The Revolt against Dualism*, pp. 300 ff.

and minds act responsively in accordance with the categories of thought. All objective experiences have the spatio-temporal form. Space, considered merely as a container, is the emptiest of concepts. Hence the space of one perceptual world cannot differ much, if at all, from that of any other. If percipients find no quale in which the space of one differs from that of another, they naturally make no distinction and consider that they have one common space. So it is with time. One's desires or dreads do not avail to hasten or delay a coming date. Hence the course of time seems an independent fixity. If space and time are assumed as prerequisites of sense perception, it is easy to give the common or public world a status of independent reality. Yet not because it is independent is it common, but because it is common it seems independent. The question of independence will have attention in the following chapter.

It may be asked, If the common world is not something independent of the worlds of individual percipients, how is the objective to be distinguished from the subjective, the real from the illusory?

Subjective and objective are relational terms that need to have the manner of their use clearly indicated. So far as the present argument is concerned, the following may be said. To the individual percipient as subject, his sense world is all objective. Being mental in origin, however, it may be called subjective as over against the conception of an independent world of things. All question of a division of qualities of things into subjective and objec-

tive is canceled by the view that I have been advocating. In this respect there is no "bifurcation of nature."

To distinguish the real from the illusory is to pronounce upon validity. Subjective and illusory are not synonymous. An illusion is a belief—especially on the level of perception—that fails to satisfy relevant tests. There are certain practical tests that can be applied by the individual without wider appeal; but a belief is fully accepted as true only when it satisfies tests that may be applied by other persons. Hence community is essential to validity for social use. But much of the individual's experience is inexpressible, and every experience in its particularity is unique and never repeated. Only propositions based upon the interrelations of many experiences are even susceptible of proof. Yet who would be so rash as to assert that all the inexpressible and unique experiences of the individual are illusory? The line of demarcation between truth and illusion cannot be sharply drawn, for it falls within experience, and experience is ever growing. What is commonly accepted as veridical may under improved conditions of testing turn out to be illusory. The apparent motion of the sun across the sky is a familiar and striking example. On the other hand, what is suspected of being illusion may under improved conditions of testing turn out to be veridical. Psychical research is making great efforts in this field of possibility.

When the common world is recognized as the individual percipient's world insofar as it is com-

municable, epistemological dualism as usually understood falls away entirely. There are not two worlds, one outside and one "in the mind." But a deeper duality remains in full force—the duality of a causal order of activity, on the one hand, and, on the other, ourselves as acted upon by its coercive stimulation so that we build our world of experience.

4

THE foregoing analysis yields little comfort to the realist who would have the common object independent of being known. As we are all realists in our unreflective moods, and most of us have a realistic bent even when we are critical, we shall do well to examine the opposing line of thought as it might be presented by a critical realist or an objective idealist.

The things all about us—thus runs the counter argument—are obviously public. They make up the common world. They stand out as the realities, over against the private exclusive constructs of the individual percipients. These constructs by the lone percipient are symbols of the real things. For example,³ if there is an apple on the table, each person present perceives it in his own way. His percept refers to the real apple and is symbolic of it, but the real apple remains in factual isolation. Suppose there are three observers; then there are four apples, three symbolic and one real. No observer has the real apple in his experience.

3. Similar illustrations go back at least as far as Thomas Reid.

At this point the neo-realist might interrupt to disagree, for here, indeed, we reach the crux of the matter. What is the status of the real apple? The critical realist gives a different answer from that of the neo-realist and from that of the objective idealist. The question calls for careful study. But just now we are facing a doubt whether it is true that none of our three observers has the real apple in his experience. If any one of them should withdraw the apple that he sees, he would remove the apples of both the other observers. Then each must have in his experience the real apple.

Thus the argument for an independent common world ends in a contradiction. Let us consider now the same illustration in accordance with the view suggested in the earlier part of the chapter. When the causal order that acts upon each percipient leads each to perceive an apple on the table, these percepts are private and different, but congruous. The apple that each percipient has in his own experience is the real apple. In the causal order there are no apples, for that order is assumed as the source of activities known only by their effects upon us. But—*mirabile dictu*—we can influence them. Within limits, there is complete reciprocity between the causal order and ourselves. If one observer takes his apple from the table, the dynamic order so acts upon all the observers that they can no longer locate their apple, unless they adjust themselves to the changed conditions. They may then find it in the pocket of the first observer. “But,” someone asks, “what would happen if each

of the three observers should try at the same time to appropriate his apple?" Such unfortunate simultaneity is what leads to collisions and conflicts. It demonstrates, however, that even though each observer deals with a private apple, he is dealing with what we call the real apple, common to all.

What, then, we may resume, is the common object—which in our illustration we call an apple? It is, for each percipient, his own private construction in response to the impulsions from the dynamic order, but it is regarded by the percipient as identical in meaning—after allowances have been made for differences of position and the like—with the corresponding object in the experience of each other percipient of the object.

CHAPTER V

THE INDEPENDENT REALITY

1

AT THIS POINT a recapitulation may be helpful. We began with a study of sense perception in order to find out our relation to the physical world about us. In the first chapter we passed in review very briefly some of the more promising theories of perception, and reached the conclusion that all the conditioning in perception comes in the form of stimulations, and that the objects resulting are the constructive responses of the percipient. They are to him what the stimulations mean; they are of the nature of interpretations.

In the second chapter we noted some of the general characteristics of the constructive activity by which we get a world of sense objects. We found that these characteristics manifest themselves not only in the qualities of things, such as color, weight, form, size, but even in their substantiality and the space and time in which they are embedded. This left us no choice but to conclude that the entire sense world originates in the activity of the percipient, working under stimulation.

This conclusion brought up various questions. Two of the most significant we considered in the immediately following chapters. One related to the nature of objects as perceived, the other to the

method by which, out of private apprehensions as numerous and varied as the percipients, we obtain a common world.

We found that objects as known in sense perception are essentially values. Their unity as complex wholes, their stability as substantial entities, their every characteristic is constituted by their value. This does not mean that the percipient attaches value to them as existent things, but that their existence as perduring entities depends upon their value-content, and existence is itself a value.

To the second question we found an answer in the social nature of human experience and in the practical interests that largely motivate human life. A common world that serves practical ends is built up of all the objects in one's private world that meet the social test. The paradoxical character of this conclusion is relieved when we remember the distinction between the dynamic order and the experience world, which is the nature we apprehend in perception. It is this experience world that we ordinarily take to be common. But strictly the activities of the dynamic order are the common basis.

A question of paramount importance is now before us. What is the independent reality?

The answer may well begin with a fundamental contrast to which reference has already been made. We distinguish between experiences that seem to originate in the action upon us of something other than ourselves and experiences that seem to originate in the play of our own fantasy. When I see a tree outside my window, I must see it where it is.

It has a determinate position. Its characteristics of color, shape, size, are equally determined. I cannot make it elm or ginkgo at will; it remains persistently maple. But if I close my eyes and give myself up to pleasant imaginings, I can have a whole forest of any kind, or a high surf dashing on the rocks, or a line of snow-clad mountains brilliant in the sunlight.

Both sorts of experience exert a profound influence upon us. But apparently the controlled experiences are primary. They mean for us a world of objects that we take to be real. In childhood and in the borderland between sleep and waking the distinction is not always sharply drawn, but apart from such exceptions, confusion between the physical world as apprehended in sense perception and the world of unreality that is the product of unbridled imagination betokens more or less abnormality.

This deep-running distinction has the merit of revealing adequate ground for transcending ourselves and affirming an independent reality. Somewhere beyond us or distinct from us there is something independent—as independent as the most thoroughgoing realist can desire. And that independent reality, whether one or many, must be the explanation of our having an experience of a physical world. Hence the question is not whether or no there is an independent reality that sets the patterns for our sense perception, but rather what is its nature.

Now realists—to speak in a general way—ascribe

independence to the physical world. They make it self-existent, maintaining itself over against the knower, and in no sense conditioned by its being known. It is there to be discovered by the knower. It moves on its course with complete indifference to any cognitive relation.

But, as we have already seen, realists, in trying to hold to the independence of the physical world, are forced from one position to another without finding firm ground. There is divergence of opinion among them as to the exact meaning to be assigned to independence. When intent on emphasizing complete detachment from the percipient, they move toward the limit reached by Santayana in his doctrine of essences, which are not the objective world that we know, but purely hypothetical entities. Evidently the independence is not to be taken as absolute, else we could not know the physical world as it is. A physical object differs in size and shape and quality as we approach it or recede from it. Which appearance is the real thing? If we say that each one of them in turn is the real thing, we are landed in the absurdity that an individual thing is as many and various as its appearances. This would make it infinitely multifarious. Bertrand Russell¹ offers another suggestion: "Given an object in one perspective, form the system of all the objects correlated with it in all the perspectives; that system may be identified with the momentary common-sense 'thing.'" But this

1. *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy*, p. 89.

accentuates the subjective conditioning of the object; for a system does not form itself, it requires a thinker.

The scientist in his analysis finds thinghood ever receding, and activity coming to the fore. In like manner, the realist is obliged to strip the qualities from his thing-world, until only "physical energy undergoing transformation in space and time" ² is left. It is not necessary to go over the various attempts of realists to keep the supposed independent world united with the physical world that we know. Here the stream of realism divides into monistic and dualistic branches. On the basis of realism, the debate between monist and dualist in epistemology is interminable, for each has an obvious truth. The perceptual experience itself is unquestionably monistic; neither common sense nor recent science³ finds any distinction between percept and thing. But the cause of the perceptual experience cannot be found nor its validity established without reference to what is beyond the psychic event, that is, without some sort of dualistic explanation. The real as causal cannot be within the effect, namely, experience; and the real as furnishing the standard of validity cannot be within the experience that is

2. D. C. Macintosh, *The Problem of Knowledge* (The Macmillan Company), p. 168. Cf. A. O. Lovejoy, *The Revolt against Dualism*, chap. viii.

3. A. S. Eddington, *The Philosophy of Physical Science* (The Macmillan Company), p. 150: "The recognition that physical knowledge is structural knowledge abolishes all dualism of consciousness and matter." See also F. R. Bichowsky, "Factors Common to the Mind and to the External World," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVII (1940), 477 ff.

to be tested. There is no occasion for setting up another thing-world. All that is needed is provision, on the one hand, for causality, and on the other, for validity. This would leave open the possibility of considerable difference between the independent reality and the world as perceived. Such possibility of difference hints that a more satisfactory view may be found if we do not start with the assumption that the physical world is independently real.

Some objective idealists, recognizing order in the physical world, make the reality of nature consist in its being thought and willed by a creative mind. There is much ambiguity and unclearness, however, as to what the status of nature is. Certain writers appear to give it reality as a cosmic system not identical with the perceived world of the human individual. It has practically the independence of the realist's physical world, but differs from that in being the expression of mind. An advocate of this view, however, meets the same difficulty that the realist faces in explaining the relation between the two worlds. Just at this point clarification is extremely important. Yet many writers leave the question in a hazy background. It seems to me quite unsatisfactory to say that in the act of knowing we reproduce a mental, though existent, world that is given. If an attempt is made to define what is given and to relate it to the reproducing, does one not inevitably come to the conclusion that the given is stimulation, and the reproducing is response? This relation is familiar and clear. And if

the stimulation is looked upon as coming, not from the perceived objects which are the constructs of the human mind, but from a cosmic causal order, then there is no puzzling duality of worlds. There would seem to be plenty of scope for creative thought and will on the part of the ultimate reality in furnishing human beings with a continuous control that leads them, on their part, to exercise of thought and will in creating an orderly world of values.

Other objective idealists incline to a more absolutistic theory, and hold that human minds are parts of the objective world regarded as mind. I sympathize with Pratt in his remonstrance against extending the meaning of the word mind until mind and nature are virtually one vague and undifferentiated whole.⁴

As has already been said, our sense of an independent reality comes from the control exercised over us in perception. The independent reality must be dynamic in character, because it acts upon us. This activity or causality is what must be fundamentally affirmed of the independent reality. It stirs us to the construction of our world, and continuously controls our objective experiences.

Leibniz,⁵ in his theory of windowless monads, dispenses with continuous influence from without, and holds that each monad develops in accordance with its own nature. The object perceived is wholly

4. *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXI (1934), 200 ff.

5. *A New System of the Nature and of the Interaction of Substances*, secs. 14 f.; *Monadology*, sec. 11.

the product of the monad perceiving it. Of course, this raises at once the question: How, then, is a common world possible? An earlier question also is suggested: How can the idea of a common world arise in a monadic mind? Leibniz replies with his doctrine of preëstablished harmony. The monads depend upon a supreme Monad, which has fitted together their activities in such wise that universal harmony results. But even if it were granted that questionings about a common world could be satisfied thus, the doctrine that all has been arranged in advance by divine wisdom annuls human freedom or reduces it to the possibility of developing in accordance with the nature given to the individual. Furthermore, although Leibniz has a good deal to say about the clearing up of sense experience that is originally confused, he makes no adequate provision for distinguishing truth from error.

Yet there is a valid element in the suggestion. For in responding to stimulations the percipient acts, of course, according to his native endowments and propensities. An intelligence that is dull or subnormal can hardly respond to a given stimulation as fully or in the same way as one that is sensitive and keen. But this applies to response to influences from without, and does not mean that perceptual experience as a whole develops from within.

The theory that each percipient evolves his sense world out of his own nature suggests the immediacy of the control. In the first chapter I have shown why we cannot accept as a final explanation the theory that the stimulations occasioning sense per-

ception come from the object perceived. If, then, the control does not come from that source, it must be immediate. It must be exercised directly upon the self.

2

CONTINUED study of our sense experience will throw more light on the nature of the control.

The next point to be noted is that each person, perceiving his world of objects for himself—that is, responding in his own way to the stimulations he receives—has an experience that is continuous during his conscious life and by inference during periods of unconsciousness. He finds in it order and progress. By the use of scientific methods he can connect every part with every other so as to think of the whole as a cosmos. The connections are such that although changes are taking place all the time, he may anticipate future events according to laws that he discovers. These statements represent ordinary facts that are hardly open to question. They point plainly to the conclusion that all the stimulations the individual receives throughout his career come from the same source.

This conclusion is strengthened by a further consideration. In the previous chapter we saw that two or more percipients can converse about the objects of their several worlds and understand one another. This is a marvelous feat, not to be lightly passed over. It is so usual that we accept it as a matter of course; but the wonder of it grips the reflective mind. The only explanation that seems to

have any virtue in it is that the stimulations received by different individuals are somehow related. That the stimulations are thus interrelated is construable only on the assumption that they all come from the same directing source.

The stimulations, considered in themselves, are forms of effective action. As activities, they can exist only in the present, and must be constantly renewed if they produce effects that continue when the ever-vanishing present becomes the past. Hence continuity in sense perception leads to the inference that the stimulations are successive throughout the duration of the perceptual response. The only alternative to this would seem to be some such view as that just cited from Leibniz, namely, that external control over sense perception is exercised only at the initial stage by setting off the perceptive apparatus, which thereafter runs its course. This is incredible in view of the infinite details and complexity of lifelong experience, and is ruled out by the recognition of undetermined volitional activity on the part of the percipient. It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that the occasion of the mind's constructive activity is as continuously present as nature is supposed to be continuously existent. The inferred continuity of nature is the real continuity of the causal activity. Physical objects as our responses to stimulation exist only in the present when they are manifested. They can continue to appear only if they are continuously renewed by that on which they depend. So far as they enter into our experience, they are demonstrably con-

structs. They exist in time as real objects in a real world because, on the one hand, we who know them persist and through memory can associate past experiences with present events in such a way as to constitute objects that endure, and, on the other hand, the stimulations to which we respond in sense perception keep up their activity upon us, causing us to have this continuous experience. To account for the continuity of this control we must think of the ultimate source as perduring.

I have been speaking of the stimulations as if they had a measure of independence and a status all their own. But really they serve only as a scaffolding, for convenience in the argument. As activities they presuppose an entity that is acting; for activities are not self-sustaining. They can no more be separated from their source than a moving ball can be bifurcated into a movement that sustains itself without the ball, and a ball that is not moving. There is a common illusion that when we take the whole of nature into our purview, we may ignore this obvious requirement of a ground for the activity and may regard the universe as pure process that implies nothing beyond itself. The scientist usually works as if this were true; for he is not interested in what is operative in the process, but only in what are the modes of its activity. All his findings are given in terms of these modes or laws. The process, taken in isolation, comes to be for him the world of actualities. It is his world because it is the focus of his interest. But if he were seriously asked what in the universal process is active, he should

be quick to see that the process, when taken by itself, is an abstraction, and that the concrete reality must continue its energizing presence through the momentary events of the entire process. Clear thinking rules out the idea that one event creates its successor. Something must endure through the process to make it what it is.

The refusal to recognize the reality of such an entity is held by an influential body of thinkers to be the advanced position in the intellectual conquest of nature; for it is a refusal to forsake experience and venture into the transcendent. But this is positivism enamored of itself, and shutting its eyes to the real nature of experience. Such positivism not only abstracts from the total situation those aspects which lend themselves to exact operation and description, but assumes that these constitute all that the situation has in it. Yet what is ignored is what gives concreteness and makes the situation real. If we must use the word transcendent, which is quite misleading in this connection, we should recognize that the transcendent in the situation is what gives it significance and objectivity.⁶ Yet the contention of the positivistic critic contains a much-needed warning: if we postulate a transcendent source of the process, we are at liberty to assign to it only the characteristics that are plainly warranted by its causal relation to experience.

What shall we call this source? Inasmuch as it is

6. Cf. A. S. Eddington: "The purely objective sources of the objective element in our observational knowledge have already been named; they are *life, consciousness, spirit*." (*The Philosophy of Physical Science*, p. 69.)

known by what it does, a dynamic term seems appropriate. The words force and energy have acquired scientific meanings, which make them undesirable here. Power is a better term. Since this power is conceived as the ultimate ground of nature, it must be cosmic in its scope and adequate to its task. Let us now consider what cogent inferences we may draw concerning its fundamental characteristics, and leave to the final chapter the more speculative matters.

In considering the stimulations just now, we found reasons for holding that they all come from the same source. This brings up two related questions.

First, is this cosmic power one or many? Although a superficial reading of experience might suggest a multiverse—the product of many powers—the weight of evidence clearly favors the view that, since interaction must be admitted, all existing things are interdependent and form a system. The larger task of science is to trace out these interconnections and organize the whole. But if nature is a universe, the power that expresses itself therein must be alone in control.

Second, is this cosmic power in its own nature a unity? Since it acts everywhere throughout the universe without need of transference through space, and since it maintains a perfect correlation between the past and the present, we are compelled to infer that it transcends both space and time. If, like physical objects, it were spread out in space, it would be infinitely divisible, and its internal co-

herence would be an opaque mystery. If time distinctions affected its inner life, so that in itself it was a succession, there would be no construing its mastery of the past. Apparently we are within the limits of presumptive evidence if we ascribe internal unity to the cosmic power.

As has already been argued, the continuity of sense experience indicates that the cosmic power must endure. The full significance of this we are not yet ready to consider.

Pursuing our search of sense perception for clues, we note that the multiformity in the physical universe must have its counterpart in the multiformity of the stimulations received from the controlling power. And since our physical world is changing momentarily and no two of our experiences are ever quite alike, the cosmic source must provide ever new forms of stimulation—new in their particularity but fitting into patterns variously related to one another. This shuts out the idea that the stimulations come in a mechanical way. To be mechanical they would have to be repetitious. A mechanistic conception of nature is the product of a finite intelligence generalizing its experiences in the effort to dominate an otherwise unmanageable complexity. For in practical life we classify objects and deal with each class as if its members were virtually all alike. The infinite variety, which would mean to us chaos impenetrable, yields with surprising readiness to methods of generalization. We can gather up an untold number of processes into one conceptual content and call it a cactus or

a boat or a guitar. We can find laws that not only cover the activities of the immediate present in our limited sense world but apply to all nature and all time; at least, we proceed as if they held, and we are not confounded. To simplify nature thus is of incalculable value. It makes knowledge possible and all forms of effective control over physical things. We therefore tend to ignore the embarrassing multifariousness of nature, and then to think of the stimulations that act upon us in sense perception as correspondingly reduced in number and variety.

That we can simplify nature in this way and thereby increase our power over it and our insight into its workings is of great significance in our attempt to characterize the ultimate reality. To indicate just what is involved, let me go back a little.

The controlling stimulations come to each individual in such a way that his responses mean to him an orderly world; and these responses are such that from them a common-to-all world can be produced, a world that is unique for the individual and yet has a common meaning, so that the one can be practically ignored in favor of the other. That this should come about, the stimulations each receives must have reference to the stimulations all other beings receive. The possibility of reducing to thoroughgoing order the world constructed by us in response to stimulations, and attaining a common world, leads to the conclusion that the stimulations themselves have orderly arrangement and sequence. One theory would start with a mere welter of events, from which the intelligible world

is derived by selection and arrangement. This view might be plausible if one person did all the selecting and arranging, but it cannot explain how countless persons should, each in his own way, so select and arrange as to attain a common intelligible world. There seems no escape from the conclusion that intelligibility runs through the welter. In inferential constructions we unhesitatingly assume that the power controlling us now in sense perception has followed an orderly course in its activity throughout the ages, so that our imagination can wing its flight into the distant past and build with somewhat of the same assurance as that with which we fashion our present world. We need not carry this line of thought any further to see that the source of all these stimulations works out each moment what to a finite human intelligence would seem to be an infinite problem in mathematics. This cosmic reality must know what it is doing. Its knowledge as well as its power must be immeasurably beyond the range of human comprehension. There is no other principle of order than intelligence. The choice, then, lies between affirming intelligence of the power that controls us in sense perception and abandoning the problem altogether.

We need not set up our own intelligence as a standard for the infinite intelligence of the cosmic power. We laboriously struggle and blunder into the little we know, and have to revise it and replace it with some other guess. But a knowledge that is detailed and accurate in every respect is not incon-

ceivable. It is the kind of knowledge we should naturally associate with an unlimited intelligence. To an intelligent cosmic power the changing universe of activities would be at any moment of time exactly what that power willed it to be, and hence would be completely known.

As a result of the foregoing argumentation, we seem justified in holding that the independent reality whence comes the control in sense perception is a dynamic unity, which transcends time and space, and which acts in a way that is not mechanical but orderly and hence indicative of intelligence. At this point let us break off consideration of this ultimate Power, and then resume after we have canvassed the field of the inner life of selfhood.

PART TWO
OURSELVES

CHAPTER VI

WHAT ARE WE?

1

THUS FAR we have looked outward from ourselves and found a world of objects, which critical reflection led us to conclude are our own constructs, as we respond to excitations from a dynamic order. This conclusion shows us our relation to the objective world in its essential simplicity. The processes involved are, of course, as complex as the outcome, which is the world of sense perception.

In Part Two we turn from the world of physical things to consider the self which apprehends them. It is not my purpose to canvass the whole range of organic life. My primary concern is humanity. This narrowing of the field puts to one side many fascinating problems, but leaves a superabundance of others—so many, in fact, that I hardly hope to do more than indicate what they are and what seem to be acceptable solutions.

I wish there were a more satisfactory word to use than self. It is a dull word. It has yielded the adjective selfish, just as ego has furnished egotistical, with the result that the words ego and self may give an impression that does not do justice to the social nature. The word mind, although a favorite with philosophers, throws undue emphasis upon the intellectual aspect. In like manner, the word

will over stresses the volitional, and through hypostatization has led to serious misunderstanding. "The active subject of experience"¹ expresses the meaning, but is too cumbrous for frequent use. The term person has much to commend it, but is often made to cover not only conscious life, but forms of physical expression. Speaking generally, I am in sympathy with those who would limit the meaning of person to human selves manifesting appreciation of ideal aims. Personality is then the flowering of selfhood. But it seems to me impossible to draw a sharp line between the two. The germ of personality may be in selfhood when we know it not. I am not sure but animal pets that have the ability to elicit human affection and respond to human interest have the rudiments of personality. Though animals express themselves by behavior without the use of abstract symbols, they say a great deal to those who study them sympathetically. The mystery of the growth of selfhood is involved in drawing a line between a self that is not yet a person and one that may be so considered, and nobody has yet solved that mystery. Accordingly, I shall for the most part use the term self, and trust that the reader will give it the full meaning that I shall try to set forth.

2

FOR practical purposes we all know what the self is. Even before we reached the reflective stage, we could distinguish between the "me" and the "not

1. H. Wildon Carr, *The Monadology of Leibniz*, p. 172.

me." But if we try to explain just what we mean by the term self, we encounter difficulties. When we ask, "What are we?" immediately we tend to form some image of the self as a diaphanous substance, or an extremely rarefied combination of activities, or a vague aura of consciousness. Convinced that the self is real, we put it among objects, because we naively think of them as the primary reality. We locate the self in the world of our experiences. It is the central fact of its environment. In treating it thus we treat it as an object, we lay it open to inspection and description after the manner of scientific research.

Study of the self from the observer's point of view yields a great deal of information that has value. Psychologists have relied upon it almost entirely since psychology has aimed at becoming an exact science. Their line of reasoning is evident. If we want to know what the self is, we must know how it acts. We must know its behavior under the manifold conditions of life. The main advantage of this method of approach is that it gives us something to analyze. We find that the self thus examined shows various forms of activity—perceptions and other noetic functionings, feelings in great variety, and conations. These can be studied scientifically. We may know them as distinguishable psychic events, and discover close connections between them and the neural system of the body. Then we set up a hypothetical entity as somehow encompassing all the activities that can be called psychic and all the connections among the activi-

ties. The sum of activities and connections becomes the self. But the self as analyzed and built up in scientific study is a thought-construct, not the real self that does the analyzing and building up. The seekers for insight into the nature of selfhood have no instruments of discovery at their disposal except intellectual forms. Whatever they bring back with them is content—not mind but concepts; and the self cannot be held in a concept.

Even after critical reflection has convinced us that the self is not to be found among its objects, the delusion remains for our everyday thinking. We identify one another as selves by the physical manifestations that constitute us as objects. The routine of life may be carried on with no other conception of selfhood, just as we may use the telephone without thinking about electricity. But when we deliberately raise the question, "What is the self?" we cannot be satisfied with a convenient proxy.

In further consideration of the self, certain contrasting views that have their advocates may be examined.

3

THE theory that the self is the body, or some part of it, functioning in special ways, may call to its support emergent evolution, and assert that the animal body may be endowed with all the qualities and characters that appear as it becomes increasingly complex. Biologists advocating emergent evolution start with the simplest chemical combina-

tions, as, for instance, the union of oxygen and hydrogen to form water, and point out the well-known properties of water as emergent, that is, as not existing till the chemical combination is effected. Thus they trace a long line of emergents. Each compound introduces into the world new modes of activity, until a very complex arrangement is effected from which life in a low form emerges. When still further complexity is reached, the higher manifestations of life appear.

But the theory of emergent evolution in its full sweep does not go unchallenged. For example, William McDougall, though a scientist, says of its various versions: "In each scheme offered us there is compromise or vacillation. *Something of Life or of Mind is imported into the physical universe from which Mind is said to have emerged.*"²

There is certainly no inherent probability in the supposition that the body as a living organism, or the brain as a "mind-brain,"³ is aware of itself, of its relations to its environment, of its past, of its needs and wishes, and is able to devise effective plans for satisfying these. How can there be combined in a physical entity, even though a marvel of complexity, such wholly dissimilar functionings as those that characterize strictly space-filling things and those that have no direct reference to objective space but have their sphere in the subjective world of ideals? Activities of the one sort, inter-

2. *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution* (D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.), p. 196.

3. R. W. Sellars, *The Philosophy of Physical Realism*, p. 411.

interpreted in accordance with the materialism defended by these theorists, have to do with electrical charges and chemical combinations and movements of masses. Activities of the other sort, interpreted in any way consistent with argument in defense of a theory, have to do with meanings and values; they may with equal readiness refer to the past or the future; they may be critical estimates of elaborate reasonings, may weave together various conclusions into a thought system that satisfies the ideal demands of intelligence, may develop a plan of action that will involve multitudes of persons and require years of persistent effort for its realization. These two types of functioning are so different that, when viewed in their concrete actuality, they have practically nothing in common. Hence there seems no likelihood that anything but confusion can result from attributing them to an entity that is only physical.

The assumption that body or brain in certain functionings may be equated with the self starts with the view that physical nature has a kind of priority, an independent existence that does not need to be proved. But our studies in Part One have led to a different conclusion. We found there that physical things *qua* physical are continually changing, both internally and in relation to other things; that their status as enduring through change depends upon their relation to a percipient, who constitutes them values; that apart from their value-content they are reduced to a succession that exists as a succession only for an intelligence, able

to connect the past with the present. Objective things were seen to owe their existence, as space-filling substances, to the controlled constructive activity of the percipient, while their apparent causal efficiency reflects the real efficiency of the control in sense perception. Things are derived; they cannot reasonably be thought as originating the possibility of their own existence.

This line of reflection might be indefinitely extended by a detailed study of experience, but enough has been said to discredit the view that the body does our thinking for us. Further consideration of the body must be postponed until the following chapter.

4

AMONG recent writers on selfhood Bernard Bosanquet, a disciple of Lotze, has made one of the most elaborate studies. He appeals vigorously from fixity and exclusiveness to fluctuation and comprehensiveness. "We, our subjective selves, are in truth much more to be compared to a rising and falling tide, which is continually covering wider areas as it deepens, and dropping back to narrower and shallower ones as it ebbs, than to the isolated pillars with their fixed circumferences, as which we have been taught to think of ourselves."⁴ "The best general description of the nature of mind is to call it a world; and the world which constitutes a mind is not limited according to any hard and

4. *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (The Macmillan Company), pp. 372 f.

fast rule. It has been found suggestive and convenient, for example, to speak as if the principle of individual distinctness were 'one mind, one social function.' But obviously this is a quite unreal simplification of the facts, unless we reduce its meaning to what is true enough; viz. that it is a serviceable ideal to regard the content of a single mind, however complex, as constituting a single conation. Consciousnesses are of all degrees of comprehensiveness. They are centered *par excellence* no doubt in a range of externality which a single body focusses for a single mind each to each; but this immediate centeredness is no ultimate limit for their comprehension; and there are many conditions under which it might truly be said that a single mind is constituted by and controls more bodies than one. In a word, then, we are to think of the individual as a world of experience, whose center is given in the body and in the range of externality that comes by means of it, but whose limits depend on his power."⁵ "What we call 'the individual' then is not a fixed essence, but a living world of content."⁶

Bosanquet's profound observations are a needed protest against any cramping notion of selfhood. But in making the self "a world of experience" or "of content" he treats the self as objective. He goes so far as to say that "if the hindrance against two selves having the same immediate experience could be removed, the result involved would be the coa-

5. *Op. cit.*, p. 287.

6. *Op. cit.*, p. 289.

lescence of the two selves into one.”⁷ Although Bosanquet seeks in one connection at least to ward off the charge that he is substituting abstractions for concrete beings, he does not succeed in exonerating himself.⁸ In his view the subjective self is purely formal and transient; the true positive self of content is realized in the eternal reality of the Absolute. Because of this turn in his thought from the self as subject to the self as experienced content, Bosanquet can speak plausibly of the confluence of selves, meaning the working over of different experience worlds until they harmonize. It is this blend of objective selves or experience worlds which constitutes his Absolute. As Pringle-Pattison writes, “If one were inclined to put it strongly, one might almost say that Professor Bosanquet’s theory does not contain the idea of self at all.”⁹

Some writers who do not accept Bosanquet’s view of the Absolute agree with him to some extent in holding that the self is experience or consciousness. The words experience and consciousness are not sufficiently definite to preclude ambiguity and misunderstanding. But without going into a study of their possible meanings, I will assume that they are here used in no Pickwickian sense.

William James, in his vivid style, describes con-

7. *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* (The Macmillan Company), p. 47.

8. *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 373 f. Cf. the criticism by A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Life and Finite Individuality*, ed. H. Wildon Carr, pp. 108 f.

9. *The Idea of God*, p. 271.

sciousness as a train of "successive thinkers, numerically distinct, but all aware of the same past in the same way."¹⁰ This view of the self at any particular time as a cross section, so to speak, of flowing experience, including memories and anticipations, has still its advocates and needs critical consideration.

The view is supposed to be reached by introspection: if at any moment I ask, "What is the self?" I look within, and find consciousness of certain sensations, emotions, memories, and so on; this consciousness taken as a whole is myself—at least, my self of that moment. The whole self is one's total experience in one's continuing life.

An insidious error lies in this abstract form of statement. What we actually find is not consciousness, but ourselves consciously seeing, feeling, remembering.¹¹ When we insist on being concrete and inclusive in our study of any momentary experience, we find that this is permeated with a sense of being owned. No experience as such is self-sustaining.

The authority of Hume, in his famous vain search for himself among his inner states, has been misleading on this point. He was actually ignoring himself, and focusing his interest on his percep-

10. *Psychology, Briefer Course* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 203.

11. Cf. B. P. Bowne: "The self does not stand behind experience as its mysterious noumenal ground to be reached only by inference, but reveals itself as present in experience. We have neither an abstract consciousness of self, nor only a consciousness of mental states, but a consciousness of self as having states." (*Introduction to Psychological Theory*, p. 247.)

tions as distinct and disparate events within the field of his consciousness. While thus engaged he was demonstrating his ability to abstract from the essential reality, which was himself viewing his experiences. His demonstration was clear, but it left the reality intact. The reality is always the self experiencing. For the self is conscious, not consciousness. It is the experient, not experience. What justification is there for saying, as some writers more or less openly affirm, that consciousness is conscious, or that experience experiences itself? In ordinary usage there is no such confusion. It is a rose or a traffic light—not redness—that is red; it is a man or a horse—not lameness—that is lame. Vision does not see itself.

This mistaking of the abstract for the concrete in a study of the self diverts attention from the chief characteristic of the self, namely, that it is active. Here is the most important place to apply the maxim that to be is to be active. As I have argued, the self is aware of an environment because upon stimulation it constructs a physical world. And this is but the beginning of its activity, whereby it has a complex and constantly changing experience. But if the self is considered to be consciousness or experience, it takes on a passive character as a mere datum. Only by legerdemain can it seem to have any power of self-maintenance. It is no longer a true self, but the expression of something else. The dynamic manifestations of selfhood, if not turned over to the bodily organism, must be surreptitiously smuggled in. There is ob-

servable a current tendency to shift easily from experience to experiencer, from activity to actor, and back again, without discrimination. But, surely, fruitful thinking calls for clear distinction between these obviously different though correlative terms.

Perhaps there should be some mention here of Santayana's view, which in its own way has a similar inconsistency.¹² However beguilingly set forth, his theory shows not only the fatal weakness of all materialism, but the incongruity of trying to combine therewith some recognition of active selfhood. His materialism rests on his skepticism. Our interest at present must be confined to his tangle of assertions about the efficacy of matter and the inefficacy of spirit except so far as it is identified or fused with the physical. Santayana says that what he prefers to call spirit might be called consciousness, attention, feeling, or thought. He does not escape attributing to spirit what would ordinarily be called action; yet he affirms that power belongs to the material world. In comparison with those who ostensibly hold to a view of the self as consciousness and yet without acknowledgment make it active, Santayana is a little more frank; for he openly defends a fusion by which spirit has its roots in a power dwelling in matter.

Hume's trouble came chiefly from failure to give full recognition to the nature of the self as active. He says that the mind is a kind of theater for the appearance of successive perceptions. Yet he

12. *The Realm of Spirit, passim.*

straightway warns: "The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind."¹³ And he tries to satisfy the necessity of recognizing some activity by having the perceptions "pass, repass, glide away, and mingle." Certainly the mind is no theater. Rather, it is the protagonist of its own life-drama.

In spite of serious defects, why does the view that the self is consciousness or experience still find support? Apparently the main reason is fear of an appeal to the unknowable or the mythical. For what can be said of the self apart from its experiences?

We cannot too often remind ourselves that in considering the self we have left the world of things, and turned to what is *sui generis* and not knowable in terms of anything else. The self is an ultimate. Hence we need not expect to define it by the ordinary method of definition. But inasmuch as the self is revealed by what it does, we may study its world of experience—including the emotional and conative life as well as the intellectual, and including the physical universe and the social contacts with other selves—and find that every distinguishable aspect tells us somewhat of the self's nature. Particular aspects we shall consider in later chapters.

The view that the self is an agent, knowing its self and its world, need not mean that it is a transcendental entity in the Kantian sense; for the con-

13. *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Pt. IV, sec. VI.

nection between the actor and the act, the thinker and the thought, is thoroughgoing. It has been compared to the expression of a proposition in language. The subject is contained in a word or a group of words, and the predicate in another word or group of words. The two can be analytically treated in disjunction, as if each had meaning apart from the other. But strictly, the subject is subject only with reference to the predicate, and the predicate is nothing apart from the subject. In like manner the self as experient cannot be separated from its experience, nor can there be experience apart from an active self. This excludes the old conception of the soul as somehow existing whether active or not. In comparing the relation of the self and its experience to the relation of subject and predicate in a proposition, we are not so much finding a likeness between two relations appearing in different fields as looking at different stages of the same relation; for consciousness has the subject-object form, which is carried on to expression in a proposition.

The question of lapses in consciousness, as in sleep or swoon, is difficult at best, but is certainly not easiest to answer when the self is equated with consciousness. One can hardly suppose consciousness by itself able to come again into existence; but the alternative seems to be to have some power create the consciousness anew at the close of each interval in such a way as to include all its memories, habits, propensities, and aspirations. Neither view commends itself as probable. But if we hold

that the self is not consciousness but primarily an agent, we have a somewhat better prospect of explanation. Even apart from the debatable field of bodily functioning, much activity that is attributable to the self does not come into consciousness. In basic processes of intellection and in habitual routine, the self works often, or usually, without being conscious—as we ordinarily understand the term—of what it is doing. A considerable portion of even the process of reaching conclusions goes unobserved. The self is conscious of its conclusions, and of such part of the antecedent work as requires persistent effort and attention; but it is conscious only dimly, if at all, of such part of the work as is done with great ease and rapidity. If the self, then, is not always conscious of its activity, it is not unreasonable to assume that during such breaks in consciousness as come with sleep or swooning, the self may continue active in certain ways, as, for instance, in the vital processes that maintain the efficiency of the body; for sleep and swoon are not death. That we can, when awake, recall a dream indicates continuity of mind, bridging the gap in consciousness.

One characteristic of the self is of especial interest as reducing the mischief wrought by objectification of the self and at the same time helping to confirm and perpetuate the error. Whenever we objectify an experience, we put somewhat of ourselves into it. The self builds its world of experience on the model of selfhood. It interprets objects in terms of its own nature. This is immediately

seen in its apprehension of other selves, its human fellows. But the principle of interpretation in terms of selfhood is carried downward to subhuman forms. Thus an object becomes for us not only an object but in some measure a subject. It is both a complex of activities and an actor. This is the practical and nonscientific way of looking at nature. Whatever we contemplate, we see through glasses of selfhood. Hence into thought of the self as an object among its objects there comes a corrective by reason of this ever-present tendency to read into an object true selfhood in one or another stage of development. The subjective cast thus given to an objective conception of the self prevents the error of objectification from being clearly seen.

To guard the self in its unique reality against the objectively minded intellect, some other points may be emphasized. The self is not in space, for whatever occupies space is divisible. Some realists, to be sure, are inclined to stop with space-filling units exceedingly minute as ultimate indivisible elements; but they shut their eyes to the true nature of space as the principle of externality. A spatial self would have to be considered a compound of elements held together in some way. Psychology for its own purposes may analyze psychic phenomena and seek to connect them with bodily functionings; what is analyzed, however, is not the self, but the self's conception of itself. The self could not as self be in space and do its work as thinker and organizer of its world. Space is a form of the self's experience.

Nor is the self in time in the sense in which objects are. If it were, it would be transitory and in need of renewing, instant by instant. It could have no life in itself. This consideration alone would be fatal to any objectivistic theory of selfhood. We are apt to overlook its decisive character, because in our experience world the objects do endure through time. But when we reflect on the nature of time and our relation to the temporal flow, we see that the objects in our world exist for us through time only as we connect the present appearance with a past that no longer exists and think of the two as constituting an enduring object. The object lasts by virtue of the self's complex constructive activity involving the exercise of memory. Any object of knowledge ceases to be for us when we cease to construct it as an object of experience. If we say that it existed nevertheless while we were not experiencing it, we reconstruct it and put it back into the temporal hiatus. We are not now considering the validity of such construction; no one would question its validity when it meets the tests that we can apply. What concerns us at present is that so far as known the object is a continually renewed experience. The self, on the contrary, endures in its own right and is the source of derived durations. The evidence that it endures is lodged in the power to remember.

Our awareness of the self is a matter of direct experience and not originally a thought-construct. Just as sense perception is distinguished from the judgmental form of expression concerning what is

perceived, so the direct apprehension of oneself is much more intimate and complete than any thought one can formulate about the self. When we try to tell what the experience of selfhood is, we necessarily select features that strike us as important, and we generalize in the same way as in describing what is objective. But this expression involving inference can never do full justice to the richness of the self's experience of itself, which includes the bodily functionings that represent its conditioning, all the gradations of conative activity from the mere reflex to the most completely rationalized motivation in our supreme acts of volition, all the wide range of intellection, and all the tonal quality of the emotional life. We are always in danger of forgetting that any thinking expresses only skeletonized experience. We need poets ever with us to reiterate that all theory is gray, and that we ought not to miss what the vernal wood will teach us of man.

The self is that which thinks and feels and wills; it is that which can know a world of objects and can also frame imaginary worlds, can appreciate, can aspire, can set before itself ideals to be realized, can accomplish ends whether in the world of measurement or in the world of values. It is revealed in what it does. It is manifest in all the achievements of the human race.

The self is nothing completed that we can point to and say, "This is a self." In a literal sense it never is but is always becoming. It continues to be active as long as it exists.

CHAPTER VII

OUR BODILY FORM

1

EACH human self has a body, which is its primary, and, in a sense, private sphere of activity. What is this body?

In an attempt to answer this question, we need to guard against a misunderstanding. Since the experienced physical world is the visible, tangible surrogate of the cosmic conditioning, it may for descriptive purposes be viewed as itself the source of dynamic efficiency. But this must not mislead us into identifying the physical with the cause of our experiencing the physical. With this caution we may proceed.

At the outset it is important to recognize a distinction so nearly self-evident that it is generally passed by—the distinction between the body, as a functioning organism, and the chemicals utilized by it as sources of energy. These chemicals are derived from the air and from food of various kinds. They undergo a process of metabolism in the living cells of the body. The chemical constituents never remain for a perceptible moment what they are, but are ever becoming something else. After certain energy units are taken from them, the unused residue is eliminated. As this process goes on all the time, there is constant replacement. But

the body as a continuously functioning organism abides. If all the physical elements that constitute the visible body are of the disappearing variety, needing to be continually renewed, the perduring entity must be other than physical. There must be something at work, synthesizing, defining, perpetuating. That something at work is the self. We may almost see it expressing its nature in the unity, substantiality, and continuity that it gives to its object—in this case, the body.

A descriptive definition, then, might be: the body is the form of the self's manifestation under the conditions of the physical order.

There is an old analogy that likens the body to a tent or a house, in which the self is tenant. This may serve a purpose in poetic literature; but critically examined, it has fallacious implications. It suggests that the relation between the two is adventitious. If we must have a figure—dangerous though they are for exact thought—I should prefer comparison with the relation between lightning and the assumed energy we call electricity. No one has ever seen electricity; but the lightning declares it.

We have no experience of a disembodied or unembodied self. The self is bodied forth, and for the present, at least, has no other way of manifesting itself. If we hold steadfastly to this conclusion, we may enter the fascinating field of physiological psychology without prejudice, and note the efforts made by trained experimenters to trace the connections between the psychic and the physical

functions. Our interest in this enterprise need not abate when we give up the naïve belief in the independence of the physical. However detailed and exact our information may become concerning the relation of psychic activities to physical functionings, it will only increase our knowledge of the way in which the living embodied self realizes its nature.

As physical, the body is not in the same category as the self. It takes its place among objects. Yet it seems to hold a mediating position. In relation to the self, the body is a complex means of physical manifestation. It expresses the self in its primary functioning. As the center of all experiences, it is, in changing form, continuous with the life of the self. In relation to the objective world, the body is a living organism, drawing sustenance from its physical environment, and representing the self in the open arena. Under the present conditions of life, this concretizing of the self seems necessary if the self is to be in contact with the physical order. The body gives the self a physical status, and enables it to take its place with others of its kind in a common life.

2

THE relation between the self and the body has long been in controversy. From the days of Descartes until recently, those who believed in the independent existence of the material world and yet had to acknowledge some sort of entity that was not physical—something that they called the

soul or the spirit or the entelechy or the vital principle or the self—took comfort in the theory that the two orders of existence ran their course each in its own way. The reasoning was very simple. If the physical world proceeds according to its own laws and can be changed only by something within itself, the psychic processes must run parallel without influencing the physical order. The psychic processes have their own laws, their own modes of procedure.

This theory of psychophysical parallelism has considerable historical significance as showing how persistent is the belief in an independent physical order. Yet the theory could give no satisfactory account of the interaction that seems to be constantly going on between the physical order and the psychic. The processes that go on within the body often indicate some influence other than the physical events that went before. Bad news or fright may interfere with heart action. On the other hand, more oxygen in the lungs may brighten the mental outlook. A theory of interaction of some sort has virtually all the facts of experience in its favor. For practical purposes it is the usual working theory. Whatever our ultimate view may be, we proceed in life as if the self affected the body, and the body affected the self.

But how can two entities so unlike as mind and matter act upon each other? It is unnecessary here to review the various solutions proposed. The labors of Berkeley and Hume and Kant and their successors have made it fairly clear that a division

of reality into two independent processes—mind and matter—cannot be sustained. The dualism that confronted Descartes and his followers was a misleading setup. Critical examination indicates that the duality in experience is to be interpreted as, on the one hand, mind or self with its complex activities, and, on the other, the independent order that conditions its life. You may study the manner of its conditioning. You may reason from the structured response, which constitutes nature as known, back to the character of the conditioning force. But *res extensa* drops to a subordinate role.

We have now to consider how interaction is to be understood in harmony with other conclusions reached in the present inquiry. If the physical body is phenomenal, how can it interact with the self that it manifests? This problem is closely related to that which we encountered in pondering how things as such can interact.¹ It raises the question of cause and effect. Where does causal power reside, and how does it express itself?

We found that, in meeting the situations of practical life as they arise, it is useful, if not imperative, to think of physical things as actually affecting one another. This is the language of description, and its utility has made it universal. This continuous use of dynamic conceptions in expressing the relations among physical things has developed a tendency in us all to interpret our language realistically. We evade recognizing physical things as phenomenal, and think of them as having an ex-

1. Chapter III, sec. 3.

istence in themselves, independent of the knower. This tendency is the strength of all forms of realism. But, as we saw in the earlier consideration of the subject, critical study carries us beyond this view and corrects the realistic assumption. The phenomenal is effect, not cause. To find the causal, we must go behind the physical. What is interpreted as interaction between the self and the body is really interaction between the self and the causal order, which can hardly be regarded otherwise than as intelligent. Thus the problem of explaining how the two unlikes—the physical and the psychic—can influence each other disappears.

3

How may we apply to the body the conclusion that physical things are essentially values? In considering this question we must always bear in mind that the body as living is not mere material substance. With this qualification before us, we may say that the materials composing the body are in a preëminent degree concentered values. Our individual lives, as well as our social intercourse, are dependent upon them. These physical values connect us with the rest of the environing world, and furnish us the means of understanding what the physical universe is.

The body with its various members and sensory organs provides for differentiation of the self's activity in a physical world. There is freedom of locomotion; there are all the possibilities that lie in an elaborate musculature. Through the eye the self

can give its creations pattern and color; through the vocal organs and the ear it can have social intercourse by means of speech. These are but a suggestion of the various activities made possible by the complex body. The command of the self over the body appears in the occasional utilizing of some substitute part for a specific function, when the usual organ fails.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ELUSIVE UNITY OF OUR SELFHOOD

I

THERE are many superficial indications arguing that the self is not a unity. Consciousness is fleeting, and is followed by seasons of unconsciousness. Desires come and go. And our purposes are often crisscross. But the unity that makes the self what it is does not depend upon superficial unities; it is presupposed in the actuality of life as known to us. It makes thinking and purposeful doing possible. If this deep-lying unity can be shown to characterize the self, all the breaks in consciousness, the waverings of impulse, the conflicts in the emotional life, may be understood in its light. Let us examine the matter more closely.

If I took the bare evidence of experience, I might be uncertain whether or not I am today the same individual I was yesterday; for a period of unconsciousness has intervened, and my outlook and interests are now different. Probably many people would take this as a mere quibble, and would reply: "I know that I am the same individual as I was yesterday—different, yet the same—for I can remember what happened to me yesterday." This assertion may be valid, but it expresses an inference, not an immediate experience. The self experiences itself immediately only as an inmost

present reality experiencing. The experiencing involves memory and inference. But inferences must all be tested, and here is the rub.

If the inference to the self's essential unity is to be validated, what evidence may be considered decisive? Consciousness of unity, on which many rely for proof, is held by others to be deceptive. The self, they say, is not continuously conscious. Who can be sure that it endures across periods of unconsciousness? In view of this difficulty, the grounds for the inference to unity must be sought elsewhere. Those of us who are most assured of the validity of the inference are willing to rest our case on the implications of the thought process and of volition. These arguments we must now consider.

To think is to gather data, compare, criticize, correct, and utilize in deciding upon a course of action. It never has been shown that any of these functions would be possible if the self were an aggregate and not a unity. The apparent success of attempts to divide up the self has in every case with which I am acquainted depended on assuming, without logical warrant, that the parts were essentially related. But this assumption would make it a submerged unity, manifesting itself in various ways. The kind of unity that the process of knowledge requires is unique and not possible to a space-occupying object. Its characteristic is indivisibility in agency. When the self compares one datum with another, it must hold them both in its grasp, letting its attention pass freely from one to the other, noting likenesses and differences,

and drawing conclusions that become the ground of further inferences. This process cannot be construed on any other assumption than that the thinker acts as an indivisible whole.

Thinking is made possible by memory. The thinker holds before him past experiences as belonging to the past, yet related to the present and the future. As we have seen, all his thinking, even the re-creation of the past, is in the present; yet the recognition of the past as a part of the thinker's experience points directly to the thinker's existence through the entire period. To conclude otherwise would evidently invalidate memory and make thinking a fooling with symbols, if it could be even that. Here a doubter may suggest that the self's continuity, although evident during the act of thinking, extends only for the span of the remembering. Is not the self, after all, a somewhat that is essentially transient, that exists and functions as consciousness till a break comes, when it is extinguished, though it may later be replaced by another self? To this suggestion a reply is close at hand. Gaps in our memory are of daily occurrence. Some may last for years; but however long the period, an unusual event may cause us to overleap it and lay hold of experiences of the far past. Such a feat is so frequent that the marvel of it is hardly observed. But it has great significance for an understanding of selfhood. Memory, whether of short or of long range, seems possible only because the self maintains itself throughout its activities.

Time may appear to be the independent back-

ground of all continuity of experience; but in Part One we saw that time, as we know it, originates in memory. What has existed as an experience must be re-created and brought into the present to exist again. Events are not known as succeeding one another until the self links them together into an order of succession, in which past and present are distinguished yet united. This act of apprehending temporal succession reveals the self as having a deeper continuity of being than has the time of its experiences.

Turning to volition, we find the same story. Thinking is a form of volition, and volition always involves thinking. The difference between them is largely one of emphasis. In the process of thinking, the will is continuously active in holding attention upon the selection of pertinent data, upon the discovery of connections between them, and upon the shaping of conclusions that stand the various tests of validity. In volition, thought activity is required at every step to define and appraise the resistance to be overcome. Nothing exhibits the profound integrity of the self like the constancy of a dominant purpose, undergirding all its fitful, broken manifestations. One of the supreme satisfactions of life comes from freely espousing a worthy purpose and devoting one's self without reserve to its realization. An initial problem of successful living is to find a life purpose important enough to overcome the distractions of conflicting interests and the endless succession of little undertakings that lack inner

connection. The reason for this importance, I believe, is not only that such an all-encompassing purpose ensures the maximum of achievement, but that it brings into unified harmonious expression the many-sided nature of the self.

Some leading psychologists of today regard the unity and continuity of the self as presupposed in all its experiences. William Stern, for example, says: "The individual is not partly body and partly mind, but a person with the capacity for experience."¹ "Since feeling is of a piece with experience, it is not identical with the person himself, even though of all modes of inner experience, it is nearest to him."² Gordon W. Allport writes: "Unless we postulated for ourselves a permanence of personality we could not possibly account for the many identical threads running through our conscious states."³ "The self is the subjective moderator of whatever unity the personality may have."⁴

2

AN objection sometimes brought against the doctrine of a unitary self rests upon the phenomena of dissociation or multiple personality. When these phenomena in extreme form were first studied by scientific methods, they seemed striking enough to support quite radical conclusions. But sober criti-

1. *General Psychology*, trans. by Spoerl (The Macmillan Company), p. 84.

2. *Op. cit.*, p. 530.

3. *Personality* (Henry Holt and Company), p. 159.

4. *Op. cit.*, p. 345.

cism has done its work. At present it is generally conceded that multiple personality is really a multiple manifestation of the same basic self. The phenomena that seemed so striking take their place along with others, less impressive but essentially of the same sort, which are among the commonest of our experiences.

It is due the supporters of multiple personality to point out that the word person may with them be restricted in meaning to a system of personal characteristics.⁵ Thus defined, a person is not a self in the sense in which I am using the term, but only a selected group of manifestations. For example, Ralph Barton Perry, in depicting the many-sidedness of William James, refers to "two William Jameses," "a third James," and "still a fourth James."⁶ But whatever person or personality seems to hold the field at any one time exemplifies, insofar as it functions, the law of unity.

That the same self may thus appear as successive personalities is in accordance with the nature of selfhood, which tends to reveal itself in a variety of ways. We may with great ease enter sympathetically into the life of other selves, real or imaginary. In fact, all expression of selfhood is fundamentally a kind of empathy. We are at one with what we know. All that we know is an outgoing of our own nature in some form of embodiment. The degree of empathy is the measure of our knowledge.

5. Gordon W. Allport uses the term self in a similar way. (*Personality*, p. 140.)

6. *The Thought and Character of William James*, II (Little, Brown & Company), 670-701.

The phenomena of extreme dissociation or multiple personality, as well as the more frequent experiences of distraction and conflict, as of a higher and a lower in our nature, do not touch the problem of the unity of selfhood. They are all in the field of experiences, and most of them arise from a conflict of motives or interests. They have to do with valuation.

3

If we may assume the validity of the conclusion that the self is a unique unity, continuous throughout its experiences, we may ask ourselves what significance this has for a theory of life.

In the first place, it yields the primary material for a solution of the problem of knowledge. When we appreciate that the knowing function involves holding together the past and the present, the distant and the near at hand, also distinguishing and combining, and making inferences from wide ranges of data, we realize that only an active unity is equal to the task.

In the second place, the unity of the self enables us to understand all other unities as in some manner modeled after it. The difficulty of putting meaning into the idea of unity is that it must be a unity in variety. A bare unity that is nothing but abstract unity is as empty as a void. A thing divorced from its qualities disappears. But the qualities are manifold. This world-old problem of the one and the many finds its only solution in the analogy of the self's own unity. Let us dwell for a

moment upon this insight, which issues from persistent efforts through a long past. A thing is known by its space-occupying qualities; but a real unity cannot be in space. The unity is never in the collection of qualities, but is nonspatial. The self imposes the unity as something significant for itself with reference to the whole group. As we have already seen, this is a value. Now the value, which conserves the unity of the thing, is a value with reference to some end. It is thought of as being able to produce some significant result. Thus the unity of the thing is modeled after the self's unity, which is posited as essential to its activity in manifold ways.

In the third place, to hold to the unity of the self makes it possible to treat the self as an actual entity without regarding it as a substance. Everyone who has read philosophy knows what a chameleon the word substance is. I am inclined to think it has been scotched beyond hope; for it has been turned to account by every one-sided theory of being. At least, the word should be carefully defined whenever used in a critical passage. As ordinarily understood, a substance is a something that occupies space and endures through time as the substratum of qualities—the “that” of “whats.” The self is certainly not a substance in this sense. But if the meaning of substance could be confined to that which maintains its unity and integrity while acting in a variety of ways, then the self might be considered a substance *par excellence*. Thus regarded, it enables the realist to have a real

that meets all demands; it gives the idealist a thinker able to construct systems of ideas and ideals; it furnishes the pragmatist with an indispensable norm for judging what theories work; it saves functionalism from the charge of failing to provide anything that functions; and it even makes a place for the various types of materialism as achievements of the logical intellect.

4

IN emphasizing the unity of the self we must not lose sight of the correlative truth that the self is inconceivably complex in its manifestations. How is the thinker to construe this? He has no difficulty in thinking a unity that is constructed out of inter-related elements functioning together. He can even form some vague idea of a unity without parts, though such a unity comes dangerously close to pure emptiness. But when he tries to think a unity that is original and not compounded, yet is complex in that it can act in a great variety of ways, he is soon bewildered. The reason for this is evident. The self is a thinker, not a thought nor a system of thoughts. It is *sui generis*, and not an achievement of intellectual construction. As a unitary agent, it expresses itself through emotional shifts, varying interests, plannings, conations, and so on. The question persists, How can it do this? But no answer is possible. If it be objected that this leaves us building our theory of life upon a mystery, I would point out that the self is a mystery only to those who insist upon laying it out for inspection

by the analyzing intellect. For such professional thinkers the self is not the only mystery. They find a puzzle in change: how can a thing be the same and yet different? Or in growth: how can an organism become more and more complex in its activities? Or in duration: how can a thing persist through time? Or in causal connection: how can one thing cause a change in something else? It is interesting to note that the solution of these puzzles by the intellect consists in eliminating the troublesome factor. Change is construed with reference, not to the successive differences, but to the law they exemplify, and the law does not change. Growth appears as the assimilation of material already existing, while the new functionings of the organism are accepted with becoming piety. Duration spreads out before us as on a canvas—the past being compresent with the present, yet as past, and the future merely waiting inclusion in the picture. Causal connection is understood as orderly sequence in which there is no real causal activity. So the intellectualist with his logical instruments frees the world from mystery by ignoring the things to be explained.

Yet when we ask what we know about the self, we need a lifetime to tell, with each self as its own spokesman. Every moment of its existence the self is realizing its possibilities in rich variety.

CHAPTER IX

OUR THOROUGHGOING SOCIALITY

1

WHEN I say that the self is social, I do not mean merely that people generally enjoy one another's fellowship, nor even that the love of one's neighbor is the sum of the moral law. I mean that everything the self does or thinks or appreciates manifests its nature as recognizing what is other than itself. Etymologically the word "social" suggests hardly more than that each person has fellows within his realm of knowledge. But this will be found to have great depth of meaning in view of the nature of the world in which we live.

If we watch the self at work, creating for itself under cosmic influence the world it apprehends, we see it as a power to bring into being a social other, its world of experiences. When it seeks to interpret the controlling stimulations, it has only itself with which to begin. It tries out its own possibilities as the key for decoding. It projects its own nature into an objective world. Primitive man, finding so much of selfhood in his objects, thought that spirits dwelt in them. He had not attained accuracy in observation and proficiency in critical thought. Man today, having acquired considerable skill in observing and in thinking, is prone to err in the opposite direction and lose contact with

living reality. To indicate how thoroughly our world is social, I might elaborate a little.

Whatever it is that comes to us from the dynamic order takes on meaning only insofar as we fixate some form of elementary response. We give the object unity in variety and appreciable duration. We think of it as maintaining itself over against its neighbors and therefore having energy of resistance; and we make it a center of activity, capable of bringing about results by contact with other things. All that we thus attribute to the object is characteristic of the self. We come to know ourselves by creating our world.

This method of interpreting in terms of selfhood holds along the whole gamut of existence.¹ When one tries to put more of selfhood into the event-series than can be carried, one has a momentary illusion. Thus, at the edge of the field of vision, a trickle of water across the sidewalk may seem a wriggling thing of life. Let it not be supposed, however, that as a result of self-projection every object is regarded as an embodiment of a self, even vaguely conceived. This idea is outgrown, except where crude animism survives.

Brand Blanshard grants that this characteristic of the self in attributing its own nature to its objects throws light upon our perceptual experience and upon empathy and the pathetic fallacy.² But he follows earlier writers in holding that this ac-

1. For an ampler treatment of this subject see my article, "The Organizing Principle in Philosophy," *The Personalist*, XX (1939), 152-159.

2. *The Nature of Thought*, I, 152-153.

tion of the self is based upon analogical reasoning from the self's experience of its own body. It seems to me that analogy is not the true explanation. Self-projection is characteristic of the self's activity from the very beginning of perception. It is not a mere vestigial animism. It is bound up with that self-assertion which means life. But it needs refinement by criticism. The self quickly recognizes that there are limitations upon its putting of its own nature into perceptual objects. The external coercion compels much restriction of the first impulse. Errors must be corrected; for experience, embracing wide variety, must be a coherent whole.

2

HERE we may inquire into panpsychism, a theory that has already come into view in our consideration of causality. Is there in some degree a psychic element in all forms of nature? A thorough treatment of panpsychism would involve a history of modern philosophy, with incidental references to the early Greeks. But for the present purpose a briefer statement will suffice.

Spontaneously we are all panpsychists. We would confer life such as ours throughout our experience. If the self, so far as conditions permit, constructs its world according to its own characteristics, nature may well seem instinct with selfhood. Of what the selfhood means, we know less and less as we go down the scale from the human to the simplest forms. Perhaps the reason for this is that there is less to know. Certainly the human prototype be-

comes less illuminating. We understand a thing insofar as it is human; for to understand means to bring within the scope of human ways of thinking.

The question may be simplified by considering first the relation between life and mind. As to drawing a line between what manifests vital activities and what manifests, in addition, psychic activities the biologists are not agreed. Lloyd Morgan supports the hypothesis "that from the very beginning, so far as we can descry it, mind is concomitant with life."³ This is my own view; for it seems impossible that there should be even self-maintenance without at least embryonic intelligence.

But can we attribute life to all forms of nature? When we attempt a scientific study of our physical world, we find a notable distinction among our objects. One—say, a robin—acting as an organic whole, maintains itself, renews itself, propagates itself. Another—say, a pebble—does not seem to be thus active in utilizing its environment for its own continuance and reproduction. The one is said to show activities characteristic of life, whereas the other, as ordinarily regarded, does not. A line of demarcation between the living and the not-living may be difficult to trace; but it is a matter to be determined by empirical evidence in accordance with an accepted definition of life. Where to draw the line is a problem for the biologists to solve. To grant the validity of the distinction is to reject panpsychism in a thoroughgoing form. Pan-

3. *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, p. 12.

psychism stretches the concept of life beyond its tensile strength.

Objects that manifest vital activity may properly be considered as representing that which has existence for itself, reality in its own right. Other objects may be resolved into process, a succession of disappearing events that are united and organized into things by the observer. These objects have only phenomenal reality. Here we find also such symbolic conceptions as atoms and electrons, which are strictly abstractions, however useful they may be in scientific study.

The distinction between the real in the phenomenal sense and the ontologically real is the deepest line of cleavage known to human intelligence. Attempts have been made to eliminate the distinction either by emphasizing that phenomenal aspects are all that we can know empirically, or, in panpsychism, by extending downward the attribution of life until it covers all the phenomenal world. Neither course does full justice to the situation. We must accept the complexities found in experience. The resistance that we attribute to things is, as has been explained, a transfer from our experience of coercion by the causal order. But the causality that we attribute to living beings is presumably their own, and is active and volitional in its nature.

3

I FIND it difficult, if not impossible, to limit the term social to mutual contacts among human be-

ings and to gregariousness among animals. If we start with the human community as the norm of social life, we find that in passing from the human to the subhuman, even down to the inorganic, we carry along, so far as possible, the same general form and simply reduce the scope to suit the case. The relation between a man and his dog certainly deserves to be called social. A skipper feels toward his boat much as toward a human friend; indeed, he may have a closer sympathy with the boat than with a landlubber who has had no experience at sea. A baby, for whom much of life's meaning is comprised in covering, may find society in a bit of blanket. Not only nothing human, but nothing in experience is alien to me. To be aware of anything is to sustain a social relation to it. He has the richest world who makes it most companionable.

But of course a complete social life between man and the lower levels of being is impossible. With our human fellows we have a more intimate and varied knowledge, because more of the self as a creative energy is expressed in understanding them. On this level of human personality, we get a satisfying revelation of what selfhood means. Each individual, being a unique personality, becomes a distinctive expression of the knower's inner possibilities of selfhood. Yet, evidently, the apprehending self cannot be exhaustively expressed by any one other self nor by many selves; for, so long as it lives, it continues to discover its nature in the social environment. Each new acquaintance is in a real sense a fresh objectification of the self.

Our social nature may seek higher levels also. It is important to remember always that whatever the self does is conditioned by the cosmic order. The self, therefore, learns from its world something not only of its own nature but also of the nature of the cosmic Power. On the warrant of this experience, the religious consciousness may find in what it takes to be the All-wise and All-good an expression of perfect friendliness.

By such projection the self realizes itself in its world. Then it is influenced by that world, which it looks upon as its controlling environment. This is the return influence, completing the social circuit. We are influenced not only by other selves and by objects that we regard as real in the field of perception but even by imaginary constructions. All projection of the self into an objective world, whether thought to be real or fictitious, sets up a countermovement back upon the self. This is psychological, and quite independent of the question of validity. What is called communing with nature is a social act in which nature is more or less vaguely personified. It is genuine communion, and the effect upon one may be profound. Any social relation is essentially reciprocal. There is a going out and a coming in of influence. There must be some form of activity toward the other, and some sort of response, real or imagined, from that other, before the social life takes on significance.

From a slightly different point of view we may say that in apprehending a world we give it value; and all the values of life are objective. Projection

and valuation are different aspects of the same act; but the valuational aspect is the more definite and concrete. Existence is a general notion; but the value is always particular and has reference to the self. It is the self's appropriating of the object. It is conceivable that a thing might exist apart from a self; but it seems inconceivable that it should have value apart from a self. If the idea of value is relegated to the background, the intimate relationship between the self and the objective world becomes less evident. It is by isolating the idea of existence from that of value that realists are able to maintain that the thing-world is independent of the knowing relation; for value is *prima facie* evidence that the thing-world is the self's world, an expression of its social nature.

If we look about in our ordinary workaday world, we may see how the human element in things gives them their depth and meaning. Scientific constructions are intentionally stripped of all that is obviously human and are rendered as abstract as possible. They are only signs or symbols, and their emptiness is generally recognized. But as soon as they can be put to use for the better understanding of nature, we take them over into our social world as values. The initiated know that they are only formulae or generalizations; but the less thoughtful habitually refer to them as if they were actual energies directing the processes of nature. One may hear it said: "If we defy the law of gravitation, it will avenge itself upon us." This incipient tendency to personify whatever interests

us comes to exuberant fruition in the aesthetic field. The poet who fails to see the human in all the objects of his world seems to lapse into the commonplace. We naturally make the most of our objectifications by putting all the meaning into them that the conditions permit. Our success will be measured by the extent to which we transform into a human world what may have appeared a forbidding terra incognita.

Through the study of sense perception we are now able to indicate the basis of social selfhood: the self interprets cosmic control into an objective world of values, and is thus essentially social in that its existential activity, initiated through social contact, consists in creating and appreciating a world that is other than itself.

There is some truth in the paradox that when we love another we love ourselves. Love springs up when we find in another that which we recognize as our ideal self. By love we take possession of what we are not yet but may become. This is the support for popular ideas about love between opposites and about growing similarity between lovers. Only by giving itself out does the self come into its own.

Lest the casual reader take exception to the inference that the world is the self expressed, and suggest that such a view is solipsistic, let me say that I have presented in an earlier chapter⁴ my main defense against the charge of solipsism. To have a world the self must be in social contact with the cosmic Power. But the social theory of selfhood

4. See Chapter IV, sec. 2.

that I am here setting forth may be taken as a supplementary argument, for it is quite the opposite of solipsistic. If solipsism is understood as the theory that each man is shut in by himself, as in a prison house without windows, nothing could be further from the implications of my own view. The prison house is the universe, insofar as a person may know it. Every increment of knowledge, every new experience enlarges the scope of his selfhood. A man's look is outward. His interests are in the world about him and largely in the future. Even when he turns his thoughts inward and becomes reflective, he continues the process of externalization. He makes his aspirations, longings, ideals, and purposes his objects. They become to that extent his environing world. There is no possibility of living a self-enwrapped life. The self is fundamentally an extrovert, to use the psychological term. The object, whether in the form of a person or a thing or an ideal, must always be present. The subject-object relation is an abstract name for the minimum basis of sociality.

Since the social other as person or thing is for each individual an interpretation made by himself, there is constant need for recognizing the likelihood of error. Especially in the field of personality, where complexities and subtleties are greatest, any interpretation must be regarded as highly tentative.

4

SOCIALITY is decidedly dynamic. It may vary, however, in scope. In a social bearing toward the lower

forms of life, only certain areas, as it were, of self-expression are awakened to activity. But in relation to its human fellows the self is alert and active all the way through. Sociality is dynamic because it is charged with emotion. All our emotional life issues from social situations. The most effective way of losing the higher values of social life is to assume a passive attitude toward it. And conversely, if we would enjoy in full measure our social privileges, we must have a part in their creation and maintenance. When the self is most active socially, the accompanying emotions may be intense and at the same time unobtrusive. They pour themselves into the activities, make the tasks in hand more absorbing, and sustain the devotion to the cause. Thus the social life of energetic struggle and achievement is made rich and glorious by the awakened emotions. Persons who have not learned the secret of joyousness in achievement often err by cultivating the emotions themselves in detachment from the great inspirations and ideals of social enterprises. Such emotions are a hothouse growth, ill adapted to the rigors of actual life.

The recluse or hermit is dissatisfied with the society he has known—its artificialities, its rivalries, its continuous exactions. He wants a different kind of society—communion with nature or with God. The hermit may have turned away from a social milieu that was low-minded and that developed only warped, puny, inefficient specimens of humanity. Or possibly he has an essential weakness in wanting to avoid the responsibilities of

membership in an aggressive, aspiring community; he is unwilling to take his place in the thick of the struggle, and hence assumes a dissident attitude toward the very society in which he might otherwise find his greatest development.

A social life is generally understood to be a life of coöperation with our fellows for the attainment of common objectives. The reciprocity of social life here becomes instrumental toward the realization of ends that are beyond the powers of the individual. A community, in coöperating advantageously, does not try to shut out competition, but organizes and directs the interests and energies of its members toward social ends. The members may zealously compete with one another in contributing to the attainment of the goals. But in the absence of a dominant social ideal and well-organized coöperation, the divisive effect of individual striving for personal advancement leads to economic confusion and possibly widespread misery.⁵ Coöperation in the accomplishment of a worthy purpose is the highest expression of sociality that we know. It includes the everyday linkings of home and community, the larger connections of national and international councils, and, in a very real sense, the relation of a human being to the Source of life.

5

JOHN ELOF BOODIN, in his recent book entitled *The Social Mind*, makes prominent some social

5. Cf. Thomas Nixon Carver, "Harnessing Human Motives," *Religion in Life*, IX (1940), 190-191.

aspects of life that deserve more attention than they have had. But he follows in the path of certain French and German sociologists in arguing for the existence of social unities that may be called social minds. He holds that energy is "the fundamental concept of which material and mental are species"; that mind as energy is fundamentally "will or conation in its various stages of complexity"; and that a social mind is "a concrete individual" which is "a synthesis, in some sense, of individuals."⁶ There is a social fusion, which must be regarded as the creation of a new mind. In justification of his view, Boodin repeatedly presents comparisons from the fields of physics and chemistry. "Just as the chemist speaks of the synthesis of material atoms into molecules as matter, so we may speak of the synthesis of particular minds into new unities as mind."⁷ But the desire to keep close to science has led to an abstract treatment that drifts away from the real self as a conscious subject and becomes vague and even confused. Take, for example, the following passage: "Personal minds can arise only through social interactions. They are differentiations within the social field relations. The group, therefore, is genetically prior to personality. . . . Social unities, being integrations of particular minds, are minds of the second order."⁸ Here the conception of a social continuum within which dif-

6. *The Social Mind*, pp. 154-156.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. viii.

8. *Op. cit.*, pp. 155 f.

ferentiations give rise to individual minds is not clearly distinguished from the conception of a social unity as a synthesis of individual minds already existing. In defining mind as energy, of which the fundamental nature is will or conation, Boodin lays desirable emphasis on the dynamic character of selfhood; but he leaves consciousness in comparative neglect. If he had given this aspect more consideration, he might have been saved from too objective a treatment.

There is, however, what seems to me a sounder interpretation of the expression "group mind." The term may be used as a metaphorical transfer from individual minds, functioning collectively, to the outcome of that functioning, especially as indicating common interests or purposes. It is only when one fails to see the figurative character of the expression and makes it mean a producer of results rather than results produced that serious confusion arises. When all the minds in a group are moved by the same desires and aims, each mind ideally includes the others and is thus reinforced, so that the group has a power for good or ill far in excess of what the sum total of the powers of the individuals taken separately would be.

Not only through community but through difference a group of minds adds to the strength of the individual mind. Since the members of a group have each a different experience and outlook, every one of them can present what is unique and thereby awaken responsive action. The response may be

sympathetic acceptance, with resulting community of mind, or it may be disagreement, which leads to a reëxamination and clearer definition of the original attitude.

A group may act as a unit toward another group; and the groups may increase in scope until the whole human race constitutes a social unit, a parliament of man. When war is a thing of the past, this utopian ideal may be realized. But we are far from it now.

6

If, then, we are socially related, in a profound way, to every phase of the outside world as we know it, we see that the moral law, being grounded in the nature of the self, should be valid, in appropriate form, throughout experience. The moral law is a social growth and is an abstract expression of communal wisdom. But it is not altogether directly empirical. It may find enlargement and reënforcement from a study of the self as social.

It is not hard to extend the relevance of ethical principles throughout the range where there is evidence of life in nature. The lower animals respond surprisingly to treatment that is kind or even merely just. But we do not usually require that these principles shall be observed in the manipulation of inanimate things. Yet if we translate such action into its ultimate elements, it appears as a contact between the self and the dynamic order. Reactions issue from this order, not from the phys-

ical things; and we know from numberless experiences how exacting this dynamic order has proved to be. Here we have the law of consequences ruling with complete authority; and this forms the groundwork of what in human relations is justice. Nature in its entirety is the domain of moral conduct.

CHAPTER X

OUR KNOWING

1

WE MAKE our start in the midst of a world of activities and conditions inconceivably complex and changing throughout. From this world we must get that which will nourish the body and satisfy the manifold needs of our conscious life. Our chief equipment for making our way in this world is our intelligence, which must develop from childhood, where all is mere incipience and promise, to the mature life of insight and self-direction.

We must discover what will satisfy our needs, and we must find what our real needs are. The requirement is thus twofold. We start with hunger, impulse, a cry in the night. But with the help of those about us, who at first supply our needs, we come to know what those needs are and what in nature are the sources of supply, what to seek and what to avoid. As we learn to shift for ourselves, our wants and desires change. New sets of interests develop.

Discovering objectives and ways and means for realizing them is intellection. While knowledge is what we seek after, it is instrumental, except insofar as the pursuit and enjoyment of it are intrinsically satisfying. The ability to study and find out by intellection what is true is generally called mind.

The mind is the self seeking knowledge. Since every individual must make this a chief pursuit, at least until he settles down intellectually and otherwise, the science and art of seeking knowledge became one of the earliest studies of mankind, and the literature on the subject is enormous. It is not my intention to review this literature, nor even give an epitome of results that serve as a guide to further effort. Every science has its own technique, which is always becoming more refined and efficient. But my present interest is in learning about the self through watching it work in the laboratory of knowledge.

To appreciate the amazing achievements of the human mind in the conquest of the world about us, we need to take note of the instrument with which the mind works. Here is the situation. On the one hand is a network of cosmic activities, apparently infinite in complexity and never ceasing to change. On the other hand is our ability to respond constructively to impulses therefrom by interpreting their meaning in the form of a physical world and in terms of our own interests, and then to discover the interconnections of these activities and reduce our discoveries to general statements about the structure of the world—statements that we, with considerable presumption, call the laws of nature. Now a thought or idea or concept, or whatever we may name the unit of thinking, has decided limitations. First, it always remains general and can never narrow itself down to the actual event. The concepts of lowest generality are the

best substitutes for the actual events, which do not come into our thought but are the occasion of our thinking. Secondly, the concept as content is changeless, though one concept may supersede another.

But these limitations are not serious, provided we remain on our guard against confusing the fixed content with the flowing reality. Consider, for example, the stability of meaning in concepts. Our task in seeking after knowledge is to understand changing experience through thought-content that does not change. The concept, in fixating a bit of our present experience, blending it with impressions of the immediate past, and holding the combination up for our contemplation, gives us something with which the mind can work. We gradually build up a system of concepts, valid for the march of events but sharply contrasting therewith. This system is our method of conserving gains; it is strictly anthropomorphic in structure and content, yet it so effectively serves our needs and so marvelously enables us to anticipate the future course of events that we call it the cosmos or the universe or simply nature. In short, so successful has the human mind been in elaborating its knowledge scheme that only those who are intent upon searching out the secrets of nature, penetrating more deeply into her mysteries, need concern themselves much with the disconcerting fact that the world we have to reckon with is a world that never remains the same, that is ever becoming something different. Such a world would be like the moment

of shift between kaleidoscopic patterns, were it not for the mind's readiness to select and fixate and generalize and encase in changeless concepts. Man substitutes the changeless for the changing, a world of meanings for a world of events. He puts his stamp upon nature. Behind this process and expressed in it is the purposiveness characteristic of thinking. Purpose implies evaluation of a future good. In thinking, then, the self is finding its way into the future. It proceeds by use of inference, which is the sinewy aspect of intelligence. Yet every inference is a venture.

The field of further investigation seems boundless. Every new discovery of order or energy in nature opens up unsuspected possibilities of deeper insight. Thus man is beckoned on in a thrilling search for knowledge and wisdom; and the joy of attainment is excelled only by the eagerness of pursuit.

One of the discoveries made along the way is that our knowledge itself must be repeatedly revised as we become more exacting, as our outlook broadens, and as our interests change. What at one time we thought was true we may find later does not harmonize with newly observed results and must be restudied. This necessity for continuous revision makes us not too sure of ourselves. It develops a spirit of wonder and humility in facing life's issues and causes us to seek sharper definition and a keener sense of the scope and limitations of our methods of study. This persistent call for revision ensures further growth in intellectual acu-

men. Now and then in the history of human progress leaders of thought have assumed that at least in a certain direction ultimate insight has been reached. One of the most noted of modern periods called itself the age of enlightenment. It did a great work in revealing the ability of the human mind to organize its data, clarify its methods, and criticize its own conclusions. But the insistence upon definiteness and clearness and strict logical procedure tended to narrow interest and confine it to those aspects of experience that could be rigidly defined and brought under the control of reason. Man sought to reach intellectual finalities and express them with such clarity that future generations could build thereon with complete confidence. But the hopes of those thinkers were destined to go unfulfilled. Even the Newtonian theory of space and time and gravitation, which seemed final, has required transformation in the light of investigations culminating in the work of Einstein.

What has gone on from early ages to the present time in physics, chemistry, and astronomy has moved with accelerated speed in the newer sciences—biology, psychology, and sociology. Few can keep the pace. There is intellectual work awaiting all who have the interest and endowment and opportunity to do it. Such enterprise is fascinating, because every new discovery in any line discloses mysteries that appeal to curiosity and promise great reward. This ever-present enveloping mystery increases the ardor of exploration. The researcher feels that he is following the "adventures of ideas,

as if they were doing the task and he were watching them. Yet he is ever in touch with reality, but can never lay hold of it in all its richness.

As I suggested, we may have a great variety of interests; and nature in response may give us an equal variety of insights. If with the exact scientist we confine our interest to that part of nature which lends itself to accurate measurement, we are able to utilize the resources of mathematics, and thus we seem to see into the very structure of reality. The mathematician discovers new laws not revealed in observation, but worked out according to mathematical principles. Much of science as we know it today has resulted from applying mathematics to the fields of observation. It is one of those invaluable methods of research which future ages are not likely to neglect. Science strictly so called has as its field these metrical aspects of nature. But one's interests may tend in a different direction, may lie in the field of values, where the metrical is subordinate, if it plays any part whatever. In this field the units are not millimeters and light-years but wholes of concrete experience. This calls for a different type of investigation, much more complex, elusive, personal. As I have said, values exist for valuers; and each person has his own standard by which he estimates values. These standards change with changing interests; and the values change with our sense of need and our moods. Yet there are great ranges of value that may be studied with considerable objectivity and detachment, as in the field of history, politics, morals, and the sociol-

ogy that is taking shape. Interpretation of the exhaustless world of personal relationships yields the highest types of satisfaction. Here knowledge reaches the acme of significance.

It is in this field of value study that we must place all those basic problems and beliefs which together are called philosophy. Having the greatest generality of meaning and application, these beliefs are the hardest of all to establish. They concern the nature and reality of the outside world, the nature of the self, its freedom, its relation to its world, its whole scale of values, and most difficult of all, the nature of the ultimate Power. This field has been searched from the earliest times to the present. There is so great a variety of conclusions, more or less conflicting yet supported by a formidable array of arguments, that not a few people even among the intellectuals are bewildered and discouraged. They see no consensus resulting from centuries of thought. Nevertheless, even in this rocky terrain some progress is discernible.

2

ALL this intellectual work by which man has built up his conceptions of nature and human life is made possible by the unique power of memory. This power is exercised in every mental act. Without it we could not say that two and two make four. Nor could we tell what "two" meant; for in the counting, "one, two," one would be gone and forgotten before two came into consciousness. This indispensable activity needs a brief account, not

only because it makes thinking possible but because it is so easily misunderstood. The ordinary expressions used to describe remembering indicate what I mean. We recall a former experience; we look back upon it; we store up the past in memory. Such expressions need not mislead, if they are recognized as figurative. But too often they are taken as almost literal description.

Psychologists have worked at the problem of memory for a long time. The older view assumed that experiences were in some way imprinted upon the brain cells or deposited in them, to be revived in recollection. This doctrine has been superseded by the theory of engrams, the nature of which is differently conceived by different exponents. No clear light has yet been thrown upon the matter from this direction. We may turn, therefore, from consideration of the physical instrument utilized in memory to the act itself.

Memory involves the characteristic functioning of a self, a power that creates what it knows. When it creates under compulsion, as in sense perception, the product is an objective world, apparently independent of the self. When it creates without this compulsion, it originates an ideal world, more or less related to the other. When the self creates what it remembers, it is not wholly under compulsion nor wholly free. Because the products of memory, apart from the act itself, do not appear in the world order, we conclude that the individual who is remembering is not under the same compulsion as in

sense perception. He is, as it were, put upon his own responsibility to reproduce the original situation and to that extent is or should be controlled. But the mind works so spontaneously, not to say willfully, that almost always there is an admixture of imaginative activity in recollection. When the saturation point is reached, memory is quite untrustworthy and gives rise to much error and confusion.

Memory is the self's power to create again for itself a situation or a part of a situation that it is conscious of having experienced, directly or inferentially, at some time in the course of its life-history. This recognition that the construct represents an event in the context of the past is the characteristic that distinguishes memory from all other forms of experience. As I said, memory enters into every functioning of the mind. It is to be viewed not as a separate power but as a requisite part of all mental activity. How much of the past may appear in the present experience is by no means fixed. If we have a strong historical sense, we may habitually keep our present experience closely connected with the past. A rich background, if duly subordinated, is valuable for giving perspective. But progress is forward. Too much regard for precedent impedes ideal-forming.

By way of recapitulation, a few points about memory may here be enumerated.

First, a recollection is not the original experience brought back somehow to the field of conscious-

ness. It is simpler, less vivid, and recognized as referring to the past.

Secondly, a recollection has an internal structure, which changes as interest shifts. Successive recollections of the same experience may vary considerably. One's immediate interest and mood give each a special character. The tendency toward exaggeration, idealization, and other distortion is well known. This internal mobility suggests a close relationship to the work of fantasy. Details that memory is unable to reproduce are readily filled in by fantasy, until the whole becomes a blend of what is true representation and what is fanciful. In this respect recollections resemble actual present experiences, which usually include more or less that comes as a supplementing by the imagination.

Thirdly, as a new creation a recollection is a part of the present experience; for we always remember in the present. But its content has to do with an experience that has ceased to be.

Fourthly, a recollection has no place in the physical order; for it remains private to the individual remembering and can never become a part of the common world except by mistaken inference.

3

THOUGHT processes are complicated enough when viewed as attempts by the individual mind to understand its environment. But we live in a social world and we want to communicate with our fellows. The drive toward expression is irresistible. This need of expression adds greatly to the in-

tricacies of ordinary life, to say nothing of the higher ranges of intellection, where accuracy is essential to the success of coöperative efforts.

The development of language is one of the most notable achievements of the human race. Yet, in comparison with experience itself, language is poverty-stricken indeed. Throughout life each of us is having new experiences, following one upon another and differing in various ways, often too subtly for the finest verbal discrimination. A language that would accurately express the experiences of one individual would have to have an enormous vocabulary, far greater than is found in the most elaborate dictionary in existence. And such a vocabulary, taken in all strictness, would serve only the one individual. Everyone else would need his own vocabulary, equally great. And furthermore, no word could be used more than once, because its meaning, if definite, would be applicable only to the particular experience to which it referred. Fortunately, however, we can get along fairly well with our limited linguistic resources. Our experience has general aspects that are common, and these are made the basis of communication. But since the hearer or reader necessarily interprets in terms of his own experience, there is always some ambiguity.

There is ambiguity also because a single word may serve for many meanings. A group of people who have common interests, and therefore have occasion to use a certain word often, may come to share a fairly precise definition of the word. But another group with different interests may use the

word in another sense. Thus the same word acquires various meanings.

To these difficulties pertaining especially to the communication of ideas must be added the impossibility of accurate expression of feeling. Emotions, moods, valuations are nebulous and evanescent; yet they often cover the best part of our meaning. A false fixity is given to any experience that is expressed in words. Our experiences themselves are in a fluid state; they are continually passing into other experiences. But when we congeal them into a form of words, they take on an alien rigidity. Most of life is thus distorted by the practical necessity of communication.

We begin to see the intricacies in the problem of expression. I say we begin to see; for a volume could be written without exhausting the subject. The best one can do is to be on one's guard against unnecessary obscurities, and then trust that the party of the second part will exercise abundant charity.

The value of even this limited ability to express ourselves is beyond estimate. By persistent efforts to communicate we contribute to one another's growth in insight and richness of experience. The stored-up wealth of humanity's most meaningful adventures becomes in principle available to all.

4

AN ever-present slag in our thinking comes from our propensity to make mistakes, to fail of comprehension, to get confused in our reasoning and draw

false conclusions. We are all painfully aware of this handicap. The sources of error are many—carelessness, inaccurate observation, faulty memory, prepossessions otherwise known as prejudices, wishful thinking, inconsequent reasoning. Human resources for blundering find their only analogue in the infinity of nature's processes. All our achievements have their start in ignorance and confusion and get on by discovering right methods of procedure.

Error is so characteristic of intelligence that it has become a touchstone in philosophy. The attempted solutions of the problem are various. I will mention only a few leading proposals.

According to one form of representative realism, the primary or structural qualities are not susceptible of error, but only the secondary qualities, which are supplied by the percipient. This distinction, however, will not hold. When we think that a wax figure is a human being, error infects the whole misinterpretation.

It is plain that the problem of error is embarrassing to the monistic realist who asserts the independent existence of the objects we experience. Either he must maintain that the erroneous exists as well as the true, or he must admit that our percepts are not always or altogether identical with the independent things. The first alternative is so undesirable that it is rarely taken, and the second shows a serious leak in the theory.

A different line of thought suggests that error

is misplaced truth.¹ On this theory a false conception of a situation needs adjustment. It contains portions of actuality which have been illegitimately borrowed from other situations and which must be put back into their proper place. Or the whole situation may be dislocated in the scheme of things, and must be put where it belongs. When such adjustments are complete, what was called error may be called truth. The ingenuity of this explanation has been generally recognized. But the theory rests on the false assumption that the content of thought is always existent, and that when we think we simply discover some portion of the spread-out actuality.

All such accounts make the serious mistake of overlooking the characteristic condition of thinking, namely, the freedom of the individual in directing his thought and in applying principles for testing validity. We have seen that the self manifests itself in its creative responses to stimulation from without and in its ability to continue this creative activity on its own initiative. Every response needs to be tested in appropriate ways to determine whether it is a workable interpretation, whether it fits into our practical scheme of life. Only the tested perceptions and beliefs are taken to be true, and they are true for us only so long as our changing experiences and the new tests that may be applied reveal no inaccuracies. When a forecast of some future event is not realized, we

1. See F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 188.

look for the difficulty; and somewhere along the line of our reasoning we find a false step, or at the beginning a false start. All unproved opinions are likely to be erroneous. Eliminating error is a life-long task. As we grow, we make new demands on our body of truth, and must be ready at all times to institute whatever revision is needed. Who can say how much of the world's knowledge is illusion or error?

From this point of view the problem is not how error is possible, for that is manifest, but rather how to get rid of it. In the effort to get rid of it we gain ground in our mastery of experience.

Ability to err, troublesome as it is, has a positive significance; for it furnishes the most incontestable evidence of the self's power to originate judgments as well as to realize the necessity of criticism. If the self could not test its beliefs and revise them in accordance with an ideal standard, it would hardly know itself as other than consciousness, or as distinct from the flow of impressions.

CHAPTER XI

OUR VALUING

1

As HAS already been noted, the individual's world is a world of values. Whatever is of concern to a man in any way, however slightly, is a kernel of valuation; it may be something he would desire or something he would avoid. I am using the term value in the broad positive-negative sense, covering whatever is of interest to a self. From this point of view the self is a producer and user and judge of values.

The range of these values is manifested not only by the number and variety of things and persons in the external world but by the wealth of the inner world—the world of memories, hopes and fears, loves and hates, purposes, ideals. The number of values inhering in a particular situation is limited only by the possible interests that it may satisfy. This means practically that there are no assignable limits to the richness and variety of man's value world. A fresh interest, a change of mood, a deeper insight, and the universe takes on a new aspect. Only our dullness introduces monotony and stagnation into our world of experience.

Some of these values are not usable; they are not goods, but evils or portents of evil. It is a tax on human resourcefulness and ingenuity to learn how

to utilize for the good of mankind these objects or conditions that now are looked upon as baneful. The question of evil will come up for fuller consideration later.¹

Values, viewed with reference to the self, fall into two general classes—physical and psychic.

Physical values pertain to the self as embodied. Because our physical needs—the sustenance and care of the body—are so insistent and continuously recurrent, we have learned a great deal about nature, the storehouse whence these needs are satisfied. Climate and soil, health-giving plants and strength-lending animals, granite and marble and metal hid away in the mountains, means of transportation and communication—these and such as these have been the objects of intensive study. They are still centers of interest, and probably will be to the end of time. As was suggested in Chapter III, the genius of man has enormously increased our resources. We speak proudly of the conquest of nature, yet nature is never really grudging. The trouble is that we do not always know how to ask for what we want; for the asking must be in deeds, not in words. Every stage of the so-called conquest is a revealing of what nature really is. We know it only as we discover its values.

Though material or economic goods are indispensable, they are consumed in the using and must continually be renewed. Hence they require our constant activity. Since they are directly available for an individual exclusively, they arouse competi-

1. See Chapter XV.

tion for possession. This may be obviated by multiplied production and by development of different means for satisfying a specific need. Thus industry and invention are fostered.

The psychic values correspond to the various aspects of the self's inner activity and are conveniently grouped as cognitive, aesthetic, moral or practical, and religious. It is characteristic of these types of psychic value that each may cover the whole field; for there are different ways in which the same experience may be viewed. This natural spread of values comes about because they are values for a self; and the self, while having various interests, acts as a unit. With this in mind, let us look at each of these types of value.

2 COGNITIVE VALUES

IN considering ourselves as knowers we have already had some study of cognitive values. Perception, reasoning, imagination, memory, all yield values requisite for life and growth. The progress out of ignorance into wisdom becomes a kind of life-or-death struggle. Interest means concentration of effort; enthusiasm must overcome difficulties and earn its reward in enlargement of vision and the sense of mastery. Every fact is a new value. Knowledge as such glows with a light of its own and is permanently radioactive.

This conclusion is to some extent independent of the salience of the object studied. What seems insignificant may acquire unsuspected value when searchingly examined and brought into relation to

the general body of knowledge. Every pathway into nature has its charms for the diligent observer.

Highly important is the effort put forth to test conclusions and make them worthy the name of knowledge. A large part of our thinking and research aims at finding more accurate ways of testing. Truth is a belief that endures the tests and thus becomes acceptable as a basis for action. But if a new demand is made upon it and a more exacting test applied, it may fail to satisfy the test, and then can no longer be relied upon as true in the whole range of its application. It may be treated as partly true and partly false, or possibly may be discarded altogether and replaced by another hypothesis that can meet the severer test. Thus the corpuscular theory of light prevailed until it was found inadequate to account for darkness as a result of light interference. Huygens then developed the undulatory theory, which seemed satisfactory until new facts appeared which it failed to explain. Now physicists are searching for a theory that will hold under all known conditions.

Because our tests apply only to those aspects of a thing or situation which pertain to our interest, we are able, for the most part, to live contentedly with a mixture of the true and the illusory. No one is without illusions. The student, however, is continually trying to reduce the relative amount of error or illusion and win for himself and for others a greater body of truth. The process goes on indefinitely. This is illustrated by the continuous efforts of philosophers to revise and make more

accurate their conceptions of nature and human life. The speculations in this field are bewilderingly various, and the work of revision goes on unabated. Each change of meaning introduced into our fundamental beliefs affects to some extent opinion about everything in our world. It turns out, then, that the true is what we think to be true in the light of our total experience at the time of judging. This means, not that there is no such thing as abiding truth, but that truth abides while we are convinced that it is true. The realm of truth is ever changing. The pragmatist, in declaring that a belief is true if it works, may need to add some qualifications; but he is right, I believe, in bringing the test of truth into a dynamic context.

Knowledge is not so much cumulative as growing. It becomes more and more an organic whole, in which every insight attained throws a new light upon all the rest. Every fresh demand leads to a new testing; the inconsistent is eliminated, and the valid in the new is incorporated to enlarge and strengthen. The value is thus ever increasing.

3 AESTHETIC VALUES

A CERTAIN shift of interest from the cognitive reveals another set of values—the aesthetic. Students of the theory of aesthetics have come to recognize that their field spreads over the whole of human experience.² Aesthetic value (positive or negative)

2. Cf. John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, chap. iii; C. J. Ducasse, *Philosophy of Art*, pp. 124, 189; H. N. Lee, *Perception and Aesthetic Value*, p. 103; D. W. Prall, *Aesthetic Analysis*, pp. 5 ff.

is coextensive with nature, and, as interpretation, penetrates to its inner essence; coextensive also with the arabesque traced over nature by art. We necessarily give value to everything of which we become aware.

When we contemplate an object as interesting us for its own sake, we sustain an aesthetic attitude toward it. When we are interested in using the object for some end beyond itself, our attitude is practical. When we analyze it in order to discover how its parts are related and how it fits into a conceptual scheme, our interest is cognitive. These interests are not mutually exclusive but may all be present in varying degrees at one time. The cognitive analyses may contribute to aesthetic enjoyment; and aesthetic quality may enhance the sense of practical value. The dominant interest determines our characterization.

When the object, contemplated for itself, satisfies us, we call it beautiful. When it fails to satisfy and we feel the lack, we condemn the object as aesthetically faulty. Beauty, like a cut diamond, has facets gleaming with various colors; and these have suggested many definitions. I like best the free-ranging statement that whatever satisfies us is beautiful. Satisfying is more than mere pleasing, if we take the term pleasing as ordinarily used to indicate a somewhat superficial feeling. Satisfying carries pleasing into the third dimension, reaching our whole emotional experience. There is in it a sense of fulfillment which brings liberation.

A much-discussed question is whether beauty is

subjective or objective, or both. If the tastes, attitudes, and sensitivities of the one who passes judgment are emphasized, beauty seems to depend upon the observer; yet it is the object that is beautiful. The question leads directly to a fundamental issue—whether nature is independent of the percipient, or is the product of the mind's activity in response to controlling stimulations that do not come from the object. My adherence to the second alternative makes it possible for me to hold that beauty is subjective in origin and objective in reference and meaning. It thus depends upon the observer and yet has all the objectivity that things have. The close connection between subject and object is shown in empathy. In whatever we call beautiful we find ourselves most completely. We are drawn out of ourselves, as we say; for aesthetic appreciation marks the most intimate association of ourselves with the object.

On one point there is general agreement, namely, that harmony is a primary condition of beauty. "The perfection of Beauty," says Whitehead, "is defined as being the perfection of Harmony."³ This principle has its subjective and objective sides. On the one hand, we may hold with Kant that in the appreciation of a beautiful object the imagination and the understanding, without reference to concepts, work in harmony.⁴ An element of disharmony would be introduced if contemplation of the object aroused in us conflicting in-

3. *Adventures of Ideas* (The Macmillan Company), p. 325.

4. *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, Einleitung, sec. 7.

terests—if, for instance, we could not remain content to enjoy the object but felt at the same time a desire to own it or to alter its appearance in some way. On the other hand, harmony is a well-known norm of beauty in the object. Much fine work has been done in trying to discover the different objective conditions of harmony. The analysts in this field have followed the scientific method of reducing the complex whole of a beautiful object to its elements, to lines and surfaces, colors, tones, and the like. In so doing they have been able to correlate the beauty in objects with mathematical relations and matters of proportion. Thus a kind of science of aesthetics has been worked out.

Some difficulties root in the extreme variety of likes and dislikes among men, the change of moods of individuals, and the possible development in taste. The constant efforts to introduce new ideas in music, poetry, painting, the plastic arts, and the dance, testify to the desire for change. Only the supreme exemplars of beauty survive and become classic. They remain because they are exhaustless; they can disclose new values indefinitely. Aesthetic valuation expresses initially the attitude of an individual. Yet even for him it may not be valid always. If it happens to be such a valuation as holds over and is accepted by others, it has only a more comprehensive validity, a greater outreach and duration. Aesthetic appreciation is susceptible of development. By cultivating our aesthetic sense we may lift all experience to a new level. Every such increment is a permanent acquisition.

Current discussion as to the cognitive significance of art deals with a question too broad for thorough treatment here. But a few suggestions as to underlying principles may be made. Especially should it be remembered that cognition is a phase of all activity of the self.

The mind's image-building power—its most fundamental function—is exercised in several fields, which are, chiefly: sense perception, pure fancy or imagination, memory, dreams. In *sense perception* there is coercion or control from the dynamic order; yet the mind never reacts mechanically but shows in its construct its own character and immediate interest. When aesthetic interest is prominent, as in observing works of art, the mind's creativity is primarily appreciative. In *pure fancy* the mind is under no outside control. Its images will, to be sure, arise within the scope of its own nature, and will, to some extent, partake of the character of its experience; but apart from these inherent necessities, there is free play for the individual mind. Within this field the self's freedom is at its maximum. In *memory* the self with only a suggestion of external control reconstructs a part of its historical experience. Acting thus upon its own initiative, the mind is prone to supplement its efforts by the easier method of imagination. In *dreams* the control, though not yet fully understood, seems to come in part from the source dominant in waking perception and in part from the individual mind freed from some restraints that operate during consciousness.

Art is another stage of man's audacity—the attempt to express his mental creations through physical media. It might seem that Croce has some justification for applying the term art to the inner activity of image-building; but I shall use the word in the commoner meaning just indicated. Art has a potential range as wide as have sense perception, memory, and imagination combined but is limited by the character of its media. In one sense, art covers all human creativity that is given physical expression—the artificial or man-made as contrasted with the natural. The variety within this extensive sweep makes art a difficult subject to analyze.

Expression of any sort conduces to definiteness but mainly serves for social communication. In a work of art the artist makes public his private interpretation, fancy, or ideal. This expression will be intelligible to others only as it partakes of a reality that is common or, at least, sharable.

Now an artist may essay the comparatively simple task of reproducing in a chosen medium some object of sense perception exactly as he perceives it. Even if he achieves his aim to his own satisfaction, the product will not correspond perfectly with the object as apprehended by any other perceiver; for the sense world of each individual is unique. The product will, therefore, be illuminating to other persons just because it presents a different interpretation. To this extent it will have cognitive significance. It may even be called a proposition, if proposition is defined as “the ver-

bal expression of something which is put forth for acceptance or nonacceptance,"⁵ and if the adjective "verbal" may be dropped from the definition in the case of art forms other than poetry. This art product conveys knowledge of the artist's perceptual world; but whether his interpretation is to be accepted as true of the common-to-all reality remains to be determined by the test of consensus. In dealing with themes from sense perception or memory the artist is guided by a pattern of what is or has been actual. Under these conditions literal reproduction is likely to be dominant.⁶ Yet an ideal is in force, the ideal of perfect appreciation and presentation.

Again, an artist may embody in some medium a fancy or ideal of his own, or an avowedly idealized interpretation of some part of the natural or historical process. Here the artist seems under no compulsion to express what he considers true of reality. He may present what he wishes were true, or what he thinks ought to be true, or even what he would not care to have true. The artist loves freedom. To the extent that his presentation has meaning for the percipient, it will be an expression of something put forth for acceptance or nonacceptance; it will be a clue to the inner life of the artist and therefore to possible ways of thinking. But it will not otherwise have face-value as a

5. John J. Toohey, "Proposition, Judgment, and Inference," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVII (1940), 235.

6. Bela Pratt's "The School Boy of 1850," which Greene criticizes as too literal a reproduction of the artist's model, is genetically a statue to a memory.

revelation of the real. However, as I have intimated, the artist cannot jump clear of his own experience into a field of wholly original invention, such as would offer new sense qualities or new human characteristics. He must conceive in terms of the known. His ideals must be rooted in the nature of the world and of man. And since our ideals are what is best about us, a sharing of them is a revelation of our highest values, a reality not yet wrought into history. The merit of a work of art depends upon the greatness of the ideal conceived and upon the skill with which the artist bends physical media to its expression.

Benedetto Croce, considering beauty as expression, maintains that there is no difference of degree.⁷ But if we regard aesthetic appreciation as satisfaction, we may find a difference in scope, amounting to gradation. That which has the most varied sources of abiding satisfaction is the most beautiful.

4 MORAL VALUES

IN taking up questions that pertain to the relativity of values, we pass from the primarily aesthetic to the emphatically practical or moral. The aesthetic attitude is one of relaxed appreciation, when for the moment desire is in abeyance. But when there is a demand for volition, all the resources of our active nature are called into service. In a sense, our destiny depends on our decisions

7. *Aesthetic*, trans. by Ainslie (2d ed.), Pt. I, chaps. i, ix, x.

and on the vigor with which we endeavor to realize them.

Since every situation that we face harbors many possible satisfactions, we are compelled to choose among them; for choose we must even when we choose not to choose. Perhaps human beings have no greater sign of worth than this compulsion of choosing. By reason of this constant demand upon us, we are perforce trained in weighing relative merits and in making our choices intelligent instead of impulsive. So much does our permanent welfare depend upon wise choices that we are continually prodded by our mistakes to study the whole field of consequences, and especially to consider our own limitations and possibilities. Choices must be made in the light of all we can know about ourselves and our world of values. Human beings might be rated by the range of pertinent conditions that they take into account in choosing.

There comes before us now the central problem of ethics. Can we find a criterion that will guide us in making choices among values? The wider the compass of our interests and the more sensitive we are to the values of life, the more we feel the need of a genuine perspective among them.

As we begin our search for a touchstone, we need to remind ourselves of the nature of values. They are always objective to the subject who experiences them. They are a product of the individual's valuing activity. They come into existence only through appreciation. In this sense they are re-

lational, as some writers maintain.⁸ But a realist is in trouble when he tries to keep value connected with both subject and object. The best he can do is to say that value as a quality of the object is not always appreciated but may be potential. Just what a potential value inhering in an independent object would be is not clear. As regards this difficulty, the view that I have been presenting has a distinct advantage; for by attributing independent reality, not to the world known in perception, but to the power that controls us in constructing our perceived world, the theory does away with the isolation of the object from the self. We have a perceived world that is objective and yet is sensitive to every phase of the percipient's valuation. The ground of our entire experience is the activity of the causal order upon us. This provides for the reality that we attribute to our world. But what the individual's activity projects is his own version, his interpretative estimate, of what comes to him. This does not mean that there are no standards in any field of value. Continuing experience and social communication keep us constantly revising our values to bring them into accord with one another and with those which have general acceptance among well-qualified judges.

Now since values are values for a self, their relative worth must be determined by what they contribute to the self's well-being. This should be the

8. E. g., Walter G. Everett, *Moral Values*, p. 151; Harold N. Lee, "A Precise Meaning for Objective and Subjective in Value Theory," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVII (1940), 626-637.

criterion. Is this contribution to be found in pleasure? There is enough truth at the heart of hedonism to give it a perennial appeal. Yet whenever in the history of thought it has been brought forward as an adequate account of the moral life, it has been effectively criticized and for the time set aside.

Let us take a glance at the difficulties. The earliest types of hedonism were concerned with the happiness of the individual without regard to society. To Jeremy Bentham chiefly belongs the credit for transcending the egoistic form. He added to hedonistic principles one that was incompatible with them, namely, that pleasures are to be measured not merely by their intensity, duration, and other such characteristics, but by their social results. Bentham's disciple, John Stuart Mill, made further advance by introducing the distinction of quality as a test of the desirability of pleasures. He rechristened the theory and called it utilitarianism. I need not go into the merits of the long-drawn-out discussion over this ethical system. It is sufficient for the present purpose to note that Bentham's introduction of the social test and Mill's recognition of the qualitative distinction among pleasures transformed hedonism into a view that came much closer to doing justice to the range and complexity of moral values. The pleasure meant is no longer simple pleasure but is involved in relations.

Can it still be isolated sufficiently to serve as our criterion? It would be inaccurate to say that

pleasure is a part or element of an experience. If present at all, it is pervasive of the whole. Psychological study may give us analysis, but it analyzes not the experience itself, but a concept of it. If an effort is made to separate pleasure from the cognitive and from the conative, there is isolated only a vague sentiency, which has no concrete meaning apart from the total experience. In order to give the pleasure any content, the rest of the experience must be reintroduced. It turns out, then, that we have not pleasure but pleasant experiences. Inasmuch as each experience is distinctive, pleasant experiences are strictly incommensurable.

Any particular case of satisfaction, even if considered as a present experience, reaches back into the past and looks into the future, and relates itself more or less definitely to manifold interests. This is inevitable because it is an experience by a self. Hence when a choice must be made, nothing less than the total needs and interests of the self can yield the desired guidance.

Against this view two chief objections have been brought: first, that the definiteness and constancy necessary in a criterion are lacking; and second, that there is too great leaning toward egoism.

In reply to the first criticism, comparison may be made with standards of truth and of beauty. Just as growth in knowledge and in aesthetic appreciation brings changes in our ideas of the true and the beautiful, so growth of insight into the nature and possibilities of the self changes our ideal

of the self to be realized. In all that pertains to the life of the self, this characteristic of growth must be taken into account. In using self-realization, then, as a criterion, we should allow for continuous expansion. But certain general aspects of selfhood furnish a safe beginning. We are all subject to the requirements for physical well-being. We have an intellectual structure, so to speak, which is much the same for all. We are all influenced by ideals of future good. We are all essentially social. What conduces to our upbuilding in these and other phases of our life is constantly becoming clearer. In morals we can apparently come closer to a generally accepted standard than in aesthetics. This is because moral judgments rest upon the commonly recognized facts of practical life. Differences arise for the most part from varying conceptions of selfhood. But the more superficial conceptions may be corrected, and the margins of difference in moral outlook and judgment be thereby greatly reduced.

The second criticism, namely, that the principle of self-realization is too ego-centric, loses its force when one sees clearly that the self is by nature social. We are always living in the presence of that with which we are vitally connected. Even in sense perception the social give-and-take is perfectly illustrated. Our natures go out in self-expression; and the very objects that result become for us centers of interest, concrete values. This is the social cycle. We find ourselves in our world. We know the forms of life below the human only as they reveal somewhat of ourselves. But the social aspect of our

nature comes more clearly into evidence in our contacts with our fellow men. Our first experiences and certainly our most vivid ones are of this higher social character. The contrast between goods that apparently reach only to the individual and goods that bear the stamp of sociality simplifies the task of applying self-realization as a test in choosing among values. As soon as we appreciate the social significance of all our acts, of all our desires and strivings, we attain a kind of moral maturity. Long years of training are needed to bring us to that high plane of living where the social ideal dominates the whole of life. We are lifted above the level of impulse and passion, and the various complexes that the psychoanalyst portrays, to a level where reason and good will control. Then we may have confidence that every choice made in accordance with the principle will be a wise one.

Clifford L. Barrett raises a different critical query. He says: "What meaning can self-realization have, other than that of realization of values through or within a particular conscious being? Does not self-realization consist of becoming aware of certain meanings, purposes, and values which are being realized in an increasingly satisfactory way, in the series of activities which we call life? Self-realization is not something which can exist independent of, prior to, or above values—it is their realization in a particular group or organization of human experiences. How, then, can self-realization be the foundation of the experience of value, or its necessary and primary presupposition? Can values be secondary to

that which has its being in their realization? If values originate in and exist only for a self, can that self be said to have value?"⁹

I think that this criticism springs from a somewhat abstract idea of values. They seem to be given an independent status. Ambiguity is easy here, for the word values may be taken concretely or abstractly. To say that self-realization is the realization of values in a particular group or organization of human experiences is, it seems to me, to lose sight of the concrete active self, the experiencer. I should say, rather, that self-realization is development of the self in the understanding, appreciation, and attainment of values through experience. The question whether the self can be said to have value if values originate in and exist only for a self finds its answer in the social nature of selfhood. When the self makes itself its object, it gives itself a value. There is an infusion of self-valuation in all self-consciousness. Other selves are constantly valued in social intercourse but with recognition of their subjective as well as objective character; for the valued self is recognized as not only an object but as being to itself a subject.

5 RELIGIOUS VALUES

RELIGIOUS values are frequently treated as a class by themselves, though they are so closely related to the other groups that some writers, especially pragmatists, think there should be no separation. The decision hinges on the general philosophic

9. *Ethics* (Harper & Brothers), p. 437.

position maintained. Persons who stop short of belief in an ultimate intelligence do not readily acknowledge that religion has values of its own. But in accordance with the view that I am setting forth, religion seems to offer certain values not identifiable with any other kind. These emerge in the experience of worship. Their quality depends upon the worshiper's conception of his God and upon the depth of his devotion.

Religion rests upon beliefs concerning the essential nature of man and his relation to the Power that expresses itself in the universe. Such beliefs need to be established intellectually; for in such high enterprise error is easy. Doubt is always just around the corner; and as doubt grows, indifference and aversion set in. Some religious natures try to avoid this outcome by attenuating their beliefs to vague generalities; and as these become amorphous, anything that stirs one deeply is likely to be called religious. It behooves the earnest doubter rather to reëxamine the grounds of belief. This is clearly the task of the intellect. The temptation to take refuge in authority must be resisted if freedom is prized. There is no substitute for weighing the evidence. In proportion to the strength of intellect and the breadth of learning will be the magnitude of the undertaking. What might have dispelled all doubts a few generations ago may be quite unconvincing now. Each succeeding age adds some new requirement to be satisfied. But it often turns out that the new requirements, which boast of being abreast of the times, are only some old

difficulty in a new guise. A frequent mistake, which renders an affirmative conclusion almost impossible, is to rely on the methods of the sciences as the only ones permissible. These methods were elaborated in the interest of accuracy in observation, measurement, and description. They furnish data yielding a picture of life as it appears to an observer. Religious belief has to do with the interpretation of these data. The self does not appear among them but is the interpreter. The insight that the self is the center of the circle of values, that it furnishes the model of all existential judgments, and that it is the reality we know most intimately, makes the problem of validity in religion far less intricate than at first appears.

One need not be a specialist in any of the natural sciences to extract from the study of nature enough to guide one in testing religious beliefs. But care must be taken to distinguish the authenticated data and reasoned conclusions from the assumptions made to give the conclusions concreteness. For instance, the researches of biologists have fairly well established the theory of biological evolution. This we may use as a foundation stone in our thinking. Evolutionists, however, are not always satisfied to stop with description of the process but have posited a variety of causes or determining factors. These are open to doubt. It may be legitimate to bring the general theory down to the details of life by appealing to such influences as we find working in our own contacts with nature; but where should be the stopping point for

this utilizing of ordinary experience to interpret biological theory? This question carries us beyond the aims and needs of the scientific view into what constitutes the field of inquiry of philosophy. There is no break between philosophy and the sciences. All that science achieves gives philosophy a running start.

It is in this region beyond scientific interests that religious beliefs must seek their validation. The sciences when taken together furnish the religious thinker with an elaborate and well-tested conception of nature as constituting an orderly system. No such actual synthesis of all the separate bodies of scientific knowledge has been made with the endorsement of the specialists; but wherever the scientist has been long at work, he has disclosed order and interrelationship in his particular field, with indications that the order extends indefinitely beyond. In fact, underlying his work is the assumption that the whole realm of nature is a unity of measurable activities in thoroughgoing interaction. So strong is this conviction that the scientist doubts whether he fully understands data that seem to be in conflict with it. Hence the religious inquirer is safe in accepting the assumption as a trustworthy hypothesis concerning nature. Starting with this basic assumption, the student of validity in religion may proceed with assurance to conclusions of the utmost significance. These reasoned conclusions furnish the structure of religious thought but do not take the place of the

intimate knowledge of religious values that comes as the rich product of experience.

Closely connected with the intellectual is the moral aspect of religious values. A flaw in one's conception of the character of God will sooner or later be reflected in one's conception of duty, of justice, of benevolence, and of all the other virtues. An imperfectly moralized conception of God may, by reason of the survival strength of religious tenets, continue for ages to impede moral progress. History shows tragic examples of moral conflict in which organized religion was on the wrong side. But normally a religion that is alive to the ever-advancing knowledge and insights of men will be in the forefront of progressive movements and will be a constant inspiration to racial development. Religious ideals furnish the most powerful incentives to right living, and hence have profound moral significance.

Moreover, the personal character of religious experience brings a close alliance with morals. Morality has to do, directly or indirectly, with social life; and religion is essentially a social bond. But moral values issue from conduct and the building of character; whereas religion is primarily an emotional experience.

Religious values have also aesthetic quality. Psychologically they seem to be more definitely aesthetic than moral, though they deteriorate if the consciousness of the social Other fades. The exercise of religion creates and irradiates a beauty that

transforms the whole of life. It is not strange, therefore, that our best art through the ages has had a religious motif. Yet since religious values originate in communion with God, they cannot be wholly identified with aesthetic values.

CHAPTER XII

OUR ACHIEVING

1

NOTHING will satisfy us long that does not involve some achievement on our part. All thinking and valuing look toward achieving. We are active as long as we live.

True, there is much in our nature that craves passive enjoyment. This begins to assert itself after the overflow of energy in youth abates. Many life-plans are based upon the idea that, after spending years in strenuous effort to accumulate, one may settle back happily and take one's ease. That goal, so earnestly sought, is regarded as a time when one really begins to reap life's richest rewards. But novelists, essayists, and other social philosophers unite in depicting the disillusionment that awaits him who seeks permanent peace in this way; for, as time goes on, he discovers that the luster with which his ideal of passive enjoyment shone grows dim as he approaches. He finds that his anticipations end in disappointment. Then comes pessimism with its eloquent wailings to the effect that man is ever seeking and never at rest, always struggling on, blunderingly, blindly, driven by an inner hunger, yet never attaining, never reaching the haven of satisfied desire.

While this lack of contentment is disheartening

when its inevitability is first discovered, it may come to be viewed as a mark of nobility when we understand ourselves better. Upon reflection we find that the reason why we cannot be satisfied is something deep in our own nature. There are in us possibilities that outreach our satisfactions. As active beings we must keep attaining new objectives. Life must have for us not a fixed but a flying goal. Every attainment resulting from effort toward something desired is, in the very process of attaining, actually transcended. We set for ourselves some end, some good that seems at the time the one thing wanted; but as we develop our inner life by striving to attain that good, we see new possibilities of good beyond that which we sought. New desires are awakened. A larger life opens up. And the attainment of our earlier objective does not satisfy the new ambitions. Thus one desire gives place to another; and each time a greater effort is required for realization. It is because we have the ability to grow continuously that no attainment can satisfy us permanently. Life is the progressive realization of possibilities in our nature and becomes ever richer as these possibilities are actualized. Hence what seemed to the pessimist to be a dreary fate for humankind turns out to be evidence of greatness. It is no cause for despair that we are never satisfied with any gains. These gains are but means to an end; and the end is the growth of personality in us, the realization of our unrevealed future.

2

THE self expresses its nature in its activity, both in the elementary processes of sense perception and in the complexities of cognitive, emotional, and volitional life.

I have already had occasion to speak of the self as creative, but I should like to add a little here to what has been said on that point. The self's creative activity is perhaps most manifest in the getting of its perceptual world. That the mind does anything in elementary sense perception is not immediately evident. Hence it has been possible for some to hold that primary sensations are given. But analysis of the result reveals activity, even though almost automatic. Aroused by the stimulations, the mind responds in accordance with its nature as common to all minds and as peculiar to itself. Volitional guidance of the response begins at once, and continues with increasing efficiency. This work includes probing for further sense evidence, analyzing the objective situation, testing results, hunting out hidden connections with other situations, organizing new units for further study and manipulation, and thus, with the coöperation of others, building the world of nature.

But the question may be raised, how much must we ascribe to the control, and how much to the spontaneity of the self? The question, of course, cannot be answered with definiteness. We have no means of measuring and comparing. Control from

the dynamic order is ever present to some extent, as is evidenced by the determinate character of our perceptual world. But some spontaneity on the part of the self pervades all sense perception. The self's attitudes, expectations, desires, influence its most direct responses to stimulation. The self deals with meanings, and at the very beginning of its activity it spontaneously reaches out for the what and the why. The outrunning of the response must constantly be checked, in order to prevent error. But the self works under the coercion of specific stimulations; for the details of perceived objects are not changeable at will.

Memory enters into every sense experience; and remembering, even in its most elementary forms, is an act of self-assertion.

In our daily life volitional creativity in the form of imagination plays a part that can hardly be overestimated. It not only colors and adorns what otherwise would be drab and commonplace, but fashions an ideal future that serves as a guide to further endeavor. As the work of volition, these imaginative creations reveal somewhat of the self's marvelous versatility and resourcefulness.

Thus the self in responding to stimulation asserts its power. This is its primary act of will. It comes to consciousness in the realization of that which is over against it in objectivity. It finds itself in a relation essentially social, to which adjustment must be made. Volition must be exercised in choosing among possible alternatives and in overcoming difficulties. The greater the concentra-

tion, the clearer the consciousness. The putting forth of effort is rewarded. The phrase, "the will to power," gives compact expression to a fruitful theory of human living; but right direction is all-important.

3

A VITAL problem connected with our achieving is the question debated through the centuries: Is the self free?

Perhaps the root of the trouble in answering is that freedom cannot be construed by the intellect. No concept nor assortment of concepts can equal freedom. But the mind is satisfied only when it can connect in a determinate way a particular event with the situation immediately preceding. The conditioning situation is looked upon as having the same type of reality as the event. All the preceding events help to determine what the particular event shall be. Thus the intellectual ideal is a whole of concatenated events, each of which has its fixed place in the temporal series.

In accordance with this way of understanding and explaining, a person trained in the methods of the natural sciences tends to look for something in the history or circumstances of an individual that will account for his acting as he does. The self as agent is practically ignored. Heredity and environment are the important factors. On this assumption some students of the moral life have brought to light much that has value. They discover that when they are sufficiently abstract and general, they can

trace a more or less definite connection between heritage or environment and the traits and conduct of individuals. But the findings are actuarial in character, and yield no more insight into the motivation of a particular act than insurance statistics into the biography of an individual human being.

Thinkers of another class come a little closer to experience by granting that the self is a factor in the causal series; but they take the self to be just the accumulating effects of psychic activities. These effects constitute character, which determines choices. When this theory is combined with a hedonistic doctrine of motivation, the setting is complete for determinism.

The argument thus built up may seem the last word from the side of the intellect. But the intellect does not have the last word, nor indeed the first word, on the subject of freedom. Thought can no more understand freedom than it can understand motion or change. The conclusions from a strictly scientific or intellectual treatment of the moral problem fail to answer the essential questions. As moralists we want to know why it is that we feel responsible for our deeds, how the ideal of a more satisfying future can control our acts, and what is the true nature of the moral self that can choose among goods and carry out a course of action to realize its choice. These issues reach beyond the merely intellectual.

Two lines of thought are usually followed in arguing that the self is free.

First, the self as thinker confronts a problem and

undertakes to solve it. I am prodded, let us say, by a certain restlessness, a necessity for some adjustment that will make conditions more tolerable. To make the adjustment, whether in myself or in the environment, I must study the conditions. I must discover what is the cause of the discomfort and what may be utilized to overcome it. I must weigh evidence, consider alternative possibilities, frame a hypothesis, and test it. This process may become quite involved, requiring close inspection on my part, continuous checking to learn if the data have been correctly interpreted and if the reasoning has been logically valid. If at any point the reasoning is discovered to be faulty, I must go back and revise the procedure. Now every one of these steps taken by the mind is an expression of freedom. To deny freedom would be to obliterate the distinction between truth and error, since they would be alike inevitable. Freedom, therefore, is manifest whenever the question is raised: Is the proposition true or false?

Secondly, the self as active chooses its course in conformity with an ideal of a future good. There are a great many influences originating somewhere in our natures—appetites and impulses—that play their part in determining action. These influences complicate every situation. But over and above these, there is usually some deliberate planning. The ideal of a good not yet realized can exist only in the thought world of moral consciousness. It is tentative in its nature and has its place among various ideals that might serve as the goal of action.

Since these are not all conjointly realizable, choice must be made among them. This choice expresses freedom.

The sense of responsibility that we all feel is evidence that our choices are our own. The ideal of good, by being adopted for action, becomes ours. There is nothing in life more expressive of ourselves than the ideals we try to realize in conduct. This makes the sense of responsibility extremely personal. But we are directly responsible only for conduct that involves an actual choice in the presence of alternatives. When it is a clear case of right choice, the recognition of responsibility yields a sense of moral rightness, a feeling of personal worth. When, on the other hand, the choice is made on emotional grounds, in defiance of a more considered judgment, responsibility is the source of self-condemnation and remorse, one of the acutely distressing experiences of life.

But if the student of morals confines himself to natural science methods, he must exhibit responsibility as something other than personal; he must assimilate it to the form of objective concatenation. In doing so he ties up the future with the past, makes ideals and purposes mere shadows of substantial realities that constitute the chain of events, and reduces the self to a name for complex feelings and ideational activities associated with physical functionings. Such procedure, no doubt, has its value as description, but is at best only preliminary to a study of what is distinctive in the moral life. Freedom is the *sine qua non* of moral explanation.

The physical and instinctive influences that affect conduct play their part in the making of a particular decision, but in addition the decision presupposes the ideal of a future good as the self sees it.

4

EVERY volition is effective, that is, brings about results; but not every volition succeeds in bringing about the results that we desire. For we exercise our freedom under conditions. These conditions present the opportunities for activity of any sort, since all activity has a definite direction and must use means. What are the conditions of successful volition? An answer must take into account both the objective and subjective aspects.

The objective conditions evidently lie in the structure of the outside world. When the volition concerns walking or lifting or some other bodily movement, its fulfillment depends upon the state of the musculature, the nervous system, and the like. A strong body functioning normally is the prime requisite. When the volition is of wider scope, the conditions of success are more complicated. As time goes on, the strength of man's arm comes to be increased by lever and pulley, the speed of his feet by wheels and wings, the reach of his voice by wire and wireless. His volitions, complying with one set of conditions after another, succeed in revealing to him the wonder of his world.

The subjective conditions are the counterpart of the objective conditions and consist of knowing

how in each case the objective conditions may be met. If we want a certain good, we must fulfill the specific conditions that yield this good. We never exercise intelligent volition until at least we think we know that success is possible. If we prove to be mistaken in thinking the conditions are favorable, we count the volition a failure. For example, I think the ice will bear my weight and I skate out, but if it is too thin, I break through. All the machinery of life is kept going by the necessity of our studying the conditions of success in volition. Even the simple acts of ordinary living represent net results of race experience. Generations have been in schooling to learn some of these elementary adjustments, which have become a part of the social heritage. Yet each individual has to learn by practice. Always, too, there are enough new conditions to set a problem and introduce uncertainty. We are never quite free of the necessity for experimenting. We are never quite sure of the outcome. This novelty resulting in hazard is what gives life zest. We come to regard a good that is easily won as uninteresting. We crave the piquancy of danger. But when the conditions are fulfilled, the results follow without fail.

. Inasmuch as the self achieves whenever it does anything, we must take into account also the destructive forces that men at times turn loose upon society. The most destructive force in all human history has been war. Now war is abhorrent to the moral nature. It is the breeder of hate and bitterness and savagery. Yet war expresses power at full

blast. It calls into play all the resourcefulness of the participants. The problem of civilization is to find effective means of redirecting in the interest of progress the forces in society that are now subversive.

5

PROGRESS is difficult to estimate, and indeed to define. For on account of the extremely complex nature of the self, one finds it hard to say what constitutes its well-being. Only in broad outline can this be formulated. During the long struggle of man with his environment and during his persistent efforts to discover the meaning of life, he has hit upon certain basic insights into his own nature as it is at its best. Progress through achievement could most profitably be indicated by the contributions made to the realization of this ideal. The present study has already drawn heavily upon these insights, the ripe fruitage of reflective thought by a thousand generations. Such are the social nature of the self, its freedom, its ability to create. But it would be a hopeless task to enumerate all the characteristics of our many-sided nature. Each trait, each interest, is the gateway to a whole realm of achievement and of value.

These achievements are of two types: those that result from private initiative and those that originate in the group or community. The former develop the individual as a forceful personality; the latter develop the wealth of the community, in which all share. Normally what contributes to the

upbuilding of the community contributes to the well-being of the individual member. But there may be conflict of interests. When this becomes acute, the community seeks to restrain the individual on the ground that his attitude is antisocial. A slight amount of friction is inevitable, if the individuals are strong of will and have clear-cut programs for their life of achievement. If individual initiative should be discouraged and sacrificed in the interest of the conventional life of society, high accomplishment would cease, and society itself would suffer serious loss. Progress, then, must come from the interplay of the two forces—individual initiative and corporate control. These two are harmonized in the ideal of a community of selves so far matured as to realize their true social nature.

That progress has been made from age to age can hardly be denied, even when we take into account the breakdown of whole civilizations. Something better has come into being after the overthrow of each epoch. We may now be at the end of a world epoch, as many believe. If so, we may expect that a better time is preparing. What that new era in the evolution of human society will be in concrete detail no one can divine. It is our good fortune that the future is hid from us. We are thus compelled to go forward by dead reckoning, with the moral and scientific insights of the race as our instruments of orientation. The temptation that assails every successful leader of men is to neglect these instruments of reckoning and trust to guesses and hunches and counsels of self-interest. But those

who yield to such allurements are sure to come to grief and may in their downfall carry others with them. The leader sorely needed is he who with a clear understanding of the laws of right living and a steadfast loyalty thereto combines a practical knowledge of men and of means for influencing them.

In order that we may live together in peace and comfort and in enjoyment of the common heritage, society must be organized in many different ways. Each type of interest requires its own distinctive form of organization. To manage the general affairs of the community, large and small political units are given specific functions and powers. Various theories of government are championed, from a loosely knit democracy, in which the individual is allowed the largest liberty consistent with the rights and privileges of other members of the unit, to an absolute totalitarian state, in which the maximum of control is exercised by the central authority over the individual. At present a modified form of democracy is contending with a high-handed dictatorship. The totalitarians have the greater immediate success, because they can regiment the people and compel them to do the will of the rulers. A natural result is excessive nationalism and unscrupulous exploiting of weaker states. But since the working assumption of totalitarianism is that might makes right, these dictatorships can have only a temporary lease of life; for they will sooner or later destroy one another or be destroyed from within. The continuous appeal to the motive

of fear in the people is subject to the law of diminishing returns. The necessity for utilizing a large proportion of the able-bodied citizens in military service and for expending large public funds on battleships, submarines, and bombing planes keeps the people impoverished and discontented. Within the political organization, whatever be its form, are other organized systems to serve various interests, such as production and distribution, education, and religion.

If the energies of mankind were marshaled in a truly coöperative way for building up the higher civilization that is clearly possible, there would be an accelerated movement onward. For in the organization of society as a working institution that furthers the interests of each individual and conserves the accumulated wealth, we have the condition of man's greatest achievements. But such an organization has never been fully realized, and never will be until nations cease to claim autonomy and become willing to coöperate with all other nations in a world-wide federation.

CHAPTER XIII

OUR GROWTH

1

Is it true that the self grows? Certainly there are many changes that seem to indicate growth—the broadening of the mental horizon, the increase in effectiveness of action, the advance from one level of values to a higher, the maturing of moral judgment, the keener appreciation of other selves as moral personalities, the deeper understanding of life's meaning. But the question has implications that call for more than an offhand answer.

Growth is a phenomenon so familiar that we seldom stop to consider all that it involves. The term growth is applied even to the inanimate, as when we speak of the growth of a crystal. In this case there is only rearrangement of material. A chemical element in solution is gradually deposited as a solid of crystalline form. Although the striking regularity of form is a new feature, there is no increase in the atomic sum total; there is only redistribution. Mechanistic science, dealing with a closed system, may take the growth of a crystal as archetypal, a model to be carried over into the field of the organic. A tree grows, becomes larger and stronger, by assimilating and building into its structure materials drawn from the soil and the atmosphere. It grows by accretion and organization.

But the materials on which it feeds were present in earth and air before being utilized by the tree. Here, too, there is apparently no increase of total, only a redistribution. Organisms arise, run their course, and disintegrate to nourish other forms of life. Growth and decay of organisms leave physical nature where it was before, so far as quantitative measurements can indicate.

For a mechanistic theory this kind of growth offers no special difficulty. Growth may be explained as change that is merely transformation. An explanation that shows equivalence is satisfactory. Traditionally the primary law of thought is the axiomatic principle that $A = A$; and science in mathematical form builds on equations. Biology tends to become biochemistry.

Two attempts to explain growth of the self are of this character.

First: The self is endowed at the beginning with potentialities, which on occasion of experiences become actualities. The passage from potentiality to actuality seems a sort of development. Strictly, however, the self does not grow, but simply unfolds.

This view is far from satisfactory. As is generally recognized, the term potentiality is never an explanation. If it ever has an unambiguous meaning, it refers to grounds of expectation in what is known. These lie in the observed and inferred order of events. As soon as we discover a law of sequence, we are in a position to forecast the future to some extent. After the future has become present, we can look back over the course of events and

interpret them as a case of unfolding; the later stages were implicit or potential in the initial stages. It is easy to see in this procedure the bent of the mind to affirm connection wherever possible. And always the ideal of a closed system is the lure to reliance on potentiality. The potential-actual sequence really says nothing more than that there is a continuity, presumably orderly in its nature. The view is not so much an explanation of growth as a denial of it.

Second: The self draws upon a psychic environment just as an organism draws upon its physical environment; and in consequence the self, like the organism, grows.

We can form no notion of the way in which such an appropriation of mind-stuff could take place. The growth of the self does not seem to resemble accretion. Nor is the idea of a cosmic store of thought, memory, purpose, plausible. The most acceptable form of the theory makes the source the infinite Being. The finite self is enveloped in the Infinite and partakes of the infinite resources. When the mundane career is ended, the finite self sinks back into the larger life of the Infinite, and its individuality is annulled. But this view transcends all experience, reduces the finite self to a mere aspect or transient expression of the ultimate Being, and issues in pantheism.

Both these suggestions are, at least implicitly, efforts to bring the growth of the self under the head of transformation within an unchanging total. In the first case, the total is the individual with

potentialities present at the beginning and gradually transformed into actualities. In the second case, the total is the Infinite, which reveals itself in various forms, though its fundamental nature remains the same.

Those who make such attempts to account for growth are holding to an intellectual ideal too rigid for reality. In the thought structure that is our knowledge of the world, the concepts have a definite content which does not change. But the world as experienced is a perpetual process, always becoming what it never was before. This pulsating reality can never be fully reproduced in unchanging concepts. The life that makes growth possible escapes. Even the law of identity, $A = A$, must be interpreted with some freedom to provide for progress in thought. As Hegel asserts, the identity is not abstract identity but involves distinction.¹ In the science of today the appearance of novelty, as in a chemical compound or an evolutionary series, presents a major problem.

Those who hold that the self is nothing more than certain functionings of the brain, or of the nervous system, or of the body as a whole, may regard the growth of the self as an increase in differentiation or complexity of bodily organs. There is, indeed, the closest possible connection between the self and the physical body. In childhood and youth, when the body gains in stature and strength, psychic development is most rapid. At that time the senses are keen, emotions are impulsive and in-

1. *Logic*, sec. 115.

tense, memory is retentive, interest in the outside world is spontaneous, and new experiences are thrilling. With the approach of old age, the nerves are less responsive, vision dims, hearing becomes less acute, the arteries harden. Then the self must struggle to keep going. Memory becomes capricious, thinking weakens into incoherence, volition relaxes, and even consciousness tends to fade.

But an analysis of sense perception and a study of experience have shown us a different view of the self and of the body. I have been arguing that the body is a part of the self's manifestation, a form of the self's activity. Thus regarded, the body does not set the conditions for the self's manifestation, but rather indicates the character of those conditions otherwise imposed. The growing efficiency of the body is an increase in the self's ability to utilize physical resources in its own functioning.

2

It is probably true that the self only gradually differentiates itself from its perception of external objects. Apparently its interest for some time is in its surroundings. At least, this is what students of child life tell us. A dim consciousness of selfhood may emerge fairly early; just when, no one can say, because the observer must depend, for evidence of the awakening, upon indications in behavior. Introspection does not reach so far back in our experience. We must be content with the role of on-lookers. Something happens—an emotional stirring within—that awakens the child to the contrast be-

tween himself as wanting and the object that he wants.

Yet I believe we are justified in holding that the distinction is implicit from the earliest infancy. The child apprehends the objects about him as parts of his own world. The vague sense of possession is primal, and operates as soon as there is awareness of anything. When the child distinguishes himself from his experienced environment, he merely recognizes what was actually present from the dawn of consciousness. He learns how to separate from himself what is separable. On the one side, more or less clearly apprehended, is his own self as the active center of interests, desires, conations; on the other, are the objects of interest.

The child has a confused and inadequate notion of his own nature. But he tries, with many blunders at first, to overcome what bars him from the objects of his desires and hinders him from carrying out his purposes. This process of venturing and blundering brings with it a knowledge of the rules of life's great game. He learns how to attain his ends by conforming. At the same time he discovers, little by little, what he himself is. Thus life becomes an education in self-knowledge. While this is the goal of all education, it cannot be set over against all other objectives as sufficient of itself; for every other interest of life is contributory to it. But however much the self may experience, it never comes to a complete knowledge of itself, for every advance in knowledge and achievement is a further revelation of itself to itself. Not only its

knowledge but its fantasies, illusions, errors, its likes and dislikes, its triumphs and failures, its joys and regrets, its grovelings and aspirations—everything that it experiences is woven into the texture of its being and helps to make it what it is.

Since the self finds itself in its world, its own nature must be as complex and inclusive as the changing universe that is embraced in its experience. The self develops by putting forth its powers into a resultant world. This amazing, inconceivably intricate world-building is not done once for all but is subject to continuous change. From childhood onward our conscious life becomes more and more varied and inclusive. Such an increasing power of creativity is *prima facie* evidence that the self has grown from an insignificant beginning to an intelligence that comprehends the outermost reaches of mature experience. When it is awakened to an unwonted appreciation of an object, it experiences an enlargement of itself, a new form of expression. So long as life lasts, novelty is the law of its being.

As we pass to new experiences and discover new ambitions, we leave the earlier and are never able to return to them except in desultory reminiscence. What satisfied us once can no longer satisfy. We reach out for other good, adapted to our changed valuation. Our power to remember ensures a measure of retention of the past; and the movement into a changing world of experience makes for a larger life and deeper insight into meanings. Thus the self grows through conservation of the old along with attainment of the new, which in spite of its

novelty is in many ways connected with what went before. The self is the capital instance of an entity that maintains its identity in continuous change. The old and the new mingle in human growth; yet nothing in the old remains what it was, as the new emerges out of it. There are for the self no accumulating experiences that are stored away somewhere. The self must by a new creative act bring into consciousness a new experience that it takes as representing a former experience. The door to the past is opened only by such a unique act of creative memory. The remembered experience may be lighted up with a new meaning that is caught by reason of the self's advance in insight.

The creations of the self are the concretions of value. Here we get an inkling of the inner life of selfhood. Values are the forms that the self gives to the objects of its experience world. As projected creations they are external; as values they are the most intimate possessions of the self. Since valuation depends upon ability to appreciate, we may conclude that the growth or decline of the self appears chiefly in the enrichment or impoverishment of its value world. Development of discriminative appreciation of values, along with power to actualize them, comes as near to the real and permanent upbuilding of selfhood as we can get. It means internal growth, which is evident in what we call character. For character is measured by the extent to which the self has succeeded in bringing order and unity into its value world and subjected its

own impulses to the rule of reason. Character is the self in its inner integrity.

That the normal course of a self's development is toward an ever-larger outlook, ever-deeper insights, ever-more-effective exercise of freedom, we should like to believe; but that this is not always the fact, ordinary observation compels us to admit. Life is a tangle. Often it is hard to decide in which direction progress lies and what constitutes progress. This is because we spend our days in a world of infinite complexity, and what we ourselves are or can become is never fully revealed.

The decrease in physical, and often mental, health and vigor as old age comes on raises the question whether this means a corresponding change in the self. An indisputable answer is not to be expected. But it may be said that since any apparent decline in selfhood runs parallel with impairment of bodily functioning and reverses itself whenever there is temporary improvement in such functioning, there is large probability that the deterioration pertains to the physical instrument only. The conditions of effective action are not the same as the power to act.

3

THE suggested evidences of growth find support when we reflect upon the conditions that govern our life. These are best understood as opportunities for development. Take our physical bodies. Proper training can bring out so many skills that a person

hardly knows which to choose. Or take our physical environment. It steadily yields before the onset of human vigor and research. The extensities and complexities of the universe are exhaustless. Even time and change find their meaning in growth of the self, for mere continuity is monotony and mere difference is distraction.

If we consider our psychic life, we find similar adaptation to growth. Our ability to remember is such that we can keep the past while adding the present, yet the past is left somewhat plastic for re-interpretation. Habit likewise conserves the old, yet with possibility of shift to the new. Curiosity coaxes us forward. Imagination paints what we yearn to realize.

The social environment is both reassuring and provocative. Since every generation of thinkers has meditated long upon the meaning of life, the present-day beginner has a rich fund of insight to draw upon. Certain approved norms of conduct have become our common heritage. Conformity to these mores has made our modern civilization possible, whereas defiance of them on the part of individual or nation threatens to overthrow it. An interesting illustration of the furtherance of human development through social contacts is found in the commingling of generations. This compels each of us to take into account the experiences of the less mature—the child world with its freshness, wonder, impotence, and promise—and to be in some degree aware of the outlook of those whose experiences have been more extensive and perhaps more inten-

sive than our own. We are continually reminded of what we were and stimulated to anticipate what we may become. Our life span is thus made much greater than it would have been had our companions been only those of our own age. Thus the intermingling of old and young in the same social group enlarges our sympathies. This means the enlarging of our natures as human beings. When we enter sympathetically into the child's experiences and share his world with him, we do not thus become children but we bring into our maturer, more sophisticated and skeptical way of looking at life a joyful simplicity that brushes away cobwebs. We cannot be the same individuals after such an experience. This suggests that the self in its essential nature is forever young, and even in the midst of heavy responsibilities can recover that sense of youth. When, on the other hand, we mingle with persons of longer experience than our own, we get a perspective that modifies our judgments and gives us a better understanding of the present.

4

APPARENTLY growth is something we must accept on empirical evidence without trying to assimilate it to anything else. If we take life and change for what they are, and we do not seek to force them into other forms, we recognize growth as a normal and welcome fact in our experience.

As has been indicated, the conceptual system of thought has place for only the static and changeless. Growth, however, is a problem, not of knowledge,

but of life. In its dynamic character it outruns the principles of cognition. Intellectualism applied to nature reduces the world to a mechanism. In strict mechanism there can be no advance, only repetition, recurrence. But this conception fails utterly when the question of evolution is considered; for the theory of evolution, taken seriously and applied in detail, merely generalizes the teaching of ordinary experience that the world in which we live is subject to progressive change.

Wundt² has set up as a principle, holding for every spiritual development that has continuity, "the increase of psychic energy"—a principle that forms a complete contrast to the principle of equivalence of physical energy. That we grow, as selves, I believe experience abundantly reveals. We know that ideals of good draw us on, and fear of evil drives us on, to new experiences and the larger life. When the age of reflection is reached, if not before, successive ideals of selfhood become increasingly potent influences in our development. With each closer approximation to the ideal of complete self-mastery in the interest of universal brotherhood, we see more clearly the true and supreme worth of personality. Imagination plays a decisive part in this deepening and enriching of our nature as we move into the future. What may we hope?

2. *Logik*, III: *Logik der Geisteswissenschaften* (4th ed. 1921), 274 f. Cf. J. E. Boodin, *The Social Mind*, p. 18.

PART THREE
SOME BASIC ENIGMAS

CHAPTER XIV

THE STATUS OF SPECULATIVE MATTERS

THUS FAR these studies have kept close to the more elementary facts of experience, common to all humanity. The conclusions can be tested by any critically minded person. The aim has been to sketch a view of life that would have such support as makes any of our beliefs valid. We have seen how intimately and vitally the life of the self is concerned with a knowledge of the outside world, with a conquest of natural forces in the slow process of building an ideal habitation for the restless spirit of man. We have seen how the growing self, as its interests multiply and expand, discovers that objective nature is increasingly responsive. Through every stage of its progress the self opens up a new experience world, which is amazingly intricate and never for two moments the same. Every experience makes a difference in the inner life of the self. They are all value experiences, so met as to further or hinder its well-being. Its life is full of contrasts and alternations of the desirable and the undesirable, until physical death comes.

These two aspects of the self's life—the intermixture of the good and the evil, and the continuity followed by the mundane ending—raise queries that run deep.

One is the haunting problem of evil. Why is the good never quite good and the evil so obtrusively

present? Has evil a part to play in the development of life? Is it objective in nature or does it originate within the self?

Another query has to do with a possible continuance of life beyond the physical terminus. Does death end all? Or may the life we now live be extended into an uncharted future? Can we find any empirical evidence to guide us?

A person immersed in practical affairs may brush aside these questions. He may take as incidental the evils that he encounters in the carrying out of his plans and concern himself no further than with their immediate overcoming. He may assert that one life at a time is enough for him. But though he may fend off the questions because he despairs of ever finding answers, they will remain in the background of his interests, ready to press insistently when evil becomes tragic and death brings poignant loss.

Underlying not only these two questions but life itself is a third, which seems even more hopelessly beyond human ability to answer. What is the character and purpose, if it has a purpose, of the ultimate Power that keeps the universe in process? This question gathers up into itself every human interest. No theory of life could claim to be satisfying until it had done its best to search into this problem as far as humanly possible.

To have any real credibility, attempts at answers must rest upon the most convincing evidence that a broad survey of life can yield. But the farther one moves from the beaten paths of practical think-

ing, the harder it becomes to establish conclusions. And critical studies are apt to end in the skeletonized and desiccated. I have tried to avoid this outcome by emphasis upon the nature of the self as active in coöperation with an intelligent Power and upon the decisive role of value in external reality. To see that what is merely physical has enduring existence only as value for a self is to know at least the direction in which answers are to be found. Centuries of thinking by keen minds are behind this conclusion. I have scarcely more than epitomized the argument. Centuries to come will be required to bring out its implications.

The three questions posed are predominantly speculative. While considering them under the limitations of critical reasonableness, one may recognize that they transcend the utmost reach of human intelligence, and that the conclusions drawn from available evidence are at best but tentative. I am aware that the spirit of the time is lukewarm toward these problems. But they deserve the name basic enigmas. F. C. S. Schiller includes them among his "burning questions."¹ They are the final problems of a speculative philosophy, in preparation for which critical philosophy is cultivated. Whitehead fittingly defends the "Speculative School" of philosophy as adventurous, in search of new ideas.²

Much depends upon the prepossessions with which a man approaches the field of speculation.

1. *Our Human Truths* (Columbia University Press), p. 17.

2. *Modes of Thought* (The Macmillan Company), pp. 236 f.

One thinker, accustomed to proceed in accordance with the principle of theoretical doubt, may hold that it is not safe to believe anything except empirical matters of fact. Another, having a greater trust in reason, may take the empirical data as a starting-point and go on to cogent inference. The desire for critical testing of beliefs is commendable; but the habit of doubt may easily become a handicap to insight and may develop into a kind of intellectual paralysis. I would rather take a little risk than settle back without hope of progress.

CHAPTER XV

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

1

IN THE routine of daily life, when we are meeting our obligations and are free from any great anxieties, it is easy to ignore the problem of evil in its more comprehensive character. We are used to a measure of opposition, hardship, and danger, and we have formed habits of overcoming. As a rule, it is only when some serious frustration or some great sorrow befalls us that we begin to reflect and ask the question, "Why such evil?" Reflection, once begun, may readily become absorbing, for the question involves one's whole view of life.

The vague sense of a cosmic order, in which goodness predominates, makes evil a mystery. Good is taken for granted and seems to need no explanation. Evil arrests our attention. Why should there be so much evil in human life, which seems basically good? This is not a sentimental issue. It is an intellectual problem as much as any other, for we want consistency. There is general recognition that wherever intelligence is manifested, it is for the purpose of attaining a good. When we find evidences abundant that the world is the product of Intelligence, we seek some insight showing that all the forces of the universe work together for good and that evil in every form is incidental. Until this

insight is won, we have the problem of evil on our hands.

True, one may blot out the problem with the blackness of pessimism. Brooding over the adverse and depressive experiences that come to all men, one may conclude that life is evil and anything that is not evil is illusory. This way of looking at life, however, is superficial and largely false. Usually it results from hedonistic conceptions that lack rational support. Not many thoughtful persons have ever held even theoretically to thoroughgoing pessimism.

The difficulty in coming to a satisfactory solution of the problem of evil has led some thinkers to conclude that no solution is really possible, and that we must accept evil as what it purports to be, a defect in the structure of the universe. Something must, they argue, be radically wrong with a natural order that breeds so much evil. But this rather sweeping arraignment of the world in which we live puts these plaintiffs into an embarrassing position. They are hardly at liberty to assume that the ultimate Power is wholly bad and takes delight in human suffering. Against such a fantastic notion all the goods of life bring irrefutable evidence. Nor does a considered view of the world support the old-time materialism that denies all intelligence to the universal energy. Only by a colossal ignoring can one escape the affirmation of a supreme Intelligence as the source of the known universe. There is left, then, for this group of thinkers, the view that the cosmic Intelligence is good and wills the good

for its creatures but meets opposition which it must struggle to overcome. Evil originates in this opposing force. The imaginative may picture this force as a personal Satan or Ahriman, shrewd and powerful. Some, more philosophical, prefer to regard it as an eternal part of the nature of God. This view will come up for consideration in a later chapter.¹ Suffice it here to say that this theory disrupts the unity of the ultimate Power, and leads to a series of fictitious problems.

For the present the issue may be simplified by limiting our inquiry to evil as it affects human life. Later there will be occasion to consider briefly the subhuman.

A chief difficulty with discussions of evil has been the easy slip into abstractions. That which causes us discomfort holds our attention. We isolate it from its field, in which good and bad are intermingled. It stands out in our consciousness as a thing to be got rid of or avoided. Thus we are prone to look upon evil as an entity to be dealt with as one would deal with a physical object that is in one's way. So treated, evil is abstracted from its context. But since our entire intellectual world is a world of abstractions, evil as an abstraction here flourishes in its native habitat. It easily becomes the focus of thought, the topic of conversation. Evil hypostatized stands out as having an absolute quality; it is only evil and always evil. Moreover, the ills of life are often massed together into something formidable. But in reality all evils are

1. See Chapter XVII, sec. 3.

specific. Each is an experience of an individual. Explanation is balked at the outset if it tries to deal with evil in the bulk.

Everything known, remembered, or anticipated, makes a difference to the apprehending self and hence is primarily a value, positive or negative. What yields a satisfaction is reckoned a good; what hinders in the pursuit of some objective, or causes pain and suffering, is to that extent a negative value and is rated an evil. Our appraisal of a situation depends on multitudinous factors, including physical conditions, social environment, and the need of change and variety. The complexities of our emotional life make every situation unique. The same person might consider an experience evil at one time and a similar experience good at another time. What one man considers evil, another man in like circumstance might consider good. Thus good and evil are relative to the valuer.²

But to say that evil is a form of valuation is not to say that it is an illusion. It has a reality as demonstrable as has any experience; for all experiences are experiences of value.

Evil, then, is not an independent existent but is a negative valuing by an individual. If this basic truth is kept in mind and the tendency to argue in abstractions is held in check, the problem is far from being so unmanageable as it has seemed. Of

2. Cf. H. Wildon Carr: "Literally, therefore, and without any allegorical meaning, we may say that there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." (*A Theory of Monads* [The Macmillan Company], p. 288.) Carr here uses the term "thinking" as meaning the creative activity of the mind.

course, no explanation of an individual case in all its concreteness is possible; for not only has a concrete situation roots extending into all the nooks and crannies of one's past, indeed of the race's past, but there is no way of measuring values definitely. The best that can be hoped for is a tracing of fundamental trends perceptible to the thoughtful. These, however, may be sought in a study of actual experience. Let us examine the simpler experiences of life, to find, if possible, some general explanation that may then be applied to situations more complex to see if it holds there, too. For convenience, we may recognize the customary distinction between two types of evil—physical and moral.

Inasmuch as good and evil are valuations and have the fluent character of all our appraisals, I hesitate to use the words as unqualified substantives, lest the meanings take on undue rigidity and absoluteness. But simplicity of expression is desirable; hence, with a caveat here to the reader, I will continue with the ordinary usage.

2

FIRST, then, as to physical or natural evils. They beset us on every hand. One of the commonest experiences of life is the feeling of discomfort or restlessness in our immediate situation. The room is too hot or too cold. There is noise when we want quiet. However contented we may be at a certain moment, we cannot long continue so, because the world is constantly changing, which means that we also are changing. We must continuously adapt

ourselves to new conditions. Adaptations mean overcoming inertia, mean work, sometimes mean snags, and always mean the possibility of danger. We cannot sit still and we cannot move onward without hazard. We must be both venturesome and circumspect if we would allay the restlessness within and restore the emotional equilibrium, known as contentment of spirit. We become so habituated to making these adjustments and getting the satisfactions we desire that we count the inconvenience or the labor involved as merely the price we pay for a good we cannot otherwise have. The meaning of the discomfort is revealed in the good that it causes us to search out and obtain.

Consider a little more closely just what takes place. I find myself in a situation, some factors of which I do not like. I rouse myself to change those, and try to bring about conditions that will be satisfactory. In the effort I become desirous of learning the wisest procedure, or of helping someone who shares the annoyance, and I give attention to the physical discomfort less and to the new cognitive or altruistic interest more. Though I may not yet have succeeded in altering the physical conditions, my feeling toward the total situation now shows evil lessened and good increased.

By wisely directed effort I reach a stage of satisfaction. Evil has been transmuted, as it were, into good. But the desirable results of the experience have only begun to appear. Pursuing the new values, I may find great wealth of inspirations and inviting objectives for my active energies. What

seemed at first an evil has been the means of setting me on my way toward the realization of these possibilities.

The good, so far as it is good, brings contentment with conditions as they are. It is its own excuse for being. It is that which we would retain and continue to enjoy. Apparently its entire meaning is revealed in the act of appreciating it.

The evil, on the contrary, brings discontent and makes us desire to get rid of it somehow. It acts as a goad to effort, to struggle, to search for ways and means of changing the conditions. We need never take evil supinely. Evils are calls upon us to bestir ourselves and put an end to their dominance. A protected life, running its even course, is never the best. The injunction to live dangerously covers much wisdom, though perhaps, in order to guard against easy misinterpretation, it might be better to say, "Live adventurously." If good were guaranteed to us for all time, so that evil would be banished from our world—a dream of the shortsighted and the pessimistic—there would be no incentive in life, no joy of achievement, no development of our natures. Such a situation would be intolerable. The very bone and marrow of a satisfying life is the unrest and the striving, the reaching outward and upward to better things. For the educative function of life depends largely upon our dissatisfaction with some present condition.

The interpretation of evil as a spur does not contravene the more obvious fact that we are by nature forward-looking to a future that promises

what is desirable. We fix on goals to reach, we form ideals to realize. But the distance between our present position and the goal, the discrepancy between the present situation and the ideal, is a source of dissatisfaction. Now this dissatisfaction, when joined with confidence in better things to come as a reward of our efforts, is hardly rated an evil. The evil in it becomes acute only when it is considered by itself, divorced from an appealing future. But an evil isolated is only a fragment. The reality is, or should be, evil-becoming-good. The unitary whole always includes what was and what is and what will be. To sever this connection and limit consideration to evil by itself is like refusing to look beyond the dark earthy roots of a plant to their function in giving life to the stalk, flowers, and fruits that grow above ground. Recognition of the organic connection between what we may call an evil and what it is capable of yielding in the form of good sets us on the right road to insight. The attention that we give to evil by itself is pure waste. We need to concentrate on the good that may be developed. The world regarded as a powerhouse for values consists of the cosmic network of processes that call for effort on our part to direct them toward the ends we would achieve. What we account evil gives us opportunity for action.

The element of evil in the guise of unfulfilled desire is inherent in life even at its best; for at every stage of development new possibilities of good arise, new aspirations in the light of which any estimate of the present must be at least partially ad-

verse. This condition is incident to our growing nature. Difficulties may bring on discouragement, a creeping sense of failure. When we are in this mood, even the goods that we have lose much of their appeal. Why may we never attain? Why must we always fall short of complete satisfaction? When striving to realize an ideal, we rarely think of the growth in strength and insight that results from the striving. Yet no objective result could exceed in permanent enrichment the accompanying inner development. Discontent comes from a glimpse of new values. For we are headed into the future. Tomorrow belongs to today.

These reflections bring before us a fundamental distinction. *The meaning of good is revealed in the present, whereas evil yields its meaning only in the future.* The good, so far as it can be isolated, is an immediate satisfaction complete in itself. The evil requires a future for its explanation. For example, I am hungry, and I bring it about that food becomes available. The evil of hunger has led to the good of eating. Or I am restless, dissatisfied with my present condition, and I take up some definite task, or go for a stroll in the woods, or visit some friend. The evil of my dissatisfaction has led to the pleasure of accomplishment or of recreation or of social intercourse. Whenever we find ways out of our discomfort, we forget this in availing ourselves of the goods that it has called forth. Every good that we enjoy has as its antecedent condition some form of discontent or of awakened desire. The meaning, then, of evil is what it can yield of future good.

Evil is justified when the beneficent result outweighs the evil itself.

Evil foreseen may become actual, and evil experienced may increase, if action is not taken to do away with it. Hunger, if soon appeased, is only a good appetite; but if unsatisfied, it grows to starvation. Rightly dealt with, an evil begins immediately to show its nature as prospective good. Its massiveness is thus reduced. There is less and less of unexplained evil in it with the lapse of time. The good it yields becomes progressively evident, until nothing is left of the evil as a dark mystery. Seen in perspective, so to speak, an evil looms largest at the onset but diminishes as good accrues from it, until a vanishing point is reached. The evil has disappeared. It is satisfactorily explained, for it is justified by the resulting good.

Inasmuch as each untoward experience is unique, every evil has its own revelatory future in which its entire meaning is brought to light. What might be called the shadow cone may be shorter or longer; for the point at which the evil is wholly annulled may be in the near future, as in the ordinary discomforts, such as thirst and weariness, or it may be in a future more remote, as when a conflagration gives occasion for rebuilding according to plans that bring radical improvement. The most adverse conditions may be made to yield great good; but the more serious the evil, the longer must be the perspective into the future.

This treatment of the problem of evil has the advantage that it starts with a study of our ordinary

experience and finds there a principle that can be shown to apply wherever we have sufficient data. We have some ground, then, for applying it to situations that we are not able to compass in their full range. We need not fall back on unsupported faith. To apply the principle to an unknown future is not sheer presumption. All future is unknown to us except so far as we can anticipate in the light of principles. The past is studied not so much for its own sake as for the discovery of rules that will enable us to move confidently ahead.

Since nature, viewed as objective environment, furnishes the conditions that yield good or evil, the question may be raised: Is not evil inherent in some of these conditions? For example, lightning, typhoons, earthquakes, are not under man's control and certainly bring much disaster. In reply, it may be said that man is still quite ignorant and unable to turn to his advantage all that makes up his natural environment. The conditions that generate lightning he is beginning to understand and use for achievements that go far beyond anything previously possible. The serviceableness of wind is a question as to how many miles an hour we can utilize. Seismology has progressed far enough to tell us about the geographical locations, the character of building sites, and the principles of construction that are the best safeguard against damage by earthquake. The progress of the sciences is marked by a wholesale transformation of evil into good, and there seems no limit to such progress. Whatever may be the case astronomically, axiologi-

cally we certainly have an expanding universe. If the exactions of nature should be lessened, the range and quality of the possible goods would be curtailed. The rigor of natural law is no just ground of complaint. Nature as a trustworthy source of the goods we enjoy must be constant. It must be a system of conditions definite and undeviating enough to permit us to forecast results. Such a system without the possibility of mishaps to tyros is unthinkable. The dangers of living, while always serious, are greatest at the beginning of our career and become rapidly less as we learn from experience and from other people. Some intrepid scouts, growing accustomed to ordinary risks, begin to feel the dullness of security and go forth into the unknown places of the earth or the air or the deep to increase the thrill of life.

What shall be said of intense and long-continued physical suffering? So far as my observation goes, complaint on this score is more likely to come from the onlooker than from the sufferer. Necessary withdrawal from customary activities gives time for contemplation. The patient begins to appreciate goods that he had previously taken for granted. His feeling for the values of character gains unwonted vigor. He discovers new depths in his own life and becomes more sympathetic toward others. These and further refining effects enrich the patient beyond what appears to the casual beholder. The time may come when it is possible for the sufferer to say: "Dark as the experience has been, I

no longer demur, having learned what values it yields."

There is one evil that overtakes every man, however exemplary his life, and is most keenly felt by those who most fully illustrate the social virtues. It is the sense of loss in the death of those beloved. As Tennyson recognized, such consolations as "Other friends remain" and "Loss is common to the race" do not mend the break in a particular and close tie. Memory and, for those who believe in an afterlife, anticipation give the sense of a spiritual presence, transcending the limitations of time and space. But comforting reveries may become a selfish indulgence. The real challenge of the loss is not met, and good realized from the evil, until one undertakes to perpetuate and multiply in oneself and in others the values exalted in the life that is gone.

Fortunately nature does not leave any individual without some of the lessons of suffering. There are those whose burden of pain, physical or mental, is not observable. They bear up under it so valiantly and patiently that even friends are unaware whence comes the inner strength and know only that a great character is in process of maturing.

It is hardly a coincidence that those who suffer much are apt to show a growing sensitivity to indications of a life beyond life. This may seem to outsiders merely a craving for compensatory good. It may well be, on the contrary, a penetration into the deeper meaning of mundane life as a preparation for a future that is unrevealed. Running all

through the experiences of life is a symbolism that the prosperous, practical man is in danger of overlooking. It may be that the wise are those who through pain, frustration, and sorrow come to understand this symbolism. The physical, glorious though it is and essential to our present form of existence, is transient and must be sustained by what is not physical. To the responsive spirit, nature seems to speak of this abiding world.

3

WHEN we pass from physical to moral evil, we have a deeper-seated problem on our hands.

Consideration of evil in the abstract and in the mass has been even more misleading in the case of moral evil than in the case of physical evil. The doctrines of original sin and predestination, as held in the medieval church, were based on erroneous conceptions in this field. We must keep close to the experience of the social individual if we are to get a clearer understanding.

The more intimate laws of personal motivation and conduct operate in ways that psychologists have not yet been able to formulate. Moral consequences are often slow in making themselves felt. Subtle degeneration may be far advanced before it becomes evident.

Moral evil is what we disapprove in the realm of selfhood. Here we must take into account the character of the individual's choice among available goods. This choice may be adjudged morally wrong if it ignores the higher values. In theology such a

choice is called sin. In ethics it is moral evil. It is the evil of intentionally choosing less than what is known to be the most desirable good within the possibilities.

Such choices generally have the support of a strong emotional state. A desire is intense for immediate satisfaction in defiance of a good superior in quality but less vividly present. When one yields to these strong immediate appeals, one's better judgment is in abeyance. One need only let oneself go and the mischief is done. Evil lies along the line of least resistance. So impulsive is man, so easily does he fall into ways of self-deception and compromise, that all too seldom has choice no trace of moral taint.

Choice, like all the acts of man, is subject to the binding effect of habit. The wrongdoer, in his thinking and planning, becomes adjusted to the pursuit of evil. What may at first have been an adventure that promised "easy money" or "sweet revenge" tends to become with repetition a law of life, a second nature. Moral stamina weakens and the moral pervert results.

Moral evil, like physical, may range from small to great. An example of a minor moral evil will enable us to study the principle.

Let us say it is ten minutes before three o'clock. I desire to finish the book that I am reading; but I am feeling uncomfortable because I know that it is high time for me to start for the place where I have engaged to meet a man at three. If I read on, I succumb to the temptation to choose my immediate

private good, the finishing of the book, instead of the good that means the keeping of my promise and the respecting of the value of another man's time. But if my discomfort at contemplating myself in the role of moral delinquent incites me to close the book promptly and hasten to the appointed place, the discomfort vanishes, and I am at peace with myself. My judgment of moral evil in the case has proved the necessary spur to my achievement of moral good.

In the moral realm, as in the physical, a judgment that evil is imminent calls for action to ward it off. This furnishes the opportunity for the production of moral good. The moment of weighing the alternatives is of crucial importance. Hocking calls it the "threshold of consent." If the right decision is made, moral good is wrought in strengthening the will to right conduct and in bringing into conscious experience a quality of emotion that makes life richer.

With a hardened criminal, remorse is the first step toward reformation. The self-condemnation that represents a judgment of moral evil becomes an incentive toward a different course. No man is beyond hope of recovery. For a static conception of the evil will is a mistake. The will—which is the self willing—is not evil in its nature or essence when it makes an evil choice. It chooses the wrong good, despite knowledge that a better choice is possible. The attitude is perverted and reprehensible but it is not hopeless. Even the most depraved character never chooses an evil because to him it is

evil. He chooses a good, something that he desires; but he chooses it from the minor values of the situation and ignores the rest. Apart from the influence of habit, which has its own problems, the task of reforming a criminal consists in convincing him that he belongs by nature to a universal society of selves, wherein alone he can find his abiding good. In the self-centered plan of his past, he has been defeating his own best interests, and has been cutting himself off from wide ranges of values that are supremely desirable. In whatever way this insight may be brought home to him, it will, as soon as it is appreciated, start a reformation.

So far as intention goes, a complete transformation may be almost instantaneous. But as regards exemplary conduct, the upward movement may be slow and tortuous. Patience, however, will find ways to conserve the driving force of a desire to reclaim what has been lost and to build up a new life.

Suggestions of what that new life may be must come chiefly from the social environment. In other words, the major responsibility for the reformation of the criminal class lies with society. The main reason for the multitude of evildoers at present is that they have to live in such an imperfect social order as now obtains. A man persistently applies the moral standards with which he is acquainted, but these are all relative to the stage of development of the society in which he finds himself. Moral evil sets the great task that confronts society today. It is easier to criticize or ostracize or fine or incarcerate or send to the death chair than to reform. Deliber-

ately to undertake the inner transformation of one's own or another's character, perverted by habitual antisocial acts, is to enter upon the most difficult business of life. But the point that needs emphasis is that this transformation can be accomplished.

The law of consequences in physical nature operates to restrain and correct the moral recreant. Dissipation brings jangling nerves, disease, and premature death. Vice is its own nemesis.

A criminal, unless he is psychopathic, is not altogether devoid of what might be called moral intelligence, that is, appreciation of the virtues that are the essence of goodness—justice, integrity, industry, friendliness. These traits of character are the normal expression of the self's nature as social. An understanding of them constitutes that center of moral personality which is called conscience. An outlaw may have a keen sense that there is injustice in the present social and economic order. He may have a right attitude toward persons of his own class and thus be approachable on some firm social ground. But his partial outlook needs to be broadened to include the whole. His inadequate basis for judgment needs the enlargement and balance that better education would bring. He needs to have the feeling of solidarity throughout the human family vivified and made emotionally effective.

Few influences in human relationships will compare in potency with kindness and persistent good will. A sensitivity to such influences is uni-

versal among people who have sufficient sanity to understand. Friendliness should be not only persistent but intelligent. What the aestheticians call empathy should characterize the attitude of the community toward its delinquents. And empathy is only another name for that vicariousness which can, if it will, achieve redemption through self-sacrifice.

4

WE MAY conclude, then, that the world of human experience with its rich and varied content of good and evil is, so far as we can see, the best if not the only kind of world for the making of character. The forward thrust of life, the joy of triumph over difficulty, the development of intellectual vigor and moral insight, the delights of mutual helpfulness and sympathy, the aspirations toward a higher, better life than we are now living, all depend upon the presence or possibility of evil to be annulled. The good of evil is in the prevention or overcoming of it.³

When the evil is so great as to reach the proportions of a life-tragedy, the future that might explain it must stretch beyond the present world. If on other grounds we may have a rational belief that man is immortal, we have all that is needed to explain every form of evil as incident to a greater

3. Cf. George Herbert Palmer, *The Glory of the Imperfect*, p. 13: "This delight in progress, in growth, in aspiration, in completing, may rightly be greater than our exultation in completeness—joy in perfecting beyond the joy of perfection."

good in which it finds its justification. The difficulty of accepting as even theoretically adequate an explanation involving a life beyond death arises from our habit of short-range perspective. We want the total situation with its appertaining future to be open to easy comprehension. We are tempted to measure man by what is obvious—his physical conditioning, his irrationalities, his meager attainments. But man has resources that only begin to be developed in the present life. If we would understand what human beings are, we should, to the utmost of our ability, view them as they must be apprehended by the infinite Intelligence that has them in training. This is not impossible. We are doing something similar whenever we read scientific descriptions of the starry heavens or of the course of evolution. Unless we are willing to venture upon cosmic thinking, the problem of evil will forever baffle us. The evils of our present experience need not be minimized. But seen in their cosmic setting, they look far less forbidding. They appear in their relation to the world of goods in which they are embedded. Though we cannot grasp the reality in all its details, we can catch the spirit of it. We can get the broad sweep of its human significance.

CHAPTER XVI

INTIMATIONS OF IMMORTALITY

I

WE NOW face our second enigma, the possibility of personal immortality for human beings. Serious thinkers have become a little shy—or shall I say weary?—of this problem; yet no one can be permanently indifferent to it without betraying narrowness and want of feeling. This problem, like that of evil, is as old as reflective thought. The net results of all these centuries of probing and pondering leave the human mind still in doubt.

Much interest has developed in the attempt to prove scientifically that discarnate spirits exist and that under conditions not yet fully understood they can make their presence known to people on earth. The Society for Psychical Research has taken the lead in these investigations. Great skill and resourcefulness have been displayed in guarding against fraud and in conducting the experiments in accordance with approved scientific method.

The discarnate spirits, if such there be, live under conditions so radically different from those prevailing here that the symbolism used for expression is a strange language to us. Thus the psychic researchers reason. They hold that certain peculiarly endowed individuals, called mediums, have the ability to receive messages from the other

world and in some measure interpret them to the inquirer.

The occult nature of the phenomena, however, invites the unscrupulous to practice the fine art of deception. Outward conditions, such as darkness, often lend cover to fraud. Grief and longing may render the inquirer unduly credulous. Clues may be given inadvertently by the questioner or obtained in some roundabout way. The confession of Nino Pecararo, who is said to have deceived Sir Arthur Conan Doyle with sleight-of-hand tricks, warns us that the feats of spiritism must be scrutinized with penetrating discernment.

Another drawback has been the general triviality of the responses received. The psychic individuals that mediate reveal so little of value that the critical public discounts the messages as paltry. The spiritistic believer explains this commonplace character of the disclosures as incident to our inability to master the language of the other world; when we have made more progress in technique, we may expect communications of greater import.

No thoughtful person can be indifferent to the strenuous and persistent efforts of psychic researchers to discover a method of holding converse with discarnate spirits. Unambiguous evidence from this source would be conclusive, if it could not be explained by any other scientific hypothesis. Enough well-accredited data have been accumulated to make even the hardened skeptic sometimes wonder. But the laws of psychic intercourse are as yet so little understood, the influence of one mind

upon another is still so obscure, that alleged communication with the departed must be supported by exhaustively complete evidence thoroughly tested by every conceivable method before the trained thinker will be satisfied. No one today, unless perhaps an extreme enthusiast, will acknowledge that these conditions have been met. The outsider must, therefore, await with open mind the further results of these scientific investigations.

If surface indications could be held conclusive, a decision against belief in personal immortality would at present be almost inevitable. But conviction wavers, and the unrest continues, though on the part of the few rather than the many. Most people are preoccupied with the needs and interests and diversions of daily living. It is easy to put off all resolute thought about man's far-distant lot.

Yet if there is any reason to believe in a life beyond death, it would be the height of folly to ignore the possibility. In the nature of things our present is charged with the future. We are creatures with purposes and ideals. We concern ourselves with the past that we may learn how to meet the future and wrest from it the goods it holds before us. If some accident should deprive us of the power to include the future in our present field of attention, everything worth while would go. We could not even exercise the simplest volition. The outreach and quality of our hopes are, in truth, a revealing measure of ourselves. Hence we cannot dismiss the question of immortality with a wave of the hand—"It does not interest me." No aspect of

life can remain wholly unaffected by our attitude toward this issue. If our life ends with the curtain fall of death, we must cut our plans and aspirations to the limits of one brief drama. At its close all values cease for us, all undertakings are broken off. Life becomes abortive, a beginning without consummation. We barely learn to adjust ourselves to our mundane environment before we pass out into nothingness. Moreover, as death is a physical event determined by physical conditions, the physical side of life is likely to take on an exaggerated importance. The body tends to become the man. Ideals languish. They seem vague and tenuous compared with the substantial goods that can be weighed and measured. This results in profound inner discontent, a discontent that must inevitably reduce the quality of all the goods of life, since it infects our ability to appreciate them. No one need be surprised, then, that those who are unable to believe in human immortality should avoid the subject. Thinking about it would be as poison to the spirit.

But man's destiny can profitably be considered only in the light of a thoroughly thought-out philosophy of life as a whole. It is one of those baffling problems concerning human welfare that require the widest outlook. Arguments advanced in support of belief in immortality have generally been formulated from the human point of view. But the crucial question is: What is the mind of the ultimate Power concerning us?¹ We must endeavor to

1. Cf. Francis J. McConnell, *Is God Limited?* pp. 238 f.

look at human life from the cosmic point of view. We may get new light on the problem if we can find indications whether the "Determiner of Destiny" is actually interested in human beings, and whether that interest is great enough and lasting enough to justify the belief that man will live beyond his earthly course.

Is it not too presumptuous to attempt to read the mind of the Infinite? Perhaps so, if we rely upon a priori reasoning. But I propose that we should seek for evidence in actual experience. If we examine human experience to discover what the cosmic Power is now doing for us, we should be able to get some empirical evidence as to its attitude toward us.

We need to proceed cautiously, however, for the element of interpretation is never absent. Neither is it absent from human intercourse. We apprehend another's meaning only by inferring that if we did or said what he has done or said, we should have feelings of a particular quality and intensity and should think thus and so. This indirect method proves trustworthy in the main. Every normal adult has developed so much skill in using media that communication comes to seem direct. But when we have to deal with an infinite Intelligence, we must examine an infinite scroll of meanings and a bewildering diversity of emotional possibilities; and we have not acquired any great skill in finding these meanings or sensing the emotional attitudes. For the most part we content ourselves with utilizing the physical manifestations about us

for our sustenance and comfort without raising the question: What message, if any, do these concreted ideas carry concerning the attitude of the cosmic Power toward us? If with unwonted diligence we search for particular meanings in particular experiences, we encounter difficulties. For example, man learns that he can till the soil, sow wheat, and harvest a crop valuable to him in sustaining life. Is that a message of good will from the Power that makes things grow? If so, what is the message? It is almost impossible to suggest a message with definite content, for there are many possible messages. The seed even before it is sown has its values, and they are not a few. The soil in which it is planted, the sunshine, the rain, have many values, all interwoven with the endless possibilities of value in other things. The task of finding specific meanings from this ultimate Source is too great for human powers. Hence we are prone to abandon all effort to look beyond the gift.

In such a situation we must follow the method that we use in ordinary thinking about nature with its overwhelming complexity. We gather multitudes of facts into one group and form a concept that stands for each of the members of the group, but does not fully describe any one of them. Every class concept holds great funded wealth of meaning. We do not attempt to catalogue all the varying details. In like manner, when we interrogate experience to discover the attitude of the cosmic Power toward us, we may better deal with general aspects than with individual features. Accordingly,

in seeking a basis for judgment concerning human destiny, I shall take up only fundamental characteristics of the self, of nature, and of their interrelation.

The question of immortality, then, is the question whether the ultimate Power esteems man so highly as to provide for his continued existence. The evidence on which an answer can be safely founded must be sought in a critical evaluation of common experience.

Three deductions from experience seem to me to point to an abiding interest in us on the part of the ultimate Power. With the poet-philosopher who held that obstinate questionings of sense and outward things are a master light of all our seeing, I call them only "intimations."

2 FIRST INTIMATION

Is the nature of the self such as to make probable or even possible its immortality? The nature with which it is endowed should give some indication of the estimate placed upon it by the Author of its being. The evidence, in order to be conclusive, must be drawn from essential human nature, common to all.

At the outset, the intimate connection between the self and the body must be recognized. I have already tried to show that the body as belonging to the physical world is a part of our response to stimulations from the cosmic Power, and has characteristics which are grounded in that control. To have characteristics is to have limitations, but these

limitations lie in the external conditions established by the ultimate Power in the case of the human body as in the case of the whole physical world. They are those more or less yielding conditions with which we human selves may experiment, and which we may change to an extent still undefined.

From this point of view bodily dissolution at death is not a formidable obstacle to belief in an afterlife. Disintegration of the body is no new experience to any of us. It begins when life begins. Only by a persistent counterprocess can the worn-out tissues be replaced and life continue. If we should cease for just a few moments to renew the vitality of the blood, death would result from asphyxiation; for the catabolic processes go on so rapidly that in a very short time death-dealing poisons pervade the whole body if they are not neutralized by the oxygen of the air. The body can endure longer without eating than without breathing, but deprive it of food for a few days, or at most a few weeks, and it succumbs to starvation. The healthy living organism is able to keep ahead of the toxic products only through an unfailing supply of the necessary correctives. When the vital agent ceases to function, the disintegration proceeds unchecked. We are startled when death shows the speed of the catabolism. It is a revelation of what we are from the physical point of view. A sharp cleavage thus appears between the vital agent and that which the senses apprehend as the body.

The present form of bodily existence is hardly

to be accounted indispensable to the life of the self. Even here on our planet conditions may vary so much as to mean decidedly different worlds and different bodily development. If an Eskimo were transported from polar regions to equatorial Africa, he not only would find the heavens and the earth unfamiliar but would need bodily adaptation in some respects. Any human being, in passing from childhood to maturity, acquires what is to all intents and purposes a new world, and therewith a new body, without losing identity as a self. The differences are subtle but comprehensive. Nothing remains what it was. The many changes undergone in the course of life suggest that change is an essential mark of selfhood. Death may be simply a more striking change, lifting the self out of its present form of existence into another. ✓

Two fundamental characteristics of the self are such as would qualify it for continued existence. These are its power to endure and its power to grow. Consider, first, the self as enduring.

Even inanimate things, inorganic substances, abide through time. If they did not, things would not be things; the world would lose all substantiality. Yet objects have duration only as the self ascribes it to them. The reasoning that leads to this conclusion is familiar. In all actual experience the present is continually becoming the past; it is ceasing to be as present. It vanishes as it comes into existence, except so far as it can be held or reproduced in memory. The past can exist only ideally. It is that which was but is no more. Only a being

who can remember can bring it back to be compresent with actuality, and even so it must be compresent as past. The world of things, therefore, has no duration of its own. "Change and decay in all around" appear because we survive. The nature of time and of change forbids our finding permanence or continuity anywhere outside of selfhood and what the self constructs by giving the present event a history. Thus the substantial world in its substantiality can exist only for a self. It takes on substantiality as its past is rescued by the self and connected with the passing phase called the present. Our inference that the world will endure in some form through countless ages of the future, as it has through countless ages of the past, is based on the orderly sequence in our experience, a sequence that must be referred to the cosmic control. When we think of the world as enduring, we dissociate ourselves from it; and then what presumptively endures is the cosmic Power's activity, which, affecting any being like ourselves, would lead him to experience the world.

Our continued existence is shown by our ability to connect past events with the present in a temporal order. Duration, then, belongs primarily to selfhood, and secondarily to the experience world.

The self's endurance is basic but rather bare until we seek its meaning in what befalls the inner nature. The self grows. This seems incontrovertible, however little can be said in explanation of it. Duration is presupposed, and progressive change is involved, change that seems to come from within

and to be the expression of an upsurging energy.

The self passes from the infantile stage of development, in which all is simple and vague and rudimentary, through a succession of experiences that seem to awaken new powers of insight and appreciation. It is our nature to aspire, to reach out after goods that lie beyond us. This outstretch brings into expression resources that we never before have used. In mature life we are prone to ignore the change in ourselves because we are given to generalizing. We fall into a routine and think of one day's doings as much like any other day's. We eat, work, play, sleep, all at fairly regular intervals and we are overborne by repetitions. If we are not deeply interested in the happenings of the days as they pass, we come to have a feeling of monotony. Life seems a dreary round of the same duties, the same pastimes, the same renewals. But the actual experiences are all different. In their particularity there is not one feature that is repeated. We as originating these experiences under the influence of the cosmic Source of control are expressing ourselves continually in ways that are unique.

An examination of the higher functionings of our conscious life may reveal whether there are limitations that would preclude our development beyond what is possible to us on earth. The psychic activities express the essential self. We cannot imagine that the self could be a self and not think and feel and will. If the spark of immortality is in us, it is the psyche thus active. The whole self is

present in every expression of its energy; yet its activity may for convenience be considered under the three aspects—intellectual, emotional, volitional.

Thinking, from its earliest manifestation in sense perception, is a creative process; it brings into the field of consciousness that which previously had no existence. As I have already intimated, this creativity is impressive for its immense variety and scope. There is never a hint that we cannot keep on creating new objects and new panoramas.

What shall be said of memory? We remember some experiences; why should we not remember all? Partly because some experiences do not impress us deeply, and partly because remembering requires the effort of constructing the remembered experience. All that is needed to account for forgetting is indifference, neglect, mental inertia. So far as the act of remembering is concerned, it is just as easy to recall one thing as another. The differences arise from differences of stimulus, interest, familiarity, and inhibitions. By concentration of attention and persistent effort we can greatly improve the power of memory. Variability in the limits indicates that these are external to the act itself and might be extended indefinitely without modifying the nature of recollection.

Why may we not know all truth? The answer to that question is one of the truths we do not know. As in memory, so in thinking we meet limitations that belong to our finite life. In our onward

and outward reach of thought we grow weary and have to stop. But a night's rest may set us on our way again to push the boundaries of our thinking still farther into the unknown. The limitations do not inhere in the thinking process. Persons differ markedly in their ability to think, that is, to grasp the conditions so fully and accurately that they can draw valid conclusions; but nobody who thinks at all can fail to see that what truth he attains is reached by the same method as that by which the greatest thinkers arrive at truth. In thinking we have an instrument that appears infinite in its possibilities. Intrinsically it has that characteristic of universality which automatically transcends all limits. We think of space as limited, and immediately thought overleaps the boundary. We think of the atom as the limit of division, and immediately thought splits it up. We can set before ourselves ideals of attainment far beyond all recognized limitations. As thinkers we seem to partake of the infinite.

The *emotional phase* of the self's activity is somewhat more elusive. Emotions have not such definiteness as thoughts. They are less easily isolable from the concrete whole. An emotion arises out of a situation more or less definitely before the self and takes its quality partly from the object and partly from the self's own prepossessions at the time. These complex feeling attitudes are evanescent. Sometimes they shade off imperceptibly from one to another and sometimes they change with

marked abruptness. Only those which are relatively intense and sufficiently prolonged to be objects of reflection come into the foreground of attention. Moreover, as soon as we turn upon an emotion to make it the object of analytical thought, it loses most of its characteristic quality; the stirrings of emotion give place to the calmness of thought content. Then, too, in thought activity we have a common or shared world, which seems to cover a large part of our objective experience. But in emotion the case is different; each person has his own affective life, which is strictly private and unique. There is no way of generalizing emotions into emotional concepts. The individual alone knows the ceaseless changes that go on in his own feelings—changes that vary from the ripples of indifference to the surges of ecstasy and anguish.

Now these characteristics—elusiveness, variability, privacy—indicate that our emotional life is not rigidly conditioned. External factors, notably the state of one's health and the fortunes of one's interests, have their effect; but the possibility of overcoming such effect shows the internal freedom and vitality of emotion. It seems to have no intrinsic limitations.

If we turn from the more intimate aspects to the emotional activity known as appreciation or valuation, we have easier means of judging, because our values are objectified in our experienced world. The object of all our thinking and willing is the attainment of some good. For each self the range of the good is limited by the ability to appre-

ciate. But this ability may be developed.² The growth of the self can be measured in no other way so well as by the scope and character of its appreciations. Advice to forego the exceptionally good lest it spoil one's taste for common fare is never serious. Well we know that a taste of the exceptionally good will incite us to make this the common fare. It is proverbial that the luxuries of one generation become necessities of the next.

The universe as changing is constantly calling forth a change of interest. Any one situation, moreover, may be interpreted in terms of interests many and diverse. What Gilbert White gathered in Selborne, though far more than is harvested by most of us unintensive cultivators of our freehold, only hints at what experience may yield.

The chief problem of life is the organization and enlargement of our interests. Such organization is important not only in giving life its direction and significance but in opening the way to new values. Without organization the goods available are a helter-skelter mixture. The greater the number, the greater the confusion. We are overwhelmed by their multiplicity and variety. But when we find an adequate principle and learn how to organize accordingly, we can take over more and more of the values of life without distraction and give it ever-increasing wealth of content.

Growth in appreciation is well illustrated in the

² Recently a friend, to whom I was speaking of this as a gain from advancing years, replied: "Yes, I enjoy things more, and I enjoy more things."

enjoyment of beauty. The development of aesthetic taste proceeds so unobtrusively as to be almost imperceptible, stage by stage. Yet we find ourselves learning to like what at first left us unmoved. We begin to see beauty where once we were concerned only for usefulness. All nature as well as art seems waiting for us to appreciate it. Just as this collection of values is exhaustless, so may be our range of appreciation. We seem never to reach the end.

In appreciation we are for the moment satisfied. The tension of seeking is relieved; the purest enjoyment is ours. But this relaxation passes into quickened activity as we are stirred to fresh intellectual and volitional effort.

In *volition* we seem more obviously conditioned by the external Power that prescribes the fixities of our world. These fixities, however, simply mean an orderly procedure, which can be expressed in the laws of nature. And science is constantly staking wider bounds at which to locate them. They affect possibilities of fulfillment but not the nature of volition as an act.

In willing we may seem also to have more sense of inner effort than in thinking or appreciating. We often hesitate and ponder and shrink and goad ourselves. All this may be charged to volition, whereas it should be charged to our ignorance. Before we exercise volition, we must have some assurance that the result will be such as we desire. The content of volition, generally speaking, depends upon what experience indicates is possible

to us. In comparison with the widespread and intricate environment in which our will seeks realization, our knowledge is so scanty that we may expect much uncertainty and faltering. There is venture in every volition. We always face the danger of defeat. This is a powerful incentive to foresight and intellectual effort. On the other hand, we are confident that if we master the requirements of nature, we shall succeed.

Again, the differences in individuals are not limitations upon volition as such. They may be attributed in part to the amount and character of previous experience; for familiarity blunts the sense of danger, and according as we meet success or failure, courage waxes or wanes. In part the differences are due to what we call natural endowment. They are simply facts to be accepted. Some minds may get satisfaction of a sort by referring them to heredity, or even to metempsychosis. But what the sciences have yet discovered in the study of heredity is not sufficient to constitute an explanation; and metempsychosis is not susceptible of any proof. The differences in individuals have to do largely with the conditions of success rather than with the willing.

The core of volition is desire that has become determination. As soon as we know what we want and are persuaded that we can compass the conditions of procuring it, the volition is almost spontaneous. Persistence may be necessary to attain success, that is, the volition may need the continued backing of a vivid sense of the value sought.

But the act of volition is as easy in one case as in another.

So far as we have been able to discover, the only limitations upon psychic functions are external. Even these limitations, however, are not adamant. The self is conditioned, but not necessarily hampered, by its environment. Through its ability to find out what are the furthering conditions, it may make its environment a means of its own growth; and thus, by continuous discovery of better methods of conforming, it may grow indefinitely. Indeed, the conditions expressed in nature may well be looked upon not as limitations but as resources.

As has already been suggested, the self grows by creative sociality. Here, too, is no hint of limitation, for the social values available are exhaustless. If the physical universe and humanity in its full extent are yet finite, there is the infinite Power, with which the self is ever in contact.

In view of all these considerations, we may surmise that *the ultimate Power has given the self such a nature as could develop indefinitely without exhausting its possibilities*. This is only a surmise but it is reinforced by other suggestions. The very vastness of the universe reflects the vastness of our natures, for the universe as we know it is what we make of the stimulations that are our data. Again, our knowledge of the world and our participation in its activities prove that our limited intellectual and volitional life is similar in character to that of a Power capable of managing the universe.

We cannot, indeed, fail to observe the faults and blunderings of humanity as it now exhibits itself. But if we would see ourselves as the cosmic Power sees us, we should take our measure not by what we are but by what we may become if we make the most of that which is given to us. It is not necessary that we should be able to anticipate in detail the distinctive character of our development. A child cannot anticipate how his nature will manifest itself and how the world will appear to him when he is grown up. A very slight progress in intellectual and moral life means a qualitative transformation of one's whole world.

All infinities are subjective. Our experience is finite but it can take on infinity—or at least indefiniteness. When we try to think exhaustively, we must bring our own nature into the thought. Thus, as soon as we try to understand our little world of sense perception, we spread it out over immeasurable space and extend its history back through countless ages. We analyze into the ever smaller, we synthesize into the ever greater. We press for universality, as when we tend to assume that the laws of nature are without exception, and that the laws of logic hold not only for human thought but for all conceivable thinking.

If we may conclude that the selfhood we are on the way to realizing has no assignable limits, we seem to approach the cosmic view of human life and find some of the mysteries less dark. Our restlessness and discontent betoken the stirrings of a nature that the present does not satisfy. However

commonplace our outlook, however binding our routine, however trivial our aims, there are moments of inspiration when we get glimpses of a larger life. These rare insights show us where lie the abiding satisfactions. No succession of transient goods can give us that inner harmony which brings permanent peace. We weary of them unless we can connect them somehow as the unfolding expression of a life-purpose. And as the life-purpose gains in reach, these elementary and transient experiences yield greater values. We must have a purpose that commands all our vagrant interests before we can fully enjoy any of the goods of life. This impulsion suggests that the spirit of immortality is working in us though we know it not. If it is, then all the experiences of life, both goods and evils, must have direct reference to our eternal destiny and find in this reference their deepest meaning.

Our next task, therefore, is to study the setting of life to learn if possible what is its true character considered from the cosmic point of view.

3 SECOND INTIMATION

WE must now inquire whether the world of sense experience in its utmost objectivity indicates that the ultimate Power is interested in us as selves. The apparent indifference of nature has often been dwelt upon as evidence that human beings are mere by-products of the cosmic process. And nature may seem not only indifferent but hostile. What is the meaning of it all?

The answer to the question of meaning in na-

ture must be sought in the interrelations of nature and selfhood. What we spontaneously see in nature is a wide array of objects to be used if they seem desirable or shunned if undesirable. The individual objects that compose our world are individual values, which are made up of other values revealed by the analysis of our objects. Every combination of objects to form larger wholes means the creation of still other values. What further values the system might yield than those we now enjoy is a secret of the future. The enhancement of old values and the creation of new ones have gone on so rapidly since the rise of modern science that some think we must be reaching the limit. But scientists assure us that we have not begun to exhaust the possibilities.

When any of the value elements are disregarded, the object is correspondingly reduced in qualitative richness. An attempt to eliminate all value would, up to the measure of success, approach absolute vacuity. One might suppose that nature's framework or structure would remain; but even this would have to go, for it is itself a value. When science exercises its prerogative of selecting from a concrete objective situation those features which suit its purposes, it is dealing with a special group of values in order to attain by concentrated study other values not evident to the ordinary observer. Scientific abstraction reaches a limit in viewing nature as process. It thus appears as the infinite interlaced conditions for the production of values. In their changing character these conditions may

be called activities; as permanent they are the laws of nature. When we deal with the details that exemplify the laws, we work back toward the complexity of nature as we know it in sense perception. We reintroduce concrete reality.

The close connection between ourselves and the world as a world of values, positive or negative, makes nature a continuously educative influence. Every choice of ours carries with it consequences good or bad. In effect, nature says to man: The conditions of success and failure are before you; whether they conduce to your upbuilding or your undoing depends on yourself; you choose, and I will see that the results follow.

The law of consequences operates inexorably. Nature is relentless and therefore trustworthy. We must reap what we have sown. But we have power to play into the course of events and may escape one series of consequences by bringing another series into action. Practical wisdom consists in knowing from experience—our own or others'—how to meet the conditions and what in general the results will be. In ordinary affairs the gleanings of practical wisdom are sufficient to guide us to a measure of success. But every situation we confront contains unknown factors and possible combinations that we do not fully understand; hence life presents a continuous succession of problems that require forethought and detailed analysis, keeping us intellectually alert. However good our intentions, they do not count if we are ignorant

or negligent of the conditions of success. Thus we are taught by the consequences of our deeds.

There is a primary level where the self may try to evaluate nature's goods without recognizing all that is involved. It may think of goods as good in themselves without further reference. But even a little reflection should serve to show that nature is ill adapted to satisfying human needs on this basis. Goods valued for their own sake atrophy. Their value has a way of diminishing, disappearing, and even changing its nature from positive to negative. The epicure, in pursuit of disappearing value, cultivates a more and more artificial taste and finds only lessening enjoyment, growing ennui. Nature has no means of satisfying the voluptuary's inordinate desires. No increase in quantity can make up for a loss in quality. Not only physical goods but intellectual and aesthetic values may be sought for their own sake and for private enjoyment. A person may live a refined selfish life in a world increasingly illusory because detached. But such a life is in unstable equilibrium, so strong are the forces that tend to draw it from its position. Truth and beauty are too great for individual appropriation and seek a freer air.

Now if we remain on the primary level, where increasing dissatisfaction is our lot, we may blame nature and say that all is vanity and vexation of spirit. Pessimists as a class are those who have fallen by the way. They see rightly that after we have by a strenuous effort obtained the good we sought, we

are less pleased with it than we thought we should be. But they do not see the reason, namely, that the very effort put forth develops in us hitherto unawakened interests that carry us beyond the good desired. Or else they do not take up the gauntlet that nature has here thrown down. For nature never quite satisfies us. It draws us on and tries to inveigle us into growing. If we ignore the demands of our newer selfhood, the inner restlessness increases.

We soon learn, or should, that the interpretation of values on the primary level leaves most of the self, the highest and best in the self, unsatisfied. Its needs are not met. It must rise to a higher level. For the self is essentially a developing social being; it realizes itself progressively in its world, especially in its contact with other selves. If we take nature's broad hint and seek developing social values, we find ourselves increasingly better satisfied. We discover a different quality emerging even in physical goods and more fully manifest in the higher types of value. Material goods considered as merely material have quantitative limits and are consumed in the using; but when they minister to ideal ends, as, for example, aesthetic pleasure or social welfare, they take on worth that reaches beyond the limitations of the physical. Thus quantitative loss through sharing may be more than compensated by the satisfaction of supplying another's need. The higher values, such as truth, may be shared not only without diminution of worth to the possessor but with actual enhancement.

We find, then, that there is perfect harmony between nature, as a system of conditions for the production of values, and the social ideal of life for the developing self. The meaning of experience is thus flooded with light. The life according to nature is the life that appraises goods as social values that make for human progress.

But if we may affirm that nature is a system of conditions for producing values which may be rated according to their power to develop social selfhood, we reach the significant conclusion that *the physical universe is to be considered an expression of the ultimate Power's interest in drawing human selves out into a larger life.*

If the physical world, extending into the farthest reaches of space and running back uncountable aeons into the past, indicates the esteem of the causal Power for beings such as we are, we may reasonably suppose that this interest will endure and that the plans for us look toward an immeasurable future. Throughout the universe new values emerge as we investigate. Whatever be the relation between the present world and a world beyond, this exhaustless reserve of values indicates unlimited resourcefulness on the part of the cosmic Power. Provision for us even as immortal seems easily possible.

But the more we consider humanity as in training, the more we are impressed with the little accomplished in the short span of earthly life. The educative process hardly more than begins. Not without reason, therefore, we may gather that the

plans for us reach beyond the present life and that if we continue to grow toward the social ideal, we may become increasingly worthy companions of the ideal Socius.

4 THIRD INTIMATION

HAVING considered the self and nature, we are now to inquire what their interaction may show as to the cosmic Power's interest in man.

According to the account given of sense perception, objects are resultants, products of coöperation between the controlling Power and ourselves. Nothing exists for us which is wholly our own achievement and nothing exists which is wholly the achievement of the cosmic Power. Every physical object originates as a coöperative enterprise in which that Power and we ourselves work together with the utmost harmony. This coöperation interlocks much more closely than any between man and man. It is so intimate that only through careful study by many thinkers has it come to be understood. Our Coworker is so unobtrusive that we are prone to transfer our interest from the Source of control to the world that we create as expressing that control. We set that world over against ourselves and look upon it as both limiting us and affording us opportunities. Thus the reality of our universe is shifted from the causal Power to the world of effects. This narrowing of our interest to the physical world comes about through the overbearance of our practical needs. But the primary Reality is the ultimate Source of control, affecting

us momentarily and ceaselessly in a manner intricate beyond our comprehension. Its activity is of such a kind as makes possible not only a common world, which is the basis of all intercommunication of human beings, but also a changing world, which prevents monotony and provides for development.

Some changes we seem to initiate. We are active beings, moving about and exercising effort. Nature appears to receive quite readily our pushes and pulls. From the dawn of life to its end we are busy appropriating, modifying, rearranging what lies within our reach. Our impulses and needs, our desires and interests, are playing into nature with perceptible effect. How are we to explain the physical changes that follow upon our purposeful activity?

The problem taken exhaustively would include all changes that we seem to initiate whether by reflex, impulsive, or properly volitional action. For our present purpose, however, we may pass over activity that is a mere reflex or impulsive response and may consider only conations in which there is unquestionably intention or forethought.

When we feel the need of some objective good and believe we know the conditions for obtaining it, we may attempt to get the good that we desire. Such bodily adjustment as seems to be required takes place. In simple matters we are hardly conscious of the intricate processes either within our bodies or in other parts of the environment. We fix our attention upon the goal and leave nature to do the work in its own way. But if a feeling of

effort arises, the consciousness of our directive energy becomes prominent. We recognize the act as fully volitional. We have not only a clearly defined desire but a determination to realize it.

Volitional activity expresses the true nature of the self more adequately than any other function. It comprises the desire for a certain objective, some conception of method for its realization, and the committing of oneself to the realizing. Thus volition gathers the self into a dynamic unity.

Not a few psychologists of the day avoid direct treatment of the subject of volition. A theory of volition carries with it a theory of the self. Naturally any psychology without a self is here at a loss.


If we are to understand the nature of volition, we need to hold clearly in mind the distinction between productive causation and effect in the physical world. Volitional activity as usually conceived includes the immediate bodily effects. There must be an act of will initiating the sense of effort and the modifications that follow in physical nature. Without this change of attitude on the part of the self there would be nothing in the objective series of events that could properly be called the result of volition. The question may arise: Would it not be enough for all practical purposes to ignore the hidden subjective factor and treat volition as a case of orderly sequence objectively conditioned? If the term practical is understood as referring only to physical events, assent is endorsed by present-day science, which gets along very well without the idea

of productive causation. But if by the practical is meant that which conserves human interests, the answer runs deeper. We want to understand what nature really is, and what we are, and what power influences us in our having experiences. When such interests as these take the lead, the question of causal efficiency becomes paramount. We cannot advance a step without encountering it. But because we are habituated all our lives to constructing the objects that constitute our sense world, and because we become engrossed in these objects which supply our vital needs, we have some difficulty in passing from the world of picturable effects to the world of real causes. Yet even a little training in the subject of productive causation would make it familiar ground. It is a world in which we need to be oriented, for there we shall find both ourselves as thinkers and doers, and the ultimate Source of power. There too we must find the solution to problems of meaning and destiny.

As active beings we are effecting changes in nature continually. These changes vary from the slightest tension of a muscle to those great achievements of human prowess and skill which are the boast of our civilization. Each movement of ours requires that our environment should be adjusted thereto. If you carry a book from the shelf to the desk, everything in the room is affected. The center of gravity for the room is changed, the distribution of light, the relation of that book to every other object. What is true of the room holds in proper degree for the house or any larger unit that includes

the room. In accordance with the teaching of science concerning the interrelation of objects in the physical world, we must conclude that a volitional change appearing first as muscular movement extends in its effects outward an indefinite distance—how far we may not be able to say. Any limit we might set would be arbitrary or would depend on our inability to measure diminishing effects beyond a certain degree of fineness.

How are these commonly accepted facts to be explained? We might say that it is the nature of the objective world, when set in motion in however small a part, to carry outward this motion with diminishing intensity, following the laws discoverable by science. But a scientific formulation of the way in which motion is propagated furnishes a description that does not touch our problem of causation. We want to know what causes the extensive adjustments following upon our volition. To say that nature makes the adjustments is to rest in the fiction of a pervasive force. To say that the adjustments are such and such following a law is to describe without explaining. Some real power must bring about the results. There is no alternative to this conclusion. That which effects the change we call the cosmic Power. Question whether it is able or not is out of place; for it is called the cosmic Power because it does as a matter of fact accomplish these marvelous results. If we get even a faint glimmering of their complexity, their accuracy, their nicety of discrimination, their instantaneous effectiveness, we have an overwhelming sense of the

intelligence operating in nature. And if we realize that these intricate activities follow upon our volition, we find something distinctly personal about them. 

Let us examine the situation more closely to get a clearer understanding of the factors involved. What actually does a man contribute in an effective volition? In moving the book you seem to start the physical series by your bodily functioning. Your hand and arm lift the book and change its position; then the effects go on beyond your immediate environment. But upon critical study we find it impossible to separate our bodies from the rest of the physical world. They are a part of external nature. If we are to distinguish the volition from the results that follow, we must recognize that the effects upon the body are included in the results attributable to the cosmic Power. Whatever we know as taking place in the sense world is a part of our experience and is therefore our response to the control exercised upon us. A change in the response presupposes a change in the control. Hence we must conclude that when we affect nature through willing, our volition leads to a change in the manner of control or form of stimulation and results in a modification of our constructive response. The human contribution, then, does not extend beyond volition as a psychic activity.

In volition there is an uninhibited desire, an all-absorbing idea, a prevailing choice. There could hardly be a more appropriate expression for the act of will than James's "fiat." The self indicates

what it would like done, and the ultimate Power converts the volition into a cosmic deed.

This account of volition furnishes the complement of the story of sense perception. In sense perception considered as mere apprehension of physical objects constituting the outside world, we seem to be under the control of the Power not ourselves. We are actively receptive—if that expression is not too paradoxical. While our response to stimulation is constructive, it is held within limits by the form of the control. In that way the cosmic Power affects us. But in volition we affect the cosmic Power. We cause it to change the form of its activity upon us. The transaction, then, between the cosmic Power and ourselves is not one-sided but reciprocal.

We may continue our analysis. If by the mysterious way of willing you move the book from the shelf to the desk, every observer must thereafter see it not in its old position but in the new. While this is ordinarily assumed without much concern, it is freighted with meaning for reflective thought. Volitional changes that you occasion in your world are accompanied by corresponding changes in the world of every other percipient. In other words, the cosmic Power in response to your volition changes the form of its control not only for you but also for other individuals. These changes are not duplicates, alike for all, but are perfectly graduated and adjusted to preserve the orderly character of each one's world. To speak briefly and objectively, we can effect changes in the common

world called nature. All that nature means to us as individuals and as a social whole results from this interplay of what objectively are physical forces, but actually are the reciprocal activities of the ultimate Power and ourselves.

At first this outcome of our analysis of volition seems too much for us to believe. It is far beyond our comprehension how adjustments in the case of any given volition could be made with direct reference to the volitions of all other individuals at the same time. But science itself is training us to believe the incredible. The world in which we live is infinitely complex, and any explanation of it must provide for all its complexity. Much that passes for explanation depends, if not upon a show of words, at least upon a simplification of the facts. These are bulked together and labeled, and then the labeled bundles are taken as units. We may talk in abstractions and seem to elucidate the experience of productive causation. But to put content and meaning into our words, we must draw upon the facts as experienced when we exercise volition; and the facts remain as stubborn in their individuality as ever. Yet these are what we have to explain. Search as we may, we find no explanation of causal connection except in the interaction of personalities.

Inasmuch as the foregoing explanation bears some resemblance to seventeenth-century occasionalism, it may be well to bring into relief the differences. Occasionalism originated among the early Cartesians as they faced the mind-body prob-

lem. Descartes' dualism of extended matter and unextended mind made it difficult to see how the two could directly affect each other. Geulincx, Malebranche, and others, assuming that all power is of God, argued that what seems to be interaction is in fact God's direct intervention. On occasion of a certain volition of mine, for instance, God causes the appropriate change in the physical order; and on occasion of certain changes in the physical series he causes my sensations to correspond.

This doctrine issued from a realistic conception of the physical universe. As the theory of a dual reality slowly gave way under criticism, and physical things came to be viewed as processes, occasionalism was modified accordingly. The tendency was to give some initiative to the mind or self; but a positivistic attitude was also evident. It was easy for the critic to reduce the self as well as objective things to mere process. Another interesting change appeared when the conception of God as an intelligent Being, ruling his universal dominion, was replaced by the conception of the Universe itself. Thus for certain influential thinkers all became pure process and change alone was real. These thinkers were simply endeavoring to exhibit the logical outcome of their assumptions. But the outcome was pitifully barren and far removed from the human experiences that were to be explained. In depersonalizing the self these thinkers did away with the only reality we know at first hand. Without the self as our empirical archetype, we can have no ground for affirming intelligence anywhere in

the universe, and all flattens out into a process in which nothing proceeds. The only way to escape this logical impasse, it seems to me, is to start anew with human experience and hold to it as the source of all our insight. We may then take the self for what it is—a thinking, feeling, volitional center that affects its environment and is affected by it. But as we have seen, this conception must be welded with that of the phenomenality of matter. Then we are free to pass from these conclusions to the question, “What is it that conditions us?” and find the answer that it is a dynamic activity, which points to a cosmic Power as its originator. The resulting type of occasionalism may be stated thus: On occasion of specific contacts with the dynamic order, finite selves are aroused to construct their experience world; and on occasion of certain volitions on the part of selves, the dynamic order in its turn is affected, so that the selves obtain a measure of satisfaction for their desires. Dependence of the selves upon the ultimate Power is interpreted in the light of experience. Thus the original occasionalism is transformed into a thoroughgoing dynamism.

If we would see our desires realized, then, it behooves us to observe the consistent methods of activity of the cosmic Power in nature; for these activities constitute the conditions upon compliance with which our success in volition depends. Fortunately for us the dynamic transaction between the cosmic Power and ourselves can be thus translated into physical processes. These may be under-

stood and utilized with comparative ease. They form an abacus on which we can work out computations otherwise beyond our ability; for we are not skilled in calculations of intangible motives and desires and purposes and influences. We should always bear in mind, however, that nature is the objectification of psychic attitudes and activities. The physical world is but an embodiment of our contact with the cosmic Power. These contacts are definite and definitely conditioned; and the conditions are as exacting and as expressive of orderly connection as are conditions in objective nature.

But how is it that if the cosmic Power is interested in human welfare, he carries out our volitions in strict accordance with the objective conditions whether we will the good or not and whether the result is what we intended or something wholly unexpected? The miscreant plots against his neighbor, and yet the cosmic Power carries out the evil purpose with the same promptness with which he responds to the beneficent volition of the philanthropist. The boy does not mean that his movement shall set off the gun, but the bullet goes home just the same. This lack of discrimination seems to indicate that the cosmic Power is indifferent to us. How is the matter to be explained?

A basic condition of normal living in a physical universe is that the laws exemplified therein shall hold under all circumstances. If they were irregularly intermittent, if the world were not a cosmos, we could not advance in knowledge; for knowledge depends upon the trustworthiness of nature's laws.

We could not know that one situation of a specific character would be followed by another of a certain sort. The world would be topsy-turvy. No calculation as to the future could be trusted. The strength of resolution would be paralyzed. If we are to live our lives with any satisfaction, if we are to grow in knowledge and self-control, if we are to realize the untold goods that lie about us, we must have a world that can be depended upon in all its processes. Orderliness in nature means that when conditions are met results follow inevitably.

The ultimate Power, then, undertakes to carry out any volition of ours whenever we comply with such natural laws as are involved in the particular case. This impartiality betokens not that the Power is indifferent to us, but that it is interested in us all—the just and the unjust, the blundering and the wise—and wants us all to learn by experience. The strict impartiality of natural law is an ever-present sign that the ultimate Power trusts us and is willing to let us have our way within unhampering limits.

If we have read aright the implications of volition, the seemingly incredible is not only an everyday but an every-moment experience. During our waking life we are never completely passive. Hence these cosmic adjustments must follow one another in unending succession. Each must be complete in itself and yet so adapted to the others that the orderly character of nature is not disturbed. Marvelous as are these results in the outside world, we should not let our thought remain fixed on the

objective situations involved. The human mind is always tempted to look upon physical objects as independent of us, as existing in their own right, and as devoid of meaning. Objects thus thought are acknowledged abstractions. Their activities seem at best to express only natural law. But in the inner world of causal contacts between the cosmic Power and ourselves the very essence of existence is meaning. Here those conditions of success which appear outwardly as the laws of nature are seen to be in reality the cosmic Power's modes of action. Their rationale may be found only in the cosmic purposes for us.

Volition, then, so far as physical effects are concerned, is tantamount to a request on our part that a certain change take place. The Power behind nature responds; and the effect is seen first in our bodily activities and then in the general environment. The language that we use in making our request is the fulfillment of conditions. If what we desire were done for us without our meeting conditions, the result would be such chaos as would render knowledge and progress impossible. The requirement that we should use the language of adjustment to conditions is our intellectual and moral salvation. Compliance never fails of accurate response.

The constant coöperation of the ultimate Power with human selves in the production of the sense world and in the adaptation of the cosmic process to human volition seems clear evidence of a deep and abiding interest. Such profound concern car-

ries an intimation of some comprehensive far-reaching purpose in the dealings with mankind.

5

IF the self is capable of unlimited development, if nature as a world of values is a training place for selves, and if the ultimate Power is in constant interaction with human selves in the world process, then anticipation of existence continued beyond death seems not unreasonable. Death is reduced to an incident in a progressive course. It marks no sudden shift to a reincarnation without continuity of memory, but is presumably not other in nature, though more striking in form, than the change that we experience at adolescence.

In these three aspects of life the interest manifested by the ultimate Power is on a scale so great as not only to justify but to need to be justified by a belief that we are destined for an immortal career.

CHAPTER XVII

THE ULTIMATELY REAL

1

OUR third enigma is the ultimate reality. Certain phases have already been discussed in Chapter V. The data then before us included, first, whatever constitutes the causal world as the omnipresent conditioning environment, and secondly, the constructive work involved in our having a common world of objects. But at that point in the development of our general theme we had not considered the nature and outlook of the self. It remains, therefore, in the light of the later discussions, to carry forward the results reached in Chapter V.

The conclusions that seemed well grounded in our experience of a common world were as follows.

(1) The ultimate reality is a power and not a mere process. A process, considered in itself, is essentially a temporal succession, of which only an end event is actually present. The past members of the series no longer exist. As events, they appeared one by one in their brief present and then ceased to be. But a disappearing specious present, or a succession of such, cannot be an independent reality nor account for continuance of activity. The activities that compose the world-process must be the continuous energizing of a power that main-

tains itself through all the changing forms of its manifestations.

(2) The ultimate reality is a unity, transcending space and time. The chief evidence for this conclusion is the continuity and coherence of sense experience for the individual and for the social whole. Nothing that is spread out in space can have the requisite unity; and nothing that is subject to temporal succession can survive a present unless it is continuously reproduced.

(3) The ultimate reality is intelligent. This inference is drawn from nature's orderliness, which cannot be otherwise explained. The study of the physical universe has been and still is the main field for the exercise of human intelligence. As I have said, many scientists feel that only a beginning has been made toward an understanding of all that can be read out of nature.

Having considered in Part Two various aspects of selfhood as exemplified in our own experiences and in human history, we are in a position to take up some further issues concerning the nature of the ultimate reality. Even though the suggestions are only hypothetical, that is, reasonable surmises, they will be of the same sort as all human inferences, and need not be wholly without value.

2

FIRST, is the ultimate reality a person?

In the history of reflection many answers to this question have been argued. The two straightfor-

ward answers, the affirmative and the negative, admit of ingenious qualifications. One of the most appealing is the assertion that the ultimate reality is not strictly a person, because it is much more; it is superpersonal. The reason for taking this position is easy to see. A self as known to us is finite; and we cannot ascribe human limitation to the Absolute—the favorite appellation used by those who hold this view. The Absolute is the All-in-all and cannot be brought within the confines of a self. Whatever is of positive content in the notion of selfhood might be taken over as representing to finite thought the least inadequate conception of the Absolute but could not go far toward completeness.

This line of thought is variously developed by those who hold the negative view. It seems to be the only way of escape from the fatal admission that if the ultimate reality is not a person, it is something less, that is, it is impersonal. This would be essential materialism. But it is practically impossible to refer in any significant way to the Absolute without implying characteristics of selfhood. For instance, the Absolute is a thoroughgoing unity embracing all variety, is pure sentiency, is infinite energy.

This view that the ultimate reality is superpersonal includes so many conflicting motifs and is withal so vague that it is difficult to criticize. Writers who, for fear of anthropomorphism, shrink from characterizing the fountainhead of all being in terms of selfhood turn hopefully to various

conceptions drawn from current scientific thinking—system, process, growth, and the like. Extremists, who exalt the ultimate reality so far above everything human as to leave no definable content, have a continual struggle to avoid identifying their “most real being” with empty space or space-time. But to make any use of this cosmic emptiness they must pack it with infinite potentialities, and then from somewhere supply a “*nisus*” or a “principle of concretion” to transform the potentialities progressively into actualities. Thus the universe evolves or emerges. If with Whitehead¹ we attribute to the principle of concretion the development of the actual in accordance with the potential, we may profitably veer away from the receptacle of infinite potentialities which lie beyond all conditions and fix our attention upon the principle itself. I question the appropriateness of the term “principle.” If it means, not merely a generalization from the manner in which the universe unfolds, but rather the agent that brings the entire process into actuality, it is what I should call a self.

Montague also finds refuge in the hypostasis of “principle.” He says: “It seems rather that the thing or principle responsible for the origin of nature as we find it was a power of fecundity, self-repetition, or increase, and that the only hope of ascribing to it *mind* or *life* would depend on showing that those categories are interpretable as later phases, ‘emergent’ yet inevitable developments of

1. *Process and Reality*, p. 374.

the principle of development itself. . . . Such would seem to constitute the 'immanent dialectic' of the concept of increase or growth, a *That* whose *What* consists of *being ever more than itself*. Of all our concepts, this notion seems to me best suited for a first principle or absolute *Prius*."² Clearly Montague is reading into the term "principle" all that is required to originate and sustain the endless variety of activities in the ever-changing universe. This "principle" works as if it knew all the details of the universal process and as if it operated with reference to the future. Here again is confusion of a concept with the dynamic reality—a most devastating confusion.

Henry N. Wieman seems even more abstract in defining God as "growth of meaning and value in the world."³

With the contention that the cosmic Power is superpersonal we may agree if person is defined in terms of human limitations. But as has already been argued, there are no intrinsic limitations in the three distinctive psychic characteristics of the human self—knowing, appreciating, willing. Hence we may think of the cosmic Power as realizing these characteristics in fullest measure. It may know all there is to know, may enter completely into every conceivable value, may actualize immediately all that it wills.

If in accordance with preceding arguments we

2. *The Ways of Things* (Prentice-Hall, Inc.), p. 534.

3. *Normative Psychology of Religion* (Thomas Y. Crowell Company), p. 51.

regard the ultimate Reality as the power at work in the world, its causal efficiency must be a fundamental characteristic. Analysis of the idea of a cosmic force shows the impossibility of accounting for its self-maintenance and continuous activity unless it has such characteristics of selfhood as memory, foresight, and volition. Since our quest carries us beyond the strict operationism of the natural sciences, we must conclude that all efficient causation requires a doer having the essential characteristics of a self. Herein lies the answer to the question raised in an earlier chapter—whether the causal efficiency represented by the inertia of physical things is of the same nature as our own volition.⁴

Pluralists inquire whether a sufficient explanation of experience may not be found in a society of finite selves without postulating a supreme cosmic Self. A reply is to be found in arguments already presented for conceiving of the ultimate reality as a unitary power. If finite selves alone are independently real, there seems no escape from solipsism, and there is no adequate rationale for the world process.

A passing word may be in place as to the question whether a body is necessary to the life and effectiveness of a self. Must we hold that if the ultimate Intelligence is to be thought of as a self, we need to take into account a body? A categorical yes or no is not possible. Our own bodies mark the scope and limitations of our power to express

4. See p. 35.

ourselves and react upon our environment. The self puts forth a body, it lives in its body, it manipulates its environment by means of its body, and it is subject to bodily conditions for its efficiency. Yet the self as the originator of thoughts, emotions, and volitions is a real agent, and hence distinguishable from even its bodily manifestations. In the opening chapter I quoted a suggestion that the physical world is the "body of God." The general line of argument that has now been developed rules out a literal interpretation of such a view. The physical world as known to any individual results from his own constructive activity in response to stimulation from the causal order. Our common world is a human invention, enabling us to communicate with one another; it has no other existence or significance. Accordingly, there is no independent physical universe, such as is assumed by those who would regard it as the body of God.

Let me gather up these various considerations. Everything that we know speaks of a power not ourselves that is at work in nature. A power that can maintain orderly activity throughout a universe unimaginably complex, from beyond the microscopic to beyond the telescopic, exceeds our human standards to such degree that even the word infinite seems rather poor in content. If we analyze closely, we find that in our own activity this power coöperates, not only exercising the control that enables us to construct our sense world, but making such adjustments as realize our volitions and yield the countless goods that we enjoy. All this

is explicable only on the ground that the power thus active is both intelligent and profoundly interested in us and therefore has a purpose in his dealings with us. If the word personal is the best we have to denote such characteristics even though on an infinite scale, let us not hesitate to speak of the ultimate Power as personal.⁵

3

SECONDLY, is the ultimate Power good?

At the outset we meet a query similar to that which was raised as to personality. Should we not think of the ultimate Power as supermoral? If by supermoral is meant having a different system of valuations, a different code from that of human beings, I do not hesitate to agree that he is supermoral. We ourselves are supermoral, in this sense, with reference to our outgrown codes. But to hold that the ultimate Intelligence is supermoral in the sense that he is not bound by the principles of justice and benevolence, or that he is not in any way responsible, is, to my mind, absurd. If there were empirical evidence that in his dealings with mankind he is morally indifferent, we should hardly rate him as supermoral or nonmoral but rather as immoral. He knows what he is doing and is therefore responsible. He is the most deeply obligated being, for he can always have his way.

Now when we begin to realize how transient are the values that we get from nature, how much labor

5. Use of the masculine pronoun hereafter will be a convenience, though ideas of human limitation should be excluded.

it costs to get them, how much danger besets our every move, how permeated is all life with pain, sorrow, and defeat, we ask ourselves, Can the ultimate Power be really beneficent and allow human beings to suffer so much?

In earlier times men might be content to trace evil to an adversary, like Satan. But as thought deepens, the conception of control divided between a good and an evil power in the universe becomes intolerable. Then begins the effort to couple the source of evil in some way with the source of good. May not the supreme One, though good in will, be limited by an intractable part of his nature which results in evil? The theory of "a finite God" is continually appearing in some new form.⁶

The strength of the argument for the finitude of God lies in the prevalence of evil in the world as experienced by human beings, though the finitist turns to subhuman life and geological ages for further confirmation.

To this theory that God is limited by a non-rational part of his own nature I find two principal objections.

(1) The theory builds upon a faulty conception of evil. The finitist seems to regard evil as an existent of some sort rather than as a negative value. Let us look again briefly at the nature of evil.

6. For a recent presentation see Edgar S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, chaps. viii-x. The subject is treated both historically and critically by Rannie B. Baker in *The Concept of a Limited God*.

To set good and evil over against each other, as having the same rank although they are opposed, is a misreading of experience. Evil is evil only with reference to the good and has a strictly ancillary status. In Chapter XIV I have tried to show that evil finds its *raison d'être* in affording room for growth toward good. Consider the discomforts that arise from our being enmeshed in a physical world. We feel the chill of a cold day but we can soon be warm again by taking the trouble to don an extra wrap or light a fire. If we can put an end to the discomforts readily, we drop them out of memory or regard them as factors that make life more stirring. They call into activity our various powers, physical and mental; they introduce an element of uncertainty and of challenge. We name them evils only when they are much intensified and may not easily be overcome.

At that stage the finitist turns them into a cosmic problem. He talks of hurricanes and tidal waves and volcanic eruptions, and says that the ultimate Power, if good, must be impotent to prevent these things; otherwise, why should he not have made the universe after a better plan? Anyone who raises this question should realize that, in order to bring about a human existence of unalloyed bliss, the whole structure and procedure of the universe would have to be changed. No one has yet shown how the suggestion could be carried out without cosmic disaster. To imagine such modifications, or rather constructions *de novo*, is beyond finite intelligence. We live in a world where the law

of consequences holds absolutely and hence we are required to make adjustments in accordance therewith. If we are wise and courageous, we prosper. But if we are not discreet, if we do not anticipate consequences and prepare for them, we pay the penalty. All the evils, therefore, that spring from nature are unmistakable evidence that we still have problems of adjustment to solve, that there is still opportunity for achievement, for discovery and invention. The human race has not come to the end of its tasks and is still under the tuition of nature. Ours is an exhaustless universe. As we advance in ability to control physical forces, we acquire new interests. To satisfy them compels us to put forth more energy, to think more persistently, to take greater hazards, and thus keeps us on the frontier of insight and valor. We are driven to realize the necessity of working together to eliminate the dangers and overcome the difficulties. What we call civilization is a coöperative enterprise on a large scale. When nations fail to coöperate, devastating wars result. The adequacy of nature, whereby not only the simple needs of primitive peoples but the ever-more-exacting demands of civilization are satisfied, would suggest that the power working throughout the universe and coöperating with us is achieving a purpose of profound human significance. Before we pass judgment on his goodness, we should try to understand in some measure what the purpose might be.

But the finitist continues: How about monstrosities and vestigial structures and the develop-

ment and extinction of whole genera of animals? In reply a man cannot say very much, for he does not know very much; and realizing this he will do well not to dogmatize. If he could know exhaustively the histogenesis of a monstrosity, he might find factors fully accounting for the development. In any case, the uncommon specimen exemplifies in extreme form the universal principle of the uniqueness of the individual. Again, structures that served their purpose at one time and later under changed conditions have become vestigial still serve a purpose in linking the present with the past. Though they may seem allowed to linger a long while, they help to draw out our sense of continuity through time. As for whole genera of organisms that cease to be and give place to different forms, we have no other than the human basis of judgment. Individual animal forms presumably live their own lives and have their own experiences. If we say that they are enjoying their existence or that they suffer much, we are judging their experiences from the human point of view, that is, we are assuming that we understand how they feel. This is legitimate in a general way; but there is always danger of error in judging others by ourselves, and greater danger the more they differ from us. Whatever we say, therefore, about subhuman forms of life must be said tentatively and with apologies to them. It is presumption to pronounce that they are failures. When they are studied with scientific care, they are found to exemplify the laws of life as well as higher forms.

What may be their destiny as individuals we do not know; we have not a ray of light on that subject. The dying out of a type in the evolutionary process can mean only that late individuals in a succession representing perhaps a million generations are no longer adapted to their environment and hence leave no progeny. This is at least an impressive example of the fundamental law of change. Even though we may think of animals as having our own elementary desires, we must, for the most part, deny to them the more intellectual sources of human misery—regrets and remorse for past mistakes, anticipation of possible ills.

There seems, then, so far as human insight has yet reached, no real evidence of hesitancy or trial-and-error method in nature's processes. Because the mills of God grind slowly, they need not be supposed out of order. The points brought forward as perplexities testify not to impotence in God but to power exuberant if not sportive, patient as in possession of eternity, and versatile without fear of exhausting resources.

The only significant question pertaining to the infinity of God is whether what he does accomplishes his ends. We are never wholly in his secret and cannot pass final judgment; but the weight of evidence appears to favor the affirmative. Never in our experience does the sun fail to come up, nor the tides to rise and fall, nor the earth to bring forth her bud. The physical sciences in their investigations proceed on the assumption that the physical universe forms a system, every part of which

sustains a definite relation to every other. They find it an intelligible, 'orderly whole. The only suggestion of another conception lies in the theory of indeterminacy or uncertainty in quantum physics; but Planck, originator of the quantum theory, argues that the uncertainty relation is not incompatible with "faith in a rational order of the world."⁷

(2) Another objection to holding that God is limited by a nonrational part of his own nature is that the theory builds upon a faulty conception of selfhood. Just as an external source of evil violates cosmic unity, so an internal source of evil violates the unity of selfhood in God. Brightman's conception of the self as consciousness or experience lends itself to an analysis into which "The Given"⁸ can be introduced. I have already recorded my reasons for not accepting this idea of the self.⁹ And I have indicated why, in the case of the human self, the given should be regarded as outside and not within experience.¹⁰

7. Max Planck, *The Philosophy of Physics*, trans. by W. H. Johnston (W. W. Norton & Company), pp. 62-78.

8. Edgar S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion* (Prentice-Hall, Inc.), p. 337: "The Given consists of the eternal, uncreated laws of reason and also of equally eternal and uncreated processes of nonrational consciousness which exhibit all the ultimate qualities of sense objects (*qualia*), disorderly impulses and desires, such experiences as pain and suffering, the forms of space and time, and whatever in God is the source of surd evil. The common characteristic of all that is 'given' (in the technical sense) is, first, that it is eternal within the experience of God and hence had no other origin than God's eternal being; and, secondly, that it is not a product of will or created activity."

9. See Chapter VI, sec. 4.

10. See pp. 14, 81 f.

But can we harmonize with the idea of a good God what is termed moral evil, the exercise of the evil will? This question must have its answer. The evil will is a fiction and has no existence on earth or elsewhere. An intelligent will—and there is no other kind—never wills evil for the sake of evil. A volition is always the act of an intelligence more or less conscious of what it is doing. Unless the act shows evidence of intelligence, it falls below the level of volition to the status of a reflex. Now all intelligent activity is engaged in to satisfy a want. To that extent it aims at the acquisition of a good. When there is little intelligence and strong desire, the good aimed at may be slight compared with the evil that follows in its wake. The so-called evil will is the uneducated will. Life's disciplines have not yet accomplished for it what they have accomplished for the good will. God has us in training to become like himself in self-mastery and constancy and ability to enjoy the highest values. The method he employs can be explained without impeachment of his goodness.

Some hold that the conception of God as finite, struggling, sometimes thwarted, brings him closer to humanity. It is true that we want a sympathetic God. But this means only that we want a God who understands and can help. A God who is infinite in his nature would be able to understand our difficulties and feel our infirmities far more thoroughly than would a limited Being. If, as I have been trying to show, God is coöperating closely with us moment by moment throughout our life,

he must have the full measure of sympathetic understanding. Such sympathy in whatever evil comes to us means suffering in a sense applicable to the Divine. God suffers not because of his own difficulties but because of ours. In like manner human sympathy that is worth anything as comfort in sorrow means genuine suffering. This kind of suffering is truly vicarious, as is the cross at the heart of Christianity. And we want the sympathy of power, not of weakness; a sympathy that can make even our heaviest sorrow, our most depressing sense of unworthiness or loss, work for us a far more exceeding weight of glory.

4

THIRDLY, is immediate experience of the ultimate Reality possible?

Inasmuch as mystical experience has been analytically treated by numerous philosophers,¹¹ I will here take up only certain aspects, upon which the philosophical view that I am setting forth has direct bearing.

Typical experiences of mystics are often intense, even overpowering. The ecstatic intensity raises questions in the minds of those who are less susceptible of emotional fervor. May not these experiences be pathological? It is well known that they can be closely imitated by the use of certain drugs. Release from prolonged emotional strain may re-

11. E. g.: W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 341-441; J. B. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 337-479; F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, I, 311-324.

sult in exaltation that rivals in glow and imaginative sweep the visions reported by mystics.

This likeness of mystical ecstasy to other experiences, not so far removed from the ordinary, offers a favorable approach. All our sense perceptions are accompanied by emotion, though much of this is mild and not worthy of special note. The most familiar objects of sense perception are all valuations. If we had never before seen a tree or a house or a suspension bridge, the wonder of the sight would be a thrilling experience. But as we become accustomed to the objects about us, we lose the feeling of wonder, and tend to regard them as mere articles of utility. They become part of our prosaic world. They are subject to analysis and manipulation. The emotional element in our experience of them is relatively less, and the intellectual overrules. There is nothing of the mystical about them that we can distinguish; for the analysis and intellectual reconstruction, and all the relating activity that connects the experience with others, are carried to the limit of our needs. Nevertheless a poetic genius may look upon what to us is commonplace and see strange meanings in the objects of this humdrum world. He finds something new, something that the intellect has not been able to analyze and mechanize. For him, and for others with whom he shares his insight, the objects forthwith have an emotional appeal that is akin to the mystical. As we advance from simple everyday objects to the rarer and more complex, the greater become the emotional possibilities.

When we reach those exalted experiences that are too vast or involved or intimate to be understood, emotion becomes the dominant element. Thus there seems to be a direct relation between the unanalyzed or unintellectualized in our experience and the mystical.

It is significant that the great mystics aver their inability to describe their characteristic experiences adequately. Emotion is not easily put into words. When a mystic undertakes to study the experience as he would any other that stirs him profoundly, he finds it possible, though not always very congenial, to assimilate it in some degree to the rest of life.

When we ask whether immediate experience of God is possible, we need to examine what the term immediate experience means. Under the conditions of our present life the beginnings of experience are found in sense perception. As has been seen, sense perception is a constructive activity of the mind when stimulated from beyond itself. No experience, whether of sense objects or of intense emotion or of abstract reasoning, is possible without activity of the mind; and *this activity is the experience*. Accordingly, if immediate experience is understood to exclude work of the mind, one might say that there is no immediate experience. Or, on the ground that the activity is the mind's own, one might say that all content of consciousness is immediate experience.

The self's experience of itself as owning its experiences has the first claim to be called immediate.

Yet mental activity is certainly involved. But self-experience does not particularly concern us here.

To the naïve mind the ordinary objects of sense perception seem to declare themselves immediately. They are apprehended without conscious effort. But when reflective thought seeks to understand the complex nature of the objects and of their relations to one another, and seeks also to learn why some perceptions prove to be erroneous, it is forced to conclude that before objects are perceived, some form of stimulation starts the mind upon what is really a rather elaborate construction. In elementary perception the mind works with such speed that consciousness overtakes it only after the work is done. We are conscious of the result but not of the process. Sense perception, then, is not immediate experience understood as the appearance of an outright datum in consciousness; nor are there, as ingredients in perceptual experience, elementary data merely presented. The naïve idea is right insofar as it means that we can have valid knowledge of objects, but wrong in that it ignores the mediating processes of intellection through which this knowledge is obtained.

A flash of insight may seem an immediate revelation. It comes apparently without effort. It may have the form of imaginative vision or of unusual generalization from experience. A new and deeper meaning of life may emerge. But such an insight is no more immediate than is the apprehension of objects in sense perception. Protracted thought

doubtless preceded; and the mind, at some moment when it was fresh and alert, saw a likeness or a connection that it had been unable to perceive before. When strong emotion accompanies the discovery, consciousness of effort is completely submerged and vividness is taken for immediacy. I believe that Montague is right in seeking to explain intuition by recognized mental activities—memory, imagination, and reasoning.¹²

Do we have immediate experience of our fellows? From the beginning and in everyday contacts we are not conscious of reasoning or drawing inferences to the presence of another person. Especially in intimate relationships we feel that there are no barriers. Our natural tendency is to find fellowship everywhere. All our interpretations begin on the human level. A little child confers humanity generously on his world; pets and playthings he treats as persons. Growing older, he becomes more discriminating. Through a process of reduction, eliminating human characteristics to whatever degree is necessary, he gradually achieves an ordered world, with objects ranging from the human through lower types of life to the simplest forms of the inorganic. There is no way of understanding the objects that constitute our world except in terms of our own essential nature. The first impulse is to interpret the presentation as a self that can presumably think and feel and act in one's own fashion. When this interpretation is confirmed by further experiences, it promotes a

12. *The Ways of Knowing*, chap. ii.

social life that may grow into ever fuller mutual understanding. We are spontaneously and persistently social.

To the question, How do I know that other minds exist? many answers have been proposed.¹³ They are open to two main criticisms. Either they put knowledge of other minds too far off, after a chain of reasoning; or they assume some given or intuitive knowledge. The answer that I am defending avoids both these faults. In consequence of the subject-object form of consciousness, we get, in the beginning of knowledge, something other than ourselves; and since we must interpret in terms of our own selfhood, we naturally try to make our object another self. The tests of the imputed selfhood are the usual tests of validity. Knowledge thus obtained is as direct as any that is possible to us. Yet it is not something mysteriously given or intuited; it is a result of the self's own creative activity.

Our present physical conditioning seems to be thoroughgoing. There is a rather widespread impression that sentiment and perhaps thought, being insubstantial, can pass from one person to another—or, if “pass” is too suggestive of the spatial, can affect the object—without resort to the physical. This is a naïve belief in telepathy. But when due allowance is made for coincidences and for difficulties in observing subtle change, there seems to be no incontrovertible evidence for unmediated

13. Cf. George A. Coe, *The Psychology of Religion*, pp. 254 ff.; John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God*, pp. 205 ff.

influence. When communication is not impeded by untoward conditions, we are scarcely conscious of the physical media or the private valuations and inferences in social intercourse. John Baillie, although seeming to make our knowledge of other minds a different "mode of consciousness" from our knowing of "the corporeal world," properly insists that the recognition of other minds is never given save in conjunction with perception of the bodies associated with them.¹⁴ I know you through a physical this and that; but you mean to me not the physical this and that but a presence, a personality. We experience meanings. They are found to be true or false according as they do or do not meet the tests of practical life; in other words, the tests that determine their validity lie outside the experiences themselves.

These reflections are especially pertinent when we are considering the problem of Deity. Do we experience God directly? Must interpretation and inference come in and bring doubt? Those who would fain answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative are willing to give realism here a last stand. Let us, they say, have a God wholly independent, without alloy of our subjectivity; and let us know him by intuition, beholding him in his glory.

In what precedes I have argued that there is an independent reality on which all else depends, and that this independent reality has the characteristics of selfhood. But our knowledge of this reality, like

14. *Op. cit.*, pp. 213 f.

all our knowledge, comes through interpretation and thought activity. It is vain to cling to a passive kind of knowing. The self's greatness is manifested in its active nature. Even with the inner eye there is no beholding that is a mere impression from without. Receptivity implies reaction. And even if knowledge as something given, a light bestowed, were possible, such an experience by an individual would not of itself prove the existence of God nor reveal his character. Intuition would not be self-certifying; it would be open to doubt and would need verification. Hence it would have no superior claim to validity.

The account of sense perception as beginning in stimulations from the independent Power shows finite selves as in constant interaction with that Power. The changing world is evidence of his unremitting activity. As has been said, we do not experience the stimulations that are his activity upon us, but we respond by creating our world of sense perception. And when we exercise volition to bring about some change in that world, we in turn get a response. If we may thus find in ordinary sense knowledge and in the results of volition proof of the presence and activity of God, we have a stronghold easily defended.

But to be aware of God as the ever-present cause of our commonest experiences requires a decided modification of our usual way of looking at life. Such patient discipline as is practiced by the mystic will be necessary to make the insight not merely an intellectual conception but a vivid experience.

It may then result in a new manner of living, in which the deepest convictions and the highest purposes are confirmed, enlarged, and unified.

5

IN conclusion, certain other matters concerning the ultimate Reality may be noted.

We live in a world of ceaseless change, but we are ever seeking therein some element of permanence.¹⁵ We are uneasy with the transitory and are always trying to substitute for it something that we can trust to be there when we want it again. In desiring permanence for the objective we continue our interest and thus make instantaneous events into values, which we call things. The things that we create out of the transitory have a relative permanence, but sooner or later they go the way of events. They change beyond recognition and pass into something else.

Science is a determined and systematic effort to find the permanent. Since individual things are always changing, the scientist looks for permanence in what lies between, that is, in the relations of one thing to another. When he has discovered in these relations a uniformity that holds under repeated test, he announces a law of nature. In this way he succeeds in replacing the unmanageable particularity, the utter transitoriness of events, with a world which in structure at least may be relied upon as holding through the flux. All our sense of

15. Cf. Ralph Tyler Flewelling, "The Need and the Illusion of Absolutes," *The Personalist*, XXI (1940), 119-128.

security in the midst of change hinges upon this scientific replacement, which offers a relative permanence. But man is discovering that the laws of nature may be statistical in character. Since the world to which they apply is infinitely complex and ever changing into something other than it was, it can never be reduced to the monotony of law. Every definite situation comes new in its details. Not a determinate world but an intelligible world is the fundamental faith of science.

Permanence, whether in objects or in natural law, is derived from the permanence that belongs to selfhood. We know our changing world as substantial because we are not of it. We are no prey for the ravages of time. In that sense we have a timeless nature. Our experiences are ever new, but we abide through them all. Just as our changing objects derive substantiality from our continuance of interest in them, so the world derives a trustworthy stability from the plan of the controlling Power. There is such order and method in the universe as we may translate into natural law; but the law has not the dead rigidity of mechanical sameness. The astronomer must even mechanize an imaginary "mean sun" upon which to base his calculation of Greenwich time. The orderliness of the world is rather such as reveals the steadfast purpose of a living intelligent Self. The laws of nature are the promises of God.

After we have once reached the idea of the ultimately permanent, the problem for thought is to construe the relation between the permanent real-

ity and the changing world. How can the timelessly permanent be the source of change? Many have been the struggles in the past to reconcile these two necessities of human thought. If the permanent is the source of change, must we not carry change back into the permanent and make it changing? The only light we have on this problem comes from within our own natures. Our experiences succeed one another and each is different from those which have gone before. Yet we keep our identity throughout life. In like manner we may think of God as ultimately permanent yet ceaselessly active in his contacts with finite personalities—and otherwise, for aught we know.

Our insatiable thirst for the permanent, which leads the scientist to find conservation in the physical world, is the impelling urge in our religious nature. We seek that which will conserve the supreme values of life. Since all values depend upon this discovery of the nontransient, the more the values appeal to us, the more we want assurance that they will abide. Only those values which can be related in a vital way to the Power that is cosmic in range of activity and is the Source of all permanences can be considered ultimately satisfying. Now when we see that this cosmic Power is always working with us and giving meaning to whatever emerges above the threshold of consciousness, we find ourselves in everyday life brought into the presence of the Eternal. The changing character of experience is but the flowing expression of our connection with this ultimate Constancy, this

absolutely permanent Reality. And we partake of his permanence. Nothing can disturb the peace of one who has entered into this rest. And nothing can so strengthen us for the never-ending struggle of life as the consciousness that we are thus linked with a progressively active Reality whose nature we can describe only by the paradox—permanence in change.

The heart of our world of values is the fellowship of selves. The supreme values are assuredly real only as they are shared. If we try to live without giving ourselves to the production of the higher social values, the persons that constitute our society become for us mere tools, means for getting the kind of goods that an acquisitive individual can understand and appreciate. On the other hand, if we devote ourselves to the realization of an ideal society, we not only improve the quality of our own self-expression in the social whole but find society becoming for us essentially the ideal we would realize in it. In this way even the low-vaulted social life about us may be, though but in the beginnings, a *civitas Dei*.

In ordinary intercourse we reveal for the most part only our superficial and conventional interests. We are shy of other people, whom we know and trust but little. We hug safety in shallows and evasions. But when mutual friendliness prevails, reserve disappears. Sympathy opens one's nature until the depths are disclosed. In an ideal society of good will, each person would share the spiritual life of others, always novel and exhaustless in its

human appeal. There would be perpetual enrichment of one another. Only in such wise can normal spiritual life develop; for the essence of the spiritual is the social.

There is some truth in the contention that as we mount upward, familiar features of personality seem to recede. But this is not to be interpreted as meaning absorption in the Infinite. In our highest experiences it is not self-consciousness nor consciousness of values that is obliterated but self-reference. In other words, we come to a realization of our nature as wholly social. We become conscious of a self that we hardly dare to think of as our own, so near of kin is it to the divine.

On this upper level we can view the changing world in its true character as the self's interpretation of divine activity and watch the self develop toward that which doth not yet appear save as likeness to the ultimately Real.

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